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ABSTRACT

PHYLOGENY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE VICISSITUDES OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE ANXIETY OF ATAVISM

By
Frank Pittenger
December 2017

Dissertation supervised by Daniel Burston, Ph.D.
This cross-disciplinary dissertation provides a missing intellectual history of an
ostensibly dead idea. Once widely held and no less elegant for its obsolescence, the
principle of biogenetic recapitulation is best remembered by its defining mantra,
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” Among psychologists and sociologists as well as
embryologists, the notion that the development of any individual organism repeats in
compressed, miniaturized form the entire history of its species enjoyed broad (if not
uncontested) acceptance through the early twentieth century. The author reexamines the
origins of this theory in the work of Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel, and traces its
influence in psychology from early psychoanalytic theory to late twentieth-century
evolutionary neuroscience. It is argued that recapitulationism (or the “biogenetic law”)
appealed to psychological theorists for its moral and affective implications, rather than its
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scientific merit or usefulness in generating testable hypotheses. Central to this study is an
emphasis on the use of recapitulationism to critique doctrines of evolutionary and social
progress. The dissertation concludes that for contemporary neuroscientists no less than
early psychoanalysts, the ghost of phylogeny, or the evolutionary past, is most often
summoned to explain worrisome and unexpected disruptions in normal human
development—especially when those disruptions emerge within what is taken to be the
height of modernity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
“I saw him extend his short flipper of an arm for a gesture that took in the forest, the
creek, the mud, the river,—seemed to beckon with a dishonouring flourish before the
sunlit face of the land a treacherous appeal to the lurking death, to the hidden evil, to the
profound darkness of its heart” (Conrad, 1899/1999, p. 104; emphasis mine).
Somewhere near the bottom of the dustbin of developmental psychology lies a
simple idea. Once widely held and no less elegant for its obsolescence, the theory of
biogenetic recapitulation is best remembered by its defining mantra, “ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny.” Among theologians, psychologists, and sociologists as well as
embryologists, the notion that the development of any individual organism repeats in
compressed, miniaturized form the entire history of its species enjoyed broad (if not
uncontested) acceptance through the early twentieth century. Only with the rise of
Mendelian genetics in the nineteen-twenties did natural and social scientists begin to
cease searching for the outlines of the species within the specimen. Yet by the last quarter
of the twentieth century, biogenetic recapitulationism was so thoroughly repudiated—and
so unquestionably taboo—that Stephen Jay Gould (1977) saw fit to open one of the first
postwar studies of the topic with the understated admission, “I am aware that I treat a
subject currently unpopular” (p. 1; see also Boakes, 1984; Butterworth, Rutkowska, &
Scaife, 1985; Wray, 2009).
Things were not always so. Long after evolutionary biologists had traded their
embryonic comparisons for Punnett squares, subtle iterations of the principle of
biogenetic recapitulation exerted a profound influence upon the psychological sciences in
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the United States and Europe. This tendency is at once most controversial and least
understood in the case of Freudian metapsychology. As is well known, Freud’s
recapitulationism grew more pronounced even as the theory itself fell by the wayside
among biologists (Dufresne, 2000, pp. 54-57; Otis, 1994). Previous explanations of
Freud’s unwavering commitment to the biogenetic principle, however, have failed to
address the curiously tragic use he made of the ostensible parallels between ontogeny and
phylogeny. Indeed, even after it had been abandoned as a plausible mechanism of natural
selection and individual development, recapitulation remained invested—or in Freudian
terminology, cathected—with a highly moral anxiety.
As I argue throughout this dissertation, the latent psychological functions of the
biogenetic principle (rather than its scientific or theoretical veracity) account for the
idea’s pattern of emergence, disappearance, and return from the late nineteenth century to
the present—and this in spite of the so-called neo-Darwinian synthesis by which it is
unequivocally rejected (cf. Gould, 1988; Ruse, 2006).1 While originally a theoretical
mechanism attesting to cultural and evolutionary progress, in psychological contexts
recapitulationism has repeatedly been invoked to explain its operation in reverse. A
theory of a parallel devolution, “Haeckel’s law” has been used to explain the process by
which psychological function appears to regress according to a phylogenetic legacy
1

The emergence of the modern evolutionary (or “neo-Darwinian”) synthesis in
the early twentieth century tends to obscure the relationship between what were once
competing theories of heredity and evolution. While the present study focuses more or
less exclusively on pre-Mendelian theories of heredity—specifically those involving
embryology, natural selection, and postnatal human development (i.e., ontogeny)—the
more familiar histories of eugenics and “Social Darwinism” unfolded in tandem (and
often at odds) with Lamarckian and recapitulationary ideas. On the relationship between
such theories and recapitulationism, see Richards (1987, pp. 512-548) and Bowler
(1983). For the origin and critique of the language of “Social Darwinism,” see
respectively Hofstadter (1959) and Bannister (1979).
2

preserved in the unconscious and the brain itself. For contemporary neuroscientists and
evolutionary psychologists no less than Freud, the ghost of phylogeny, or the
evolutionary past, is most often summoned to explain worrisome and unexpected
disruptions in “normal” human development—especially when such phenomena unfold
within what is taken to be the height of modernity.
Chapter 2 locates the earliest appearances of this trend within the mature thought
of the German evolutionist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), whose systematization of the
biogenetic principle provided recapitulationist theories with a trans-disciplinary
explanatory power. While Haeckel was the first to present the biogenetic law in its
modern form, the most abiding features of recapitulationism were those established by
Freud in his so-called middle period. As I show in analysis of certain evolutionary trends
within late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Anglo-American developmental
psychology (Chapter 3), Freud’s curious reversal of the biogenetic law in the form of the
death drive actually amplified prior, more tentatively framed features of psychological
recapitulationism.
Far from being merely the “biologist of the mind” that some postwar historians
have branded him (Sulloway, 1979), in basing his metapsychology and philosophy of
history on the biogenetic principle, Freud was also a moralist, who transformed the
manifestly progressive, teleological spirit of nineteenth-century evolutionism into a
vehicle for expressing a kind of cultural-critical anxiety (Fromm, 1970; Rieff, 1959). As I
show in Chapter 4, at some point during the First World War, Freud (e.g., 1915/1957c)
came to understand recapitulationism as a bi-directional process, one in which the
ontogenetic reenactment of evolution becomes subject to reversal. From his first forays
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into the material that would appear in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to his final
published writings, for Freud and his followers evolution would always carry with it the
capacity for devolution.
While this particular development has been well documented within the
historiography of psychoanalysis (e.g., Makari, 2009; Rieff, 1959; Spurling, 1989;
Sulloway, 1979), the intellectual-historical reading that follows sheds new light upon the
origins and “afterlife” of evolutionary metapsychology. Though previously neglected, the
tragic dimensions of the biogenetic law have been the one consistent feature of its
psychological applications, a pattern observable everywhere from Haeckel’s Generelle
Morphologie der Organismen (1866) to the “paleopsychology” of the early twenty-first
century (e.g., Bailey, 2002; Haeckel, 1874/1900a; see also Di Gregorio, 2005; Richards
2008). Considered more broadly, this study also reveals the manner by which postnineteenth-century psychology has appropriated and reshaped ostensibly progressivist
scientific theories for moral, critical purposes (cf. Holmes, 1983; Young, 2006). Indeed,
as I show in Chapters 4 and 5, the principle of biogenetic recapitulation achieved its most
lasting influence at precisely the moment of its scientific demise and obsolescence. No
longer a viable biological theory, recapitulationism came to function as an all-butinvisible explanatory bridge between celebrations of modernity and fantasies of
primitivity.
Freud, of course, was not alone in clinging to recapitulationism well after it fell
out of favor (Morss, 1990; Otis, 1994). Thus while the first psychoanalyst occupies a
prominent place throughout this study, my broader emphasis is on the incompletely
understood process by which psychological recapitulationism (a) rose and fell as a pan-
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explanatory evolutionary-psychological theory, (b) saw itself transformed into the
philosophical basis for the tragic metapsychology that found its most definitive
expression in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1961a), and (c) transitioned
into something of an afterlife through postwar neuroscientists’ and evolutionary
psychologists’ appeals to the reenactment or reemergence of “primitive stages” within
human ontogeny.
There is, of course, no shortage of documentation of early psychoanalysts’
varying forms of recapitulationism. Freud, Carl Jung (1912/1916), Otto Rank
(1924/1993),

and

Sándor

Ferenczi

(1924/1989)

grounded

much

of

their

metapsychological theories on appeals to the psyche’s reenactment of human evolution in
individual development (Dufresne, 2017, pp. 229-236).

Outside of Freud’s circle,

prominent developmentalists like G. Stanley Hall (1904, 1907), James Mark Baldwin
(1895/1968, 1903, 1915), and, to a lesser extent, Jean Piaget (1926/1975, 1978) also
endorsed versions of the biogenetic principle (Gould, 1977, pp. 139-165; see also Morss,
1990). Missing, however, from most existing treatments of these intellectual genealogies
is an attention to the tragic sensibility that the biogenetic principle came to bear.
Ultimately, this anxiety of atavism—of the resurgence of ancestral traits in the course of
“normal” development—became the conceptual mouthpiece for an abiding skepticism
towards the viability of civilization and sanity.
Such skepticism toward teleological accounts of individual and social
development notwithstanding, the story of recapitulationism told here also reveals some
unusual dimensions of Anglo-American psychology’s efforts to reconcile natural and
cultural history within the development of the individual mind. As we will see, efforts to
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discern the repetition of human history within individual development have been far more
durable than one might expect, and not only among the more avowedly psychoanalytic.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, “Haeckel’s law” made substantial
inroads in education and developmental psychology as well. More recently, attempts to
locate a compressed, atavistic evolutionary past in the immediate, individual present have
shown up in elaborations on Paul MacLean’s “triune brain” theory (e.g., Bailey, 1987;
Koestler, 1968; Linden, 2008; Sagan, 1977). Most telling or all have been applications of
such research to the conceptualization of aggression and trauma (Bailey, 2002; Levine,
2010).
Now no less than in the early twentieth century (and however disguised),
contemporary instances of recapitulationism carry a decidedly moral tone. Compare, for
instance, the following two excerpts from essays on child-rearing, one published in 2008
and the other in 1918:
1. There is no such thing as a modern infant. The modern individual begins
his career at precisely the same point at which the cave-man started.
(Wells, 1918, p. 371)
2. [B]etween your child’s first and fourth birthdays, his rapid maturation will
greatly resemble a superfast rerun of ancient human development. It’s
thrilling to watch as the same great achievements that took our primitive
ancestors eons to master spring forth in our children over the space of just
three years. (Karp, 2008, p. 6)
Of these two characterizations of children as evolutionary “primitives” tasked with
recapitulating eons of evolution in a few short years, the more recent is undoubtedly the
more playful; “greatly resemble” lacks the stalwart conviction of “at precisely the same
point.” Still, the endurance of this theme over the ninety years separating these colorful
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assertions testifies to the persistence of recapitulationism well after its demise within
evolutionary biology.
And so what of this persistence? There is something about a dead idea that elicits
skepticism from both historian and psychologist. In order to account for recapitulation’s
rise, demise, and remarkable “after-life,” I show that what first developed as a core
principle of evolutionary biology was transformed into a tragic metapsychology in the
hands of early psychoanalysts. This transformation is strikingly evident in works like
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and the posthumously published Phylogenetic Fantasy,
where, in a Nietzschean mode, Freud speculates that human evolution has always borne
the capacity for “involution” (Freud, 1920/1961a, p. 50). Indeed, following its
repudiation by evolutionary biologists, recapitulationism became a key theoretical tool
for social scientists attempting to “localize” the tragic directions of human history within
contemporary brain anatomy. Whether described as death drive or reptilian brain, the
persistence of the phylogenetic past in everyday ontogeny came to mean that
development contained its own antitheses.

A Note on Terminology
Anyone that wades into the history of recapitulationism may be forgiven for
feeling quickly overwhelmed by a flush of peculiar jargon. Besides being a gifted
illustrator, the German evolutionist Ernst Haeckel, who systematized the biogenetic law
in its modern form, was as well an inveterate neologist. As with his evolutionary and
social theory, some of his semantic innovations (e.g., “ecology” [Ökologie]) have proved
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more lasting than others.2 While I have done my best to define the more obscure of these
terms when they do appear, the following requires clarification from the outset.
First, “ontogeny” refers to the process of individual development; “psychic
ontogenesis,” for instance, means the phasic sequence of individual psychological growth
from infancy into adulthood. Second, “phylogeny” refers to the evolutionary history of a
species. Thus Haeckel’s (1874/1900a) “Phylogeny of the psyche” refers to the evolution
of the human mind across natural history (vol. 1, p. 23). To say, then, that “ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny”—the chief tenet of the (variously branded) biogenetic law,
biogenetic principle, and biogenetic recapitulationism—is to say that individual
development reenacts or repeats the evolutionary history of its species. Psychologically,
this means that in the process of maturation a child must traverse in compressed form the
entire evolutionary history of the mind.

Historiographical Survey
Scholarly treatments devoted specifically to the moral and philosophical
dimensions of recapitulationism are relatively few. This is particularly true of the idea’s
intriguing persistence beyond the nineteen-twenties.3 That said, the topic is broached in
several studies that discuss the biogenetic principle’s place within the histories of

2

Gould (1977), if it is any consolation, found it advisable to supply his readers
with a glossary of recapitulationist terminology, despite presumably addressing an
audience already initiated into the area’s idiosyncratic lexicon (pp. 479-486).
3
This observation does not, however, apply to the development and fate of the
specific scientific claims of embryological recapitulation, which have been well
documented. For an account of the specifically biological issues surrounding
recapitulation theory from the nineteenth century onward—as well as the theory’s
afterlife within contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, or “Evo-Devo,” see
Hall (1992, pp. 48-65).
8

evolutionary biology and psychoanalysis. Invaluable as cultural histories, these
treatments have been somewhat less informative with respect to the moral, critical
purposes that recapitulationism came to serve en route to its ostensible demise. By way of
explaining this curious lacuna, I briefly discuss below the place of biogenetic
recapitulation within the relevant postwar historiography.
The earliest and most widely cited treatment of the cultural history of
recapitulationism appeared in the first section of Stephen Jay Gould’s aptly titled
Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977). Unusual in its structure as well as its subject, Gould’s
work was essentially two monographs in one, with largely distinct arguments advanced in
two separate sections.4 In the book’s first section, Gould (1977) set a rather high standard
of historical scholarship, “quoting verbatim every important statement on the nature of
relationships between ontogeny and phylogeny” (p. 5). Besides providing a foundation
from which to argue for the continued relevance on some retooled version of the
biogenetic principle, Gould’s text succeeded in situating recapitulation theory within a
longer intellectual history, one that stretched from the pre-Socratics to nineteenth-century
Naturphilosphen to the eventual ascendance of Mendelian genetics.
While not of immediate relevance to the present study, it is worth noting that the
second section of Gould’s (1977) text provided one of the first postwar reappraisals of the
biogenetic law. At the risk of criminal oversimplification, Gould argued that the apparent
recapitulation of phylogeny within ontogeny is in fact one (but not the only) form of
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Gould’s approach confused some of his readers in the natural sciences. One
reviewer confessed to finding the book’s “historical review of the relationship between
ontogeny and phylogeny … to be rambling and largely irrelevant,” and suggested that
“Gould would have done better to have written a thinner book which would have been
read by more workers” (Bock, 1978, pp. 431-432.)
9

“heterochrony,” the process by which changes in developmental timing (i.e., differing
rates of individual development across descending generations) may be accelerated,
retarded, or displaced in response to selective or environmental pressures. Recapitulation,
Gould (1977) concluded, “was not ‘disproved’ …. It was, instead, abandoned as a
universal proposition and displayed as but one possible result of a more general
process—evolutionary [i.e., naturally selected] alteration of times and rates to produce
acceleration and retardation in the ontogenetic development of specific characters” (p.
206).5
Gould’s study also demonstrated the place of recapitulationism in two areas of
particular relevance to the present study: early twentieth-century developmental
psychology and psychoanalysis. Whether in the hands of Hall or Baldwin, of Freud or
Ferenczi, developmental and psychoanalytic theories of human growth tended to invert
the appeals to recapitulationism then fashionable among eugenicists and ethnologists. As
Gould (1977) argued, instead of appealing to the biogenetic principle to characterize the
primitive as a child, such figures preferred “to ask what comparative anatomy and
evolutionary history had to say about the nature of children” (p. 135). Whether through
education research or psychoanalytic archeology, the manifest primitivity of the child
bore witness to the presence of a latent prehistory (cf. Morss, 1990). And yet, Gould
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While my focus in this dissertation is largely confined to recapitulationary
psychologies, Gould’s revision and resituation of the biogenetic principle provided the
foundation for the most obvious living descendent of Haeckelian recapitulationism: the
burgeoning field of evolutionary developmental biology, perhaps better known as EvoDevo. Pioneers in this area have written their own history faster than is typical in most
sciences, which is curiously fitting, given the reappraisal of the recapitulation theory
involved. On this see the essays in Laubichler and Maienschein’s (2007) From
Embryology to Evo-Devo, as well as Wray (2009).
10

noted in his brief exegeses of key texts from this period, little attention has been paid to
the centrality of recapitulationism in the development of these fields.6
While Gould effectively demonstrated the influence of some form of
recapitulationism on everyone from Democritus to Dr. Spock, his exhaustive survey of
the idea’s history was undertaken in order to justify a more exclusively biological
argument regarding the importance of developmental timing in evolution. Again, far from
a cultural-historical interpretation of the persistence of an otherwise dead idea, Gould’s
(1977) was “primarily a long argument for the evolutionary importance of
heterochrony—changes in the relative time of appearance and rate of development for
characters already present in ancestors” (p. 2). An analysis of the moral use and meaning
of recapitulationism was as remote from his project as his theory of paedomorphosis and
heterochrony is from mine.
If Gould’s (1977) scope was ultimately too biological to shed much light on the
moral valences of recapitulationism, Celia Brickman’s (2003) Aboriginal Populations in
the Mind brought both the insights and the limitations of postcolonial theory to the topic.
Persuasively locating a “covert racializing subtext within the discourse” of early
psychoanalysis, Brickman (2003) connected her readings of the field’s early texts to the
racial scala naturae of fin de siècle Europe (p. 6; see also Brickman, 2002; Wallace
6

Cf. Gould’s (1977) remarks on G. Stanley Hall’s textbook, Adolescence: “few
modern scholars appreciate the central role of recapitulation in defining both title and
subject” (p. 143); and on Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: “Statements
like these have been cited before as isolated testimonies to Freud’s conviction. But the
central role of recapitulation in his entire system has rarely been noted” (p. 156).
Sulloway’s (1979) Freud: Biologist of the Mind, which had not yet been published at the
time of Gould’s writing, gives due diligence to the place of recapitulationism within
Freud’s thought. Because his text has so dominated debates surrounding psychoanalytic
evolutionism (and was comparatively silent on the trans-disciplinary history of the
biogenetic principle), my analysis and critique of Sulloway’s work appears in Chapter 3.
11

1983). In so doing, she argued that the language of psychic “primitivity”—still common
within the discourses of psychopathology and evolutionary psychology—continues to
carry the same colonialist implications amidst which it was first formulated. While her
research was directed more toward envisioning a de-racialized psychoanalytic theory than
exploring the afterlife of the biogenetic law, her success in illuminating early twentiethcentury psychoanalysis’s connection to nineteenth-century evolutionism is suggestive.
Taking her cue from Gould’s (1977) abridged intellectual history, Brickman
demonstrated the colonialist origins of Freud’s attempt to transform the biogenetic
principle into social-psychological theory.
Not unlike the many recapitulationists she discussed, Brickman’s (2002, 2003)
argument was at bottom a genetic one, in which meaning is a function of origins. Noting
the intertwinement of early twentieth-century developmental psychology, psychoanalysis,
and the discourse of racial superiority, her interpretation also led to moral questions
similar to those that recapitulationism was once used to frame: “Does an ontogenetic
theory of development in psychoanalysis necessarily imply a phylogenetic one?

Is

psychoanalysis necessarily racist?” (Brickman, 2003, p. 73). As important as these
concerns are, they also reflect the same “anxiety of atavism” that sustained the biogenetic
principle well after its demise among evolutionary biologists: In worrying that the
colonialist dimensions of psychology’s “phylogeny” might be repeated in the “ontogeny”
of psychoanalytic treatment, Brickman provided both an interpretation and an example of
the afterlife recapitulationism has enjoyed.
In a brief (and rather stridently written) monograph, The Meaning of Evolution,
Robert Richards (1992) offered a less presentist evaluation of the historiography
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surrounding nineteenth-century recapitulationism. The subtitle of this text—“The
Morphological Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin’s Theory”—
effectively summarized Richards’s argument there and in other works (e.g., Richards,
1987, 2008), much of which was addressed to contemporary neo-Darwinians like Gould.
Among his stated aims was a demonstration of Darwin’s commitment to such heresies as
transcendental morphology, Lamarckian inheritance, and, naturally, the biogenetic
principle. Indeed, his genealogy undergirds much of the analysis of Haeckel’s thought
that I present in Chapter 2.
Richards (1992) also succeeded in revealing an alternately hagiographic and
polemical trend in the scholarly literature surrounding evolutionism and the biogenetic
law (viz., the “ideological reconstructions” of contemporary historians of science). In a
sense, this kind of intellectual-historical splitting (if one may use the language of
“primitive” ego defenses) explains the failure of previous historians to account for the
tragic dimensions of Haeckel’s psychology. For the purposes of the present study,
however, Richards’s (1987, 1992, 2008) research is most compelling in its success at
demonstrating the degree to which nearly all nineteenth-century evolutionists subscribed
to a manifestly progressivist view of psychological evolution. Far from being a “personal
fancy,” Richards (1992) showed that Darwin’s belief in the progressive, unilinear
character of evolution “was deeply embedded in the structure of his theory” (p. 115n).
The merits of the above notwithstanding, existing scholarship still fails to account
for two key developments since the early twentieth century. First, Freud and other early
psychoanalysts ultimately stripped the biogenetic law of its teleological, progressivist
implications. (In fact, as I show in Chapter 2, Haeckel’s thought had actually planted the
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seeds for this shift well in advance.) In the place of the previous century’s manifestly
optimistic vision, Freud offered an essentially tragic account of humanity’s phasic
reenactment of its past. Rather than a compressed progression from primitive to modern,
the ontogenetic instantiation of the phyletic past came to mean that modernity itself was
given to progressive reversals—and that these reversals could be observed at the level of
individual regressions. The primitive-ancestral ceased to be one of so many
developmental milestones, and, like the “flipper” that replaces an arm in Conrad’s
(1899/1999) Heart of Darkness—came to haunt the modern with the omnipresent
possibility of its atavistic expression.
Second, existing cultural histories of the biogenetic principle tend to stop with the
idea’s apparent demise around the nineteen-thirties (e.g., Gould, 1977; Richards, 2008;
Sulloway, 1979), a development that I reexamine in Chapter 3. Given, however, the
popularity of attempts to “localize” alleged regressions to the phylogenetic past within
neural ontogeny (e.g., Bailey, 1987; MacLean, 1990; see also Harrington, 1991),
Haeckel’s discredited law seems to have proven surprisingly durable. Whatever the fate
of the biogenetic principle among evolutionary biologists (Gould’s [1977] reformulation
notwithstanding), recapitulationism continues to exert a pull on the popular-psychological
imagination.
As will be clear throughout, the above features of recapitulationism’s
historiography make this study something of a two-headed beast. Of these the first, which
discusses pre-war intellectual history (Chapters 2, 3, & 4), is necessarily the more
prominent, an imbalance that deserves some explanation: While the continuity of
recapitulationism as a driving concern within fin de siècle evolutionism, developmental
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psychology, and later psychoanalytic metapsychology is routinely noted, it is rarely given
center stage in cultural or intellectual histories (cf. Masuzawa, 1993; Rieff, 1959; Ritvo,
1990; Winter, 1999). It seems as if the biogenetic principle has been something of a
bridesmaid within the historiography of evolutionary biology and psychology, always
playing a supporting role but doing so with its own biography still apparently unwritten.
Where such theoretical continuity has been observed, its importance has been treated as if
it were self-evident, requiring no discussion beyond its place within the historical record.
Furthermore, I am aware of no prior studies—Gould’s (1977) included—that address the
specter of reversal within the long history of biogenetic thinking.
But this is not, however, a comprehensive history of recapitulationism. It is rather
a more modest case that because of its own internal logic and despite its “intellectual
quicksand” (to use one of Sulloway’s [1991, p. 245] characterizations of Freud’s
scientism), in its own phylogeny the biogenetic principle has served a singular and
consistent function. From Ernst Haeckel to Paul MacLean, the practice of drawing phasic
parallels between individual and phyletic history has provided a counterpoint to antitragic narratives of evolutionary progress, of teleologies unencumbered by circumstance,
degeneration, or reversal. This continuity has proceeded largely without notice over the
last century, and that this has been so should be enough to show just how difficult it is to
square our best hopes for the future with our reticence to reckon with the persistent
presence of the past.
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CHAPTER 2

RECAPITULATION, PROGRESS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT: DARWIN AND HAECKEL
“Speaking generally, the child presents in a passing state the mental characteristics that
are found in a fixed state in primitive civilizations, very much as the human embryo
presents in a passing state the physical characteristics that are found in a fixed state in
the classes of inferior animal” (Taine, 1877, p. 259).
In this chapter, I explore some of the incompletely understood connections among
three core concerns of nineteenth-century evolutionary thought: psychology, progress,
and recapitulation. While largely overshadowed in the historiography of science by more
successful theories of heredity, these were hardly fringe affairs for the first and second
generations of evolutionists. Take, for instance, the case of Darwin (1859/1977,
1871/1977, 1872/1965), who grounded much of his initial descent theory in On the
Origin of Species on a version of the recapitulation hypothesis; whose theory of natural
selection quietly but confidently emphasized a species of optimistic progressivism (albeit
one that was more epiphenomenal than orthogenetic); and whose arguments in The
Descent of Man and The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals gave special
emphasis to the natural history and continuing advancement of the human psyche. As I
show in analysis of the thought of Ernst Haeckel as well as Darwin, a similarly tripartite
preoccupation could be found to varying degrees among many of the period’s most
influential evolutionary theorists.
Yet despite the progressive spirit once inseparable from psychologies grounded in
recapitulationism, by the time much of the scientific community had been won over to
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“Haeckel’s law,” the teleology of recapitulationary theory in particular had begun to
undergo a directional shift, one that anticipated its fate in the coming century. More than
any other theory of descent or development, biogenetic recapitulationism gave expression
to the fears of progressive reversal and “devolution” that would come to preoccupy
psychological theorists in fin de siècle Europe and North America. Such fears saw their
most sustained expression in late Victorian anxieties surrounding biological degeneration,
but their effects could be observed wherever evolutionary thought took root.7 To many,
scientific affirmations of evolutionary progress only served to summon the specter of
decline. Even while embracing narratives of developmental progress, a growing number
of lay-evolutionists as well as prominent scientists grew preoccupied with the prospect of
degeneration—with the fear that the logic of natural history might pull the human spirit
back to its more unsavory, animalistic origins. “What is there more congruous than the
notion of transmigration?” asked the Brooklyn pastor Hugh Carpenter (1882), as he
reflected upon “Man’s Conception of God” in a post-Darwinian world. “If there be evolution, there surely is de-volution, a degradation of species. Nature teaches it” (pp.
698-699).
Hoping to trace the shifting fortunes of the biogenetic principle within this
climate, my argument here is two-fold: First and foremost, I demonstrate that, far from
being peripheral concerns, for early evolutionists recapitulationism, progressivism, and
pre-Freudian psychologies were, if not quite synonymous, effectively inseparable, indeed
all but mutually constitutive—at least for a time. Second and more importantly, I argue
that the relationship of these three concerns—evolutionary progressivism, the ontogenetic
7

For summaries of such developments in scientific, medical, and literary quarters
see Pick (1989), Chamberlain (1981), Carlson (1985), and Bowler (1989).
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recapitulation of phylogeny, and theories of human psychology that derive therefrom—in
the work of nineteenth-century evolutionists frames and anticipates the “reversal” of the
biogenetic law by the twentieth century’s first psychoanalysts and developmental
psychologists. The latter development cannot be understood apart from the
intertwinement of these concerns in the prior century.

In one of the last sustained attempts at a meta-narrative of American religious
history, Sydney Ahlstrom (1972) called attention to a common thread in approaches to
science and hermeneutics in the nineteenth century: “Inasmuch as the categories of
genetic explanation underlie geology and evolution as well” as the historical criticism of
scripture, he offered, “we may crown Clio, the muse of history, as the intellectual
monarch of the century” (Ahlstrom, 1972, p. 774).8 Historiography tends to be
understandably harsh with this kind of sweeping generalization, but this much seems
clear: From the laboratory to the pulpit, from the field expedition to the mission field, a
teleological and generally progressivist historicism pervaded scientific inquiry and the
popular imagination in the long nineteenth century. No phenomenon escaped the period’s
relentless historical scrutiny—not the Biblical text, not the layers of the earth, and
certainly not the human mind.9

8

Gould (1977) seems to have confessed to the same unavoidable generalization,
which frames his discussion of the period as well: “It is a cliché of intellectual history
that progressivist, historical thinking replaced cyclic or static views of nature during the
late eighteenth century” (p. 33).
9
The Cambridge historian J. B. Bury (1909) offered a similar verdict on the
centenary of Darwin’s birth: “the growth of historical study in the nineteenth century has
been determined and characterised by the same general principle which has underlain the
simultaneous developments of the study of nature, namely the genetic idea. The
‘historical’ conception of nature, which has produced the history of the solar system, the
18

Read properly, the past contained a comprehensive explanation of the present, as
well as an outline of the future. No surprise, then, that some of psychological
evolutionism’s most enthusiastic supporters in nineteenth-century Europe and North
America were educated liberal Protestant laity, who, like Freud’s devoted friend Oskar
Pfister, were eager as they were to bolster their faith with the latest in scientific
revelation.10 But whatever damage the period’s historicism may have done to received
orthodoxies, religious and otherwise, it more than made up for in promises of a newer,
brighter future built upon natural-historical knowledge. As one of Haeckel’s British
protégés, the invertebrate biologist E. Ray Lankester (1847-1929), assured his colleagues
at the conclusion of his monograph, Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880)—
which described an evolutionary mechanism he thought best avoided—“To us has been
given the power to know the causes of things, and by the use of this power it is possible to
control our destinies.”
When we have gained this fully and minutely, we shall be able by the light of the
past to guide ourselves in the future. In proportion as the whole of the past
evolution of civilized man, of which we at present perceive the outlines, is
assigned to its causes, we and our successors around the globe may expect to be
able duly to estimate that which makes for, and that which makes against, the
progress of the race. The full and earnest cultivation of Science—the Knowledge
of Causes—is that to which we have to look for the protection of our race … from
relapse and degeneration. (Lankester, 1880, pp. 61-61)11
As evolutionary thinking grew in complexity and authority—and as concerns with
cultural degeneration mounted—influential figures like Lankester were only too eager to
story of the earth, the genealogies of telluric organisms, and has revolutionised natural
science, belongs to the same order of thought as the conception of human history as a
continuous, genetic, causal process—a conception which has revolutionised historical
research and made it scientific” (p. 561).
10
For two differing views on the consequences of such alliances, see Turner
(1985) and White (2008).
11
On Lankester’s studies under Haeckel see Barnett (2006, p. 207).
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imbue it with such edifying, near-salvific capacities. Yet as we will see in an examination
of Haeckel’s shifting formulations of historical progress, the sense of influence and
control implied by the new natural history only seemed to heighten anxieties over
“relapse and degeneration.”
Before examining the progressivist and psychological dimensions of nineteenthcentury recapitulationism, however, one feature of the period’s research methodology
merits emphasis: Although the purview of post-Darwinian investigation was, in a sense,
chronologically infinite, the scientific “Knowledge of Causes” often derived more from
comparative morphology and consideration of the (ostensibly representative)
contemporary individual organism than, say, population ecology or the testimony of the
fossil record (Ruse, 1996, pp. 159-168). “We see nothing of these slow changes in
progress,” Darwin (1859/1977) lamented in the Origin, “until the hand of time has
marked the lapse of ages, and then so imperfect is our view into long-past geological
ages, that we see only that the forms of life are now different from what they formerly
were” (p. 66). As Lankester (1880) noted, the “fossil remains” of bygone species might
“sometimes give to us the actual ancestors of forms now living,” but a far more
comprehensive history was “afforded by the changes—the phases of development—
which every animal exhibits in passing from the small shapeless egg to the adult
condition” (pp. 19-20). Far better, then, to observe the process of natural selection within
the contemporary individual’s development.
Convenience and efficiency notwithstanding, this practice of generalization
through analogy should not be confused with contemporary case study methodology, for
it reflects a more deeply rooted scientific convention regarding the relationship between
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species and specimen (or ontogeny and phylogeny) in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. For instance, though rarely noted in discussions of the eponymous theory, the
French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) first argued his case for the
heritability of acquired characteristics on just such an analogical assumption. As Pietro
Corsi (1988) noted in his history of pre-Darwinian evolutionism, for Lamarck and the
many naturalists that followed his lead, “the process observable in an organism could be
related to general principles of action that were applicable to the entire class of
phenomena examined.” What is more, in the tradition initiated by Lamarck “phases of
embryonic and individual growth offered indications on growth processes in general”
(Corsi, 1988, p. 126; see also Richardson & Keuck, 2002). (Naturally, in Lamarck’s case
such indications applied equally to use/disuse inheritance and orthogenesis.)
Recapitulationist theories, which presumed a phasic reenactment of the evolutionary past
in the individual’s development, were but the epitome of this widely practiced
methodological parallelism.
Thanks to the microcosmic logic applied by Lamarck and his contemporaries, any
given embryo or adult specimen could be studied as profitably as the fossil record. As
Laura Otis (1993) noted in her study of the theory of “organic memory” in the period,
“because the individual was the product of an ongoing teleological process of absorption
and accumulation, s/he contained history”—both natural and cultural—“and history was
available for viewing, to a certain extent, in the individual” (p. 350). It was not simply the
historical record that could be observed in the individual; it was the “ongoing teleological
process” of history itself, involving not mere evolutionary artifacts, but the ever more
malleable elaborations of progress (Otis, 1993, p. 350).
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As I will discuss in more detail below, nowhere was this progressive process
clearer than in the embryo, the animated archive of natural antiquity. With the history of
the species observable in the embryonic specimen—and with laws of progress driving (or
at least deriving from) the sequence of natural history that it recapitulated—the stilladvancing human mind came to be treated as the capstone of evolution, and psychology
the queen of the sciences. “Phylogeny of the psyche, the mind, or the ancestral lineage of
Man’s psychic activities” Haeckel (1874/1900a) insisted, was “the highest of all
problems” (vol. 1, p. 23). Yet as the nineteenth century came to a close, just how long the
human mind could maintain such an exalted phyletic status grew increasingly unclear.

Darwin: Progress, Recapitulation, and Psychology
Few figures exemplified the era’s varieties of historical progressivism like
Charles Darwin (1809-1882), who, for all his assaults on inherited orthodoxies,
nevertheless concluded in On the Origin of Species (1859/1977) that since “natural
selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental
endowments will tend to progress towards perfection” (p. 373). A changeless Hobbesian
state of body and mind this was not.
Then again, it wasn’t exactly utopian either. As far as nineteenth-century biology
and psychology were concerned, Darwin’s greatest innovation was less to remove
teleology or progress from natural history, than to drain any pretense of élan vital from
the workings of selection. Rather than pre-perfected or pre-motivated, separately created
organisms, as he argued in the Origin, “secondary causes, like those determining the birth
and death of the individual,” constituted the natural-dialectical engine of progressive
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development (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 373). By shifting the source of heredity’s (and thus
history’s) tendency “to progress towards perfection” from the internal will of the spirit to
the external mechanism of selection, Darwin’s reformulation of natural history removed
the presumption of metaphysical necessity from doctrines of evolutionary progress.
Note, however, that this is not the same as eliminating such doctrines altogether.
Rather, for Darwin and many of those that he influenced, progress (and the increasing
complexity that reflected it) went from being the cause of history to its consequence. As
he surmised in a notebook entry written shortly after he first formulated the principle of
natural selection, “there is no necessary tendency in the simple animals to become
complicated although all perhaps will have done so” (as cited in Ruse, 1996, pp. 149150). And so, in this scheme natural selection was, to borrow an appropriately anatomical
metaphor from Richards (1988), “the muscle producing biological and social progress”
(p. 129; see also Richards, 1992, pp. 80-90).
In an important sense, Darwinian descent carried with it the implication of
progressive ascent: ascent towards increasing complexity, incremental perfection, and
continuous improvement, even if such trends were only visible over relatively broad
stretches of time. Human history, being no less subject to the laws of heredity and
selection, just as clearly reflected the general progressive trend. “At all times throughout
the world tribes have supplanted other tribes,” Darwin (1871/1977) maintained in The
Descent of Man, “and as morality is one important element in their success, the standard
of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and
increase” (p. 500). While such improvements were now considered epiphenomenal—they
were the result of the cumulative interaction of the organism and its environment, not its
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essence—they were nonetheless thought to be inevitable, and their presence was assumed
as much by many of natural selection’s critics as its proponents.12
Postwar historians of science with a hagiographic bent could be forgiven for
wincing at the idea of Darwin as espousing any kind of teleology, given the Origin’s
supposed rebuke of vitalism, simple orthogenesis, and other such anthropocentric
heresies of natural history. Indeed, Darwin’s quietly consistent progressivism—
observable as early as the Origin—certainly lacked the Pollyannaish optimism one
associates with other, more explicitly teleological philosophies of natural history. Not
inappropriately, scholars tend to contrast Darwin’s cautious arguments in the Origin and
Descent of Man to those of his less teleologically idiosyncratic predecessors (e.g.,
Lamarck), or alternately to his more avowedly progressivist contemporaries—say,
Herbert Spencer (cf. Bowler, 1983, pp. 20-22; Gould, 2002, pp. 94-99; McShea, 2009,
pp. 550-551; Ruse, 2009, pp. 3-19; see also Greene, 1977, pp. 1-3).
Darwin’s, however, was more a “progressive dynamic” than a progressivist
ideology (Richards, 1992, p. 87; see also Meyer, 2015). In the “struggle for existence” he
saw neither the unfolding of some divine plan nor arbitrary material changes, but an
incremental movement towards greater and greater complexity, specialization, and
intellectual achievement. And while he went to some length in subsequent editions of the
Origin and other works “to avoid personifying the word Nature,” he nevertheless
understood “the aggregate action and product of many natural laws” to operate in
accordance with a generally benevolent spirit (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 64).

12

On the British varieties of evolutionary progressivism at the time of Darwin’s
writing, see Greene (1977).
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Well known, for instance, is that the argument of the Origin proceeds from
Darwin’s analysis of selective breeding practices to the workings of natural history; less
frequently mentioned in discussions of this rhetorical strategy is Darwin’s emphasis on
the moral and aesthetic superiority of Nature to man: “Man selects only for his own
good,” he argues in the book’s fourth chapter, “Nature only for that of the being which
she tends” (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 65). The benevolent paternalism suggested by
Darwin’s prose in these and similar sections of the Origin can verge on the theological,
but his celebrations of natural selection read less like crypto-creationism than the pieties
of the previous generation’s Naturphilosophen (who, incidentally, tended to invoke
recapitulationary theories more enthusiastically than their naturalist contemporaries; cf.
Ritvo, 1990, pp. 79-98).
Can we wonder, then, that Nature’s productions should be far “truer” in character
than man’s productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most
complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher
workmanship? …. It may be metaphorically said that natural selection is daily and
hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those
that are bad, preserving and adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly
working, whenever and wherever the opportunity offers, at the improvement of
each organic being. (Darwin, 1859/1977, pp. 65-66)13
“Nature’s” conception of advancement and improvement was like the horse-breeder’s,
only better. Where the latter might select for superficial aesthetic and material traits, the
former adhered to a higher, more encompassing standard that rendered evolution and
progress all but synonymous.
Yet while natural selection might have been such improvement’s modus operandi,
its telos was at the top of the vertebral column, in the minds of men. In the third edition
of the Origin (1861), Darwin weighed in on the fruits of progressive evolution:
13

On Darwin’s connection to German Romanticism, see Richards (1987, 2002).
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If we look at the differentiation and specialization of the several organs of each
being when adult (and this will include the advancement of the brain for
intellectual purposes) as the best standard of highness of organization, natural
selection clearly leads towards highness; for all physiologists admit that the
specialization of organs, inasmuch as they perform in this state their functions
better, is an advantage to each being. (as cited in Ruse, 1996, p. 152)
Despite Darwin’s characteristically cautious prose, it is clear that a sense of advancement
and developmental progress underlies the directionality of natural selection. Furthermore,
he is at pains to characterize psychological phenomena (“intellectual purposes”) as the
culmination of such advances. Darwin seems to have thought that, as far as the human
race was concerned, the study of psychology provided some of the most visible evidence
of progressive evolution at work.
Though inseparable from the racial theorizing that began to color much of his
writing on human evolution in and after The Descent of Man, this conviction was hardly a
late arrival in Darwin’s theoretical scheme. In 1859, the same year the Origin was first
published, he wrote the geologist Charles Lyell to consider the centrality of psychological
evolution in contemporary natural selection:
I suppose that you do not doubt that the intellectual powers are as important for
the welfare of each being as corporeal structure; if so, I can see no difficulty in the
most intellectual individuals of a species being continually selected and the
intellect of the new species thus improved, aided probably by effects of inherited
mental exercise. I look at this process as now going on with the races of man. (as
cited in Greene, 1977, pp. 5-6)
Aided by good Lamarckian hygiene, Darwin’s vision of natural selection as applied to
man meant that advancement was as least as psychological as it was corporeal—and, for
that matter, that it was identifiably taking place among contemporary human beings.
So much, then, for Darwin’s qualified progressivism and its connection to human
psychology. For the outlines of his recapitulationism, one must turn to the close link in
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his work between human origins and embryonic development. Understanding how
Haeckel would systematize this evolutionary-psychological progressivism in the
biogenetic principle requires some analysis of this material—certainly among the more
speculative sections in the Origin, where Darwin considers the meaning of embryonic
development. For a variety of reasons—some historical, some ideological—Darwin’s
German junior colleague was (and remains) more closely associated with the case for
developmental-psychological recapitulationism via embryology. Yet decades before
Haeckel published his first major statement of the biogenetic law, Darwin was grounding
his evolutionary progressivism in an exploration of embryology that foreshadowed its
impact among fin de siècle theorists of the psychological.
Admittedly, the treatment of embryonic recapitulation that one finds in the Origin
and subsequent works hardly resembles the full-fledged, unified theory soon to be
systematized by Haeckel. The generally progressivist spirit of Darwin’s evolutionary
thinking notwithstanding, his narrative perspective tends to be backward-gazing, and his
methodology more reconstructive than prophetic; his concern in the Origin was,
naturally, origins, not the possible vectors of future advancement, let alone decline. Still,
his discussions of “the leading facts in embryology, which are second to none in
importance,” in the Origin’s fourteenth chapter paint the embryo with just the atavistic
quality that a coming generation of evolutionists would embrace (Darwin, 1859/1977, p.
346; see also Richards, 1992, pp. 152-166).
First, Darwin (1859/1977) notes that selective pressures generally fail to act upon
organisms in their embryonic or larval states. Reasoning in a Lamarckian mode, he infers
that inherited adaptive variations appear at the postnatal stage (or age) at which the
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organism’s ancestor first acquired them. Because, for his purposes at least, comparisons
of various species’ embryos demonstrate common descent—and because all variations
would presumably have been acquired following birth—the embryo provides a window
into the past, one that has been comparatively insulated from the slings and arrows of
natural selection. It therefore becomes “highly probable that with many animals the
embryonic or larval stages show us, more or less completely, the condition of the
progenitor of the whole group in its adult stage”; put otherwise, “As the embryo often
shows us more or less plainly the structure of the less modified and ancient progenitor of
the group, we can see why ancient and extinct forms so often resemble in their adult state
the embryos of existing species of the same class” (Darwin, 1859/1977, p. 345). The
embryonic or larval stage, then, is something of a living fossil, preserving the image of
the ancestral adult in the form of the contemporary germ.
As if to anticipate innovations soon to come, Darwin (1859/1977) concluded this
brief section on a quietly speculative note: “Embryology rises greatly in interest, when
we look at the embryo as a picture, more or less obscured, of the progenitor, either in its
adult or larval state, of all the members of the same great class” (p. 346). For all his
specimen collecting and plant domesticating, Darwin insisted that embryonic ontogeny
provided some of the strongest material for the narrative of natural history. The fossil
record notwithstanding, as he noted in an 1860 letter, “embryology is to me by far the
strongest single class of facts in favour of change of form” (Darwin, 1860/1993, p. 350).
In this regard, Darwin was as much reviver as innovator, demonstrating his
doctrine of descent in what was then (and would later become again) a rather
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unfashionable theory.14 For his part, Darwin seems to have been frustrated that little
notice was paid to his embryological speculations. Such disappointment would appear to
have changed little by the time he wrote his posthumously published Autobiography:
Hardly any point gave me so much satisfaction when I was at work on the Origin,
as the explanation of the wide difference in many classes between the embryo and
the adult mammal, and of the close resemblance of the embryos within the same
class. No notice of this point was taken, as far as I remember, in the early reviews
of the Origin, and I recollect expressing my surprise on this head in a letter to
[American botanist] Asa Gray. (Darwin, 1887/1958, p. 125)
If anything, Darwin regretted not making his case more explicit. Noting that in the years
since the Origin “reviewers have given the whole credit of the idea to Fritz Muller and
Häckel,” he protested that he “had materials for a whole chapter on the subject, and I
ought to have made the discussion longer; for it is clear that I failed to impress my
readers” (Darwin, 1887/1958, p. 125). He had, you might say, beaten everyone to the
punch, only to play his cards too close to his chest.
In addition to the still low enthusiasm for recapitulationist theories at mid-century,
one reason for the muted response to Darwin’s embryonic parallelism might have been
the idea’s relatively buried appearance in the Origin. In the section he referred to when
recalling the matter in his autobiography, he had limited himself to arguing that
comparative embryology demonstrated both the common ancestry and post-natal history
of a wide class of species, an observation to which he later returned in the Descent
(Darwin, 1871/1977, pp. 397-400). For better or for worse, whatever his additional
materials might have included, Darwin apparently left it to others to flesh out the
recapitulationary implications of his embryological speculations.

14

On the status of recapitulationism during the composition of the Origin, see
Ritvo (1990, pp. 79-81).
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He must have found their work persuasive, for a mere five years before his death
Darwin (1877) invoked the biogenetic principle in an unusually personal retrospective
essay. A recent article on childhood language acquisition, he explained in “A
Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” “led me to look over a diary which I kept thirty-seven
years ago with respect to one of my own infants,” his oldest son William Erasmus
Darwin (1839-1914; Darwin, 1877, p. 285). Darwin’s (1877) goal in this essay was to
demonstrate through observation of his own son’s development that children acquired
language comprehension far earlier than a previous author believed—“and this is what
might have been expected, as we know that the lower animals easily learn to understand
spoken words” (p. 294). Clearly implied was that his young son’s development
recapitulated in compressed form his species’ progressive evolutionary history; hence,
Darwin’s (1877) six-month-old could understand the name of his nurse well “before he
invented his first word mum,” just as a “lesser” creature could comprehend basic spoken
language (p. 294).15
More telling in this regard was Darwin’s (1877) interpretation of his son’s horror
during a trip to the zoo. At the age of two-and-a-half, William, he noted, “enjoyed
looking at all the animals which were like those that he knew … but was much alarmed at
the various larger animals in cages” (p. 288). His father apparently found this fear wholly
irrational, and offered by way of explanation a suitably recapitulationist hypothesis:
May we not suspect that the vague but very real fears of children, which are quite
independent of experience, are the inherited effects of real dangers and abject
15

Darwin’s (1877) article was the source of much fanfare well before its actual
publication, albeit thanks more to his relative celebrity by the eighteen-seventies than to
controversy or originality of insight. Lorch and Hellal (2010) trace the subsequent
proliferation in evolutionary infant studies to Darwin’s diary report—an exaggeration, no
doubt, but a suggestive one nonetheless. See also Levelt (2013, pp. 96-99).
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superstitions during ancient savage times? It is quite conformable with what we
know of the transmission of formerly well-developed characters, that they should
appear at an early period of life, and afterwards disappear. (Darwin, 1877, p. 288)
Like the embryonic coccyx, William’s phobia appeared at an early stage that testified to
its phyletic antiquity, only to recede as his development advanced. To his father at least,
there was something atavistic about the child’s alarm, whose curious appearance seemed
only to demonstrate the stable, unidirectional progressivism of natural history: The
disappearance of such atavistic anxiety as William matured reflected his species’
advancement beyond those “ancient savage times.” Whether or not one locates the
looming shadow of “Little Hans” in Darwin’s diary, at a minimum his thinking reflects
the recapitulationist consensus that existed by the late eighteen-seventies.
Note also, however, what Darwin did not consider in regard to the “very real fears
of children”—namely, that their atavistic quality might portend a regression to “savage
times,” or suggest the dominion of the primitive over the modern. Few features of
Darwin’s theory would be so altered in the coming century as this confidence in
evolutionary-psychological progressivism—which was, after all, inseparable from his
understanding of the natural course of individual development, physical and otherwise. In
a few short years, this same explanatory model would serve as the foundation for a
decidedly more pessimistic psychology of development, altogether stripped of the
assumption of inevitable progress that Darwin never ceased to endorse.
Before turning to Haeckel’s work and its popular dissemination, a restatement of
this dimension of Darwin’s legacy and influence by the late nineteenth century is in
order: First, from the Origin to his “Autobiography,” the ur-selectionist’s theory was
consistently progressive in its philosophy of history. With its current apex in the human
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psyche, such progress unfolded epiphenomenally, through the mechanisms of natural
selection, adaptation, and descent (rather than orthogenesis or simple teleology), but was
nevertheless assumed to be inevitable. Almost never did Darwin or his early enthusiasts
worry over an irreversibly degenerative process. Darwin’s (1871/1977) anxieties on this
count, such as they were, mostly centered on the potentially deleterious effects of statesponsored altruism (pp. 167-180). Far from being subject to reversal, the workings of
natural selection promised advancement.
Second, a developmental recapitulationary process provided the soundest
demonstration of the operation of all such progress. By preserving the image of the
ancient common progenitor, the embryo revealed the natural history of selection as well
as common phyletic origins. Similarly, by involving the early appearance and orderly
disappearance of ancestral traits, ontogeny documented the history of progressive
advancement up to the current species (or at least that species in its adult form). All
things being equal, pre-history was something that each “advanced” organism overcame
in the natural course of its development, a process observable anywhere from the embryo
to the mind of Darwin’s young son.

Haeckel: Progressivism, the Biogenetic Law, and Psychology
“It is possible to imagine a distant future in which most other species of life are extinct
but the ocean will consist overwhelmingly of immortal jellyfish, a great gelatin
consciousness everlasting” (Rich, 2012).
In a collection of essays marking the centenary of Darwin’s birth, the stillesteemed Ernst Haeckel (1909) reflected upon a slight change in evolutionary
terminology. While in the previous century he “gave the name of ‘progressive heredity’
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to this inheritance of acquired characters,” Haeckel (1909) explained that he had “since
changed the term to ‘transformative heredity’ …. This term is preferable, as inherited
regressive modifications (degeneration, retrograde metamorphosis, etc.) come under the
same head” (p. 139). The all-but-teleological, unidirectional implications of
“progressive”—implications that almost went without saying in the Darwinian and
Spencerian varieties of evolutionism—failed to adequately account for the sometimes
regressive, degenerative effects of use and disuse. (Recall that in pre-Mendelian 1909
Lamarckian inheritance remained a viable, if nonetheless contested evolutionary
mechanism.) Against sixty years of optimistic, progressivist evolutionary theory, in the
first decade of the new century Haeckel seemed to insist upon conceding a substantial
phylogenetic space for degeneration and decline.16
Darwin’s work left an early and indelible mark on the young Haeckel, whose
1860 encounter with a German translation of the Origin inspired a veneration verging on
the filiopietistic (Di Gregorio, 2005, pp. 74-85). Yet somewhere between this formative
moment and his later, politically contentious years, Haeckel’s view of individual life took
on a decidedly tragic cast, even as his defenses of the epiphenomenal progressivism in
Darwin’s theory only grew more strident. This curious inverse relationship—sustained, as
it was, by an unwavering commitment to the biogenetic law—is observable in Haeckel’s
16

On specifically Lamarckian controversies in the early twentieth century, see
Bowler (1983, pp. 75-106). For political as well as scientific reasons, in the interwar
years Haeckel’s reputation in the English-speaking world began a steady decline, and
reached its nadir in the late nineteen-seventies through ancestor-worshipping neoselectionists’ attempts to enlist him as the corrupt foil to a fantasied apolitical Darwin,
whose prescient, promethean discoveries were presumed uncontaminated by history or
ideology. Among historians of science, the complexity of Haeckel’s legacy is gradually
being restored, thanks especially to the researches of Robert Richards. For refutations of
the most common charges against Haeckel by postwar neo-selectionists, see Richards
(2008, pp. 439-454, 500-512), Hopewood (2015), and Richards (2009, 2013).
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own intellectual ontogeny, particularly in his treatments of human psychology and
development. In the analysis of his work that follows, I argue that Haeckel’s increasingly
low opinion of individual human potential on the one hand, and his steadfast commitment
to recapitulationism on the other, amount to more than mere coincidence, and in fact
represent the emergence of—or at the very least set the stage for—an anxiety of
“devolution” within theories of mind and descent. In a pattern that would continue well
after the demise of recapitulationism within scientific quarters, such anxiety was
animated and sustained by the ambivalent logic, by the devolutionary shadow, at the
heart of the biogenetic law.
Whatever his opinion of the human species by the First World War (a designation
which he was allegedly the first to use), Haeckel did not begin his scientific career a
tragic thinker. Unlike those that first read the Origin in its original language, he was
quickly convinced that natural selection provided the missing empirical foundation for
eighteenth-century Naturphilosophie and German-Romantic philosophies of history. To
the Jena-educated son of a Prussian jurist, the English Darwin was the scientific
fulfillment of Goethean prophecy, ushering in a brave new Weltanschauung the likes of
which hadn’t been seen since the Reformation.17 If anything, Haeckel’s promotion of the
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Cf. Haeckel’s (1882) remarks from a speech given near the Wartburg castle
where a young Martin Luther had translated the New Testament into German: “As in this
sacred spot 360 years ago Martin Luther, by his reform of the Church in its head and
members, introduced a new era in the history of civilization, so in our days has Charles
Darwin, by his reform of the doctrine of development, constrained the whole perception,
thought, and volition of mankind into new and higher courses …. In the scope and
importance, however, of their great work of reformation, the two cases were entirely
parallel, and in both the success marks a new epoch in the development of the human
mind” (p. 534). See also Haeckel’s letter to Charles Darwin dated 10 August 1864 (as
cited in Di Gregorio, 2005, pp. 96-97), Haeckel (1909, p. 148), and Di Gregorio (2005,
pp. 146-160).
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theory of natural selection on the Continent only amplified the optimistic progressivism
that Darwin’s work had more quietly presupposed. In a famous 1863 speech to the
Society of German Natural Scientists and Physicians, for instance, he defended Darwin’s
theory on explicitly progressivist grounds, going so far as to argue that “even if we find
in particular periods a retrogression, we cannot yet deny progress as a whole.”
Apparently comfortable in taking the long view on such matters, Haeckel maintained that
such “progress will not for long be constrained and … the whole history of organisms
manifests the law of progress” (as cited in Richards, 2008, p. 101).18
I will return shortly to the question of Haeckel’s progressivism, as well as to his
recapitulationary psychology and

closely related

repudiation

of

phylogenetic

degeneration theory. Before, however, suggesting some interpretations as to how these
developments shaped the use of recapitulationism in the coming century by a notably less
progressivist cast of thinkers, some attention to the biogenetic law itself is in order, most
especially its function for Haeckel. Here, the personal context for the formation of
Haeckel’s best-known theory is suggestive. Much like the resolutely recapitulationist
death drive, which emerged in the wake of Freud’s (1920/1961a) grief for his favorite
daughter, Haeckel’s most lasting, most unwittingly tragic theory crystallized in a moment
of profound loss.
On his thirtieth birthday in 1864, Haeckel’s beloved wife, Anne Sethe, died from
a respiratory infection. Haeckel took to bed for over a week, too distraught even to attend
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Much of Haeckel’s work remains untranslated from the original German. While
I have done my best to identify the translator for all quoted German-language material,
unless otherwise noted in citations all translations from secondary sources are those of
the relevant author (i.e., Di Gregorio [2005]; Richards [2008]; R. Richards, personal
communication, March 5, 2016).
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her funeral. Sent by his family to Nice to convalesce, he chanced upon a jellyfish hitherto
unknown to science, and was flooded with memories of his wife’s hair. The creature’s
tentacles, he later recalled, “hang like blond hair-ornaments from the rim of the delicate
umbrella-cap …. I name this species, the princess of the Eucopiden, as a memorial to my
unforgettable true wife, Anna Sethe” (as cited in Richards, 2008, p. 109).19 Richards
(2008), who appears to have been the first historian to notice this connection, sees in
Haeckel’s act of grief-stricken taxonomy “the metaphysical effort to absorb the
individual into the whole, each life into [the Spinozan] Deus sive natura that would
preserve it eternally” (p. 111; see also Richards, 2008, pp. 15-16, 106-110).20
Memorialized in the naming of a newly discovered species—and not insignificantly, one
with a metagenetic life cycle, with alternating generations—Anna had not so much
disappeared as transmigrated, subsumed within the immutable macrocosm of the material
world. Here, perhaps, lay the origin of the tragic, evolutionary monism that informed
Haeckel’s social and political thought, in which only the advancement of evolutionism
itself could hold any personal meaning or value.
While biologists probably find marine invertebrates more beautiful than does the
average beachcomber, a venomous medusa still seems an odd choice of species to name
as a memorial to one’s recently deceased wife. If one may speculate, it seems as well that
for Anna’s memorial Haeckel selected an object that could contain the ambivalence
inherent in his process of mourning: His longing and his resentment were fused in a
19

Haeckel named the species, Mitrocoma annae, or “Anna’s headband”
(Richards, 2008, p. 109).
20
Aside from the biographical context, Haeckel’s nominal instincts belong to a
poorly understood tradition of locating immortality among medusae, including one that
August Weismann apparently named after the degenerationist Anton Dohrn. See, for
instance, Rich (2012), Freud (1922/1957b), and McCarthy (2014).
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“new” creature at once beautiful and menacing, immortalizing a lost, beloved object
unconsciously loathed in (and for) its absence. Undoing his loss and rendering the full
gamut of his grief eternally present in the natural world, Haeckel’s “princess of the
Eucopiden” dispensed with any need for personal meaning here or in the hereafter.
However such origins are interpreted, Haeckel seems to have succeeded in his
attempt to establish some semblance of redemption within the process of phylogeny. At
the height of his grief, he concluded in a letter to his parents, “from so deficient and
contradictory a creation as man, a personal progressive development after death is not
probable.” There would be no salvation in death or in life—at least not at the “personal”
level of ontogenesis. Disavowing his hopes for love and happiness, Haeckel wagered
instead on phylogenetic progressivism: “more likely” than individual redemption “is a
progressive development of the species as a whole, as Darwinian theory already has
proposed it …. Mephisto has it right: ‘Everything that arises and has value comes to
nothing’” (as cited in Richards, 2008, p. 107; emphasis mine). Having paid his own
Faustian debts and now disavowing all ontogenetic ephemera, Haeckel cast his lots with
the redemptive potential of phylogeny.
Soon after returning from his Mediterranean shiva, Haeckel’s mourning
transitioned into something of a creative illness. Working eighteen-hour days for twelve
straight months, in 1866 he produced the magisterial (and still untranslated) two-volume
Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (Di Gregorio, 2005, pp. 115-145; Richards,
2008, pp. 108-111, 118-156; see also Ellenberger, 1970, p. 890). While replete with
extensive, technical discussions that quickly exhaust the lay-reader, his newly formulated
biogenetic law was a constant presence in the work, animating the evolutionary
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treatments of morphology, embryology, and paleontology with all the confidence of a
pan-explanatory, unified theory. Haeckel, of course, was hardly the first to suggest an
analogistic relationship between individual development and natural history (Gould,
1977, pp. 33-68; Holmes, 1944; Meyer, 1935). With the recapitulationism first spelled
out in the Generelle Morphologie, however, he may be considered original in at least one
regard: To a much greater degree than the ever-cautious Darwin, Haeckel insisted that
ontogeny was entirely subservient to phylogeny.
For Darwin, generally more preoccupied with natural-historical reconstruction
than reflecting upon the implications of his theory’s progressivism, the value of the
embryo consisted in its status as a kind of animated archive, supplying a record of all
organisms’ common ancestry and thus illuminating the history of descent.21 In strictly
technical terms, the primary (and most influential) innovation in Haeckel’s formulation of
the biogenetic law was to observe a fixed, mechanical process at work, at once dynamic
and deterministic. Rather than simply documenting natural history, embryonic
development—and by extension, the entirety of ontogeny—reflected a kind of progress
through phasic compression.
While the law’s psychological applications were only spelled out in his later,
more popular publications, its first extended iteration appeared in the Generelle
Morphologie:
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Thus, for example Darwin (1859/1959) reasons in the Origin: “So again it is
probable from what we know of the embryos of mammals, birds, fishes, and reptiles, that
all the members in these four great classes are the modified descendants of some one
ancient progenitor, which was furnished in its adult state with branchiae, had a swimbladder, four simple limbs, and a long tail fitted for aquatic life” (p. 702). On preHaeckelian versions of recapitulationism, see Meyer (1935), Gould (1977), Richards
(1992), and Richards (2008, pp. 148-155).
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Ontogeny is the brief and speedy recapitulation of phylogeny, determined by the
physiological functions of heredity (reproduction) and adaptation (nutrition) ….
The organic individual … repeats during the brief and speedy course of its
individual development the most important of the alterations of form that its
ancestors passed through during the slow and lengthy course of their
paleontological development in accordance with the laws of heredity and
adaptation. (as cited in Di Gregorio, 2005, p. 165)
Environmental pressures might have obscured some of these prior alterations through the
operation of various developmental mechanisms, but, as Haeckel (1874/1900a)
summarized in an English translation of his Anthropogenie, the “connection between the
two”—that is, between ontogeny and phylogeny—“is not external and superficial, but
deeply internal and causal …. Phylogenesis is the mechanical cause of Ontogenesis” (vol.
1, pp. 6, 7). Resemblances between, say, the development of a human fetus and the
natural history of vertebrates were neither coincidental nor, as many would come to argue
in the following century, merely a reflection of shared environmental constraints. Rather,
they illuminated the history and future of phylogenetic progress, with the individual
obliged to carry out a microcosmic reenactment of a universal and unidirectional process.
Natural history was inscribed in individual development, and its laws determined the
appearance of that inscription.
From the Generelle Morphology forward, Haeckel never missed a chance to
invoke the biogenetic principle and the power differential it implied. The mechanical
parallelism of the idea even found its way into the structure of his prose, where, like some
rhetorical fractal, it seemed to emerge in concentric echoes, stated and restated ad
infinitum:
the history of the Germ is an epitome of the History of the Descent; or, in other
words: that Ontogeny is a recapitulation of Phylogeny; or, somewhat more
explicitly: that the series of forms through which the Individual Organism passes
during its progress from the egg cell to its fully developed state, is a brief,
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compressed reproduction of the long series of forms through which the animal
ancestors of that organism (or the ancestral forms of its species) have passed from
the earliest periods of so-called organic creation down to the present time.
(Haeckel, 1874/1900a, vol. 1, pp. 6-7).
To later critics, the orderly systematicity of “Haeckel’s law” was the stuff of Teutonic
navel-gazing, not natural science. As the Scottish biologist E. S. Russell (1916) wryly
observed, one had only to subtract the presumption of historicity “from the biogenetic
law—not a difficult matter—and it becomes merely a law of idealistic morphology,
applicable to evolution considered as an ideal process, as the progressive development in
the Divine thought of archetypal models” (p. 257).22 Yet for Haeckel, recapitulationism
was no idealistic thought project. In fact, the biogenetic principle proved that at all levels
and in all phenomena—be they living or inorganic—development was animated by a
single, dynamic law of progress.
Confident that this philosophical elaboration of Darwinian descent would deal a
fatal blow to the metaphysical teleology assumed by vitalists and his growing number of
enemies within Christian (particularly Catholic) institutions, Haeckel maintained that all
his biogenetic explanations had the effect of re-enchanting matter itself. (As Richards
[2008] observes, “to contend that the same laws govern both the organic and the
inorganic could … be interpreted as a vitalization of matter as much as a materialization
of life” [p. 128].) And though he denounced his more pious critics as philistines or
“Jesuits” (the latter apparently an especially foul invective in late nineteenth-century
Jena), Haeckel never doubted that his biogenetic explanation of the universe boded well
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This no doubt is the object of Russell’s (1916) critique that in Haeckel’s
monistic evolutionism, “Heredity and adaptation are shown equally as well by crystals as
by organisms …. It goes without saying that Haeckel allowed to the organism no other
nor higher individuality than belongs to the crystal” (p. 248).
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for the future of the human species. Humanity could now occupy a humbler position,
taking its moral and political cues from the reified, ever-more-visible narrative of its
descent. Far from lamenting the necessary traversal of all the stages of pre-history,
Haeckel (1874/1900a) insisted that his doctrine would nowise “cause a retrogression in
the intellectual and moral development of man; but, on the contrary … that the very
reverse will be true, that by it the progressive development of the human spirit will be
advanced in an unusual degree” (vol. 2, p. 458). The human species might experience
some retrogression here, some atavistic degeneration there, but the general trend in
evolution—and the general effect of the theory of evolution in society—was one of
advancement and improvement. Socially as well as biologically, recapitulation was a
process that pointed forward, not backward.
This at least partly explained Haeckel’s caustic dismissals of those that suggested
a degenerative trend in evolution. In sharp contrast to the views of his renegade student,
Anton Dohrn (1840-1909), Haeckel believed that the biogenetic law provided irrefutable
proof of the unbroken progressivism of natural history. There was simply only one
direction in which evolution could work: “The phylogenetic process in nature,” he wrote
in his 1894 Systematische Phylogenie der Organismen, “is all in all a process of
progressive development” (as cited in Di Gregorio, 2005, p. 453); any suggestion to the
contrary was unthinkable.23 As he explained in the fifth edition of his Anthropogenie, the
apparent pessimism of “the failing degeneration theory” was really just more prelapsarian
anthropocentrism finding its way into the science of historical progress. In their zeal to
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On Haeckel’s battles with Dohrn and degeneration theory, see Di Gregorio
(2005, pp. 324-337) and Bowler (1996, pp. 91-95).
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recover “the dogma of personal immortality,” scientists that detected a hint of
degeneration in phylogeny had
turned the whole evolutionary theory upside down, and boldly contended that
“man is not the most highly developed animal, but the animals are degenerate
men” …. When this theory of degeneration was consistently developed, its
supporters were bound to hold that the entire animal kingdom was descended
from the debased children of men.” (Haeckel, 1905, vol. 2, pp. 528-529; emphasis
mine)
For Haeckel, the reverse had to be true: Organisms that other biologists considered
degenerate—say, jellyfish, with the alternating generations of their life-cycles—he saw as
biogenetic proof of unmitigated progress, paving the way for human advancement rather
than suggesting its capacity to decline. Any search for “immortality” had to be directed at
the process of phylogeny as a whole. Indeed, if it were true that degeneration occurred in
tandem with (or in opposition to) progressive evolution, and if
all animals were really degenerate descendants of an originally perfect humanity,
man would assuredly be the true centre and goal of all terrestrial life; his
anthropocentric position and immortality would be saved. Unfortunately this
trustful theory is in such flagrant contradiction to all the known facts of
paleontology and ontogeny that it is no longer worth serious scientific
consideration. (Haeckel, 1905, vol. 2, p. 530)
It wasn’t just that the fossil record showed Homo sapiens, with its relative superiority, to
be a late arrival on the evolutionary scene. Rather, the chief facts of ontogeny showed an
inexorably progressive process within phylogeny, reflecting not the advancement of the
individual, but the unidirectional phylogenetic laws that controlled her entire
development.
Following Darwin, Haeckel tended to treat any appearance of biological or
cultural degeneration as so much natural-historical noise. Like the growing number of
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British Darwinians, he understood descent as a process of incremental improvement and
advancement. “By and large,” he maintained in the Generelle Morphologie,
the developmental motion of the whole organic world is continuous and
everywhere progressive, even though the universally active processes of
differentiation on the small and detailed scale necessarily cause numerous and
frequently significant regressions in organization alongside the predominant
occurrence of progress. (as cited Di Gregorio, 2005, p. 163; see also Haeckel,
1868/1883, vol. 1, pp. 284-294)
Even parasitism, the degenerative phenomenon that so vexed many a nineteenth-century
evolutionary progressivist, was to the invertebrate biologist Haeckel (1904) one of the
“most luminous proofs of the theory of descent and selection, and of progressive heredity
and the biogenetic law” (p. 245). Disease, too, was but a necessary aberration amidst the
continuous march of evolutionary progress. “As in all normal vital phenomena, so in
abnormal or pathological,” he argued in one of his later popular works, “Pathology is a
part of physiology. This discovery has cut the ground from under the older notion of
disease as a special entity” (Haeckel, 1904, p. 110).
This would seem an odd stance for a lifelong hypochondriac, particularly one
twice-widowed (thrice if one counts the fatal opium overdose of his mistress, Frida von
Ulsar-Gleichen) and given to elaborate justifications of suicide. 24 Yet Haeckel was a
progressive thinker in only one dimension: that of life as a whole. In his monistic
metaphysics and social theory no less than his biology and psychology, the worth of the
individual fared considerably more poorly than the evolutionary process that her
development recapitulated.
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On Haeckel’s early revulsion toward disease and clinical practice, see Di
Gregorio (2005, pp. 36-41). On his marriages and family life, see Di Gregorio (2005, pp.
544-549) and Richards (2008). For Haeckel’s defenses of suicide and euthanasia, see
Haeckel (1904, pp. 115-124).
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Ultimately, Haeckel’s use of the biogenetic law amounted to a radical resituation
of the site and scope of evolutionary progress. One had a law of progressive phylogeny
on the one hand, and the personal deterioration that it necessarily caused on the other.
Atavistic organs “perish during Ontogeny, while others go on growing at their expense,”
Haeckel reasoned in typical analogical fashion. “This same phenomenon is met with in
human society. In this it is always the case that many individuals perish without effecting
anything; while the majority constantly develop more or less steadily” (Haeckel,
1874/1900a, vol. 1, p. 163). An individual person’s death was simply dealt out by
phylogeny through its causal control of ontogeny. “Normal death,” no more than the
conclusion of development, occurred “when the limit of the hereditary term of life is
reached,” and any actual degeneration occurred only at the inconsequential level of
ontogeny (Haeckel, 1904, p. 104; see also Haeckel, 1895/1900b, pp. 146-147, 185-187).
An individual in this scheme was thus an ephemeral, unremarkable thing, no more
or less meaningful than a transitional species along a single branch of a grand
Stammbaum:
But it is just as true of the species as of the individual that it lives for itself, and
looks above all to self-maintenance. Its existence and “end” are transitory. The
progressive development of classes and stems leads slowly but surely to the
formation of new species. Every special form of life—the individual as well as the
species—is therefore merely a biological episode, a passing phenomenal form in
the constant change of life. Man is no exception. (Haeckel, 1904, p. 403)
And yet Haeckel insisted that the law of biogenesis, which made “transitory” individual
development a function of “progressive” evolution, ennobled the human species. That
ontogeny was through and through a function of phylogeny meant not that the individual
was an inconsequential cog in a pre-programmed machine, but that as far as that
individual was concerned, value and meaning could be located by analogical reference to
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macrocosmic, broadly progressive processes. The individual was but a fractal
instantiation of a far more ultimate concern.
While not exactly radical for a social theorist or evolutionary biologist
(particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century), this revaluation would have
profound consequences when applied to human psychology. And on this matter Haeckel
had much to say indeed—actually, he felt as if he’d already said it. As he argued in his
Riddle of the Universe (1895/1900b), “All the chief laws of heredity,” the ones he had
delineated in his studies of comparative morphology and embryology, “are just as valid
and universal in their application to psychic phenomena as to bodily structure—in fact,
they are frequently more striking and conspicuous in the former than in the latter” (p.
140).
Though he began his scientific career studying marine invertebrates, Haeckel, like
so many evolutionary thinkers in the nineteenth century, had early on set his sights on the
human mind. So comprehensive was evolutionary biology’s grasp of the nervous system,
he maintained, that
it affords us a perfectly clear insight into one of the highest problems of
philosophy, namely, the Phylogeny of the psyche, the mind, or the ancestral
lineage of Man’s psychic activities, and leads us into the only path by which we
shall ever be able to solve this the highest of all problems. (Haeckel, 1874/1900,
vol. 1, p. 23)
Like Darwin, by “highest” Haeckel meant most advanced and most recent. Consistent
with evolutionary thought since the Origin, he considered both the human central nervous
system and consciousness to be the latest (and therefore most advanced) additions to the
phylogenetic sequence. More than that of any other species, human ontogeny
demonstrated phylogenetic progress “in the modifications of the brain …. The human
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mind, according to the law of unlimited adaptation, enjoys an infinite perspective of
becoming ever more and more perfect” (Haeckel, 1868/1883, vol. 1, p. 250).
But even here, he insisted that consciousness was merely the latest terminal
addition to the long drama of phylogeny. The biogenetic law demonstrated as much.
Anyone attempting to say otherwise—for instance, the proto-mysterian Emil du BoisReymond—had
overlooked the obvious consideration that … the consciousness of the human race
must have arisen gradually by evolution through many phylogenetic stages
precisely in the same way that even yet the individual consciousness of every
child is gradually completed in the course of many ontogenetic stages. (Haeckel,
1874/1900a, vol. 1, p. 167)
Here was the biogenetic law as applied to developmental psychology: A child’s ego
development simply followed the phylogenetic history that determined it. That the child
seemed to enter the world a psychological tabula rasa was the case only because her
development had to begin at the same place as the human species.
Tellingly, Haeckel’s (1868/1883) recapitulationist formulation of developmental
psychology appealed to the same analogy that would drive Freud in Totem and Taboo—it
required one “to study and compare the mental life of wild savages and children” (vol. 2,
p. 363).25 The many comparisons that Haeckel made in this vein reflected the racism
typical of nineteenth-century ethnology, but did so less to denigrate the subaltern colonial
subject than to show that both cultural and child development evinced psychological
progress. “We are,” he concluded, rightly “proud of having so immensely outstripped our
lower animal ancestors, and derive from it the consoling assurance that in future also,
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Freud (1913/1950), of course, added the “psychic lives of neurotics” to this by
then familiar analogy.
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mankind, as a whole, will follow the glorious career of progressive development, and
attain a still higher degree of mental perfection” (Haeckel, 1868/1883, vol. 2, p. 367).
But by the time he published his final popular work, The Wonders of Life,
Haeckel (1904) wasn’t so sure. Industrial progress seemed only to have produced more
poverty; “statistics of suicide increase so much in the more civilized communities,” and
bad luck in heredity boded poorly for many a child of the twentieth century (Haeckel,
1904, p. 116). If the results of ontogenetic recapitulation didn’t fully reflect phylogenetic
progress in this or that person’s life, it would presumably be the height of humanity to
allow him to end it himself:
If then the circumstances of life come to press too hard on the poor being who has
thus developed, without any fault of his, from the fertilized ovum—if instead of
the hoped-for good, there come only care and need, sickness and misery of every
kind—he has the unquestionable right to put an end to his sufferings by death ….
The voluntary death by which a man puts an end to intolerable suffering is really
an act of redemption. (Haeckel, 1904, pp. 116-117).
Suicide as “self-redemption” might sound like the cynicism of a lapsed optimist, but there
is every indication that Haeckel meant what he said—and, for that matter, that it was
consistent with the progressivism he had been advancing all along. According to the
unidirectional logic of the biogenetic law as formalized by Haeckel, progress, while
certain, was strictly phylogenetic. Its history could be observed in the individual’s
development, but not necessarily in the shape or value of her life.
Haeckel’s defenses of suicide (and elsewhere, euthanasia) seemed to follow
logically from the evolutionary doctrine he never ceased to advance: In rendering the
specimen subservient to the species, the biogenetic law allowed one to maintain a notion
of progress at the level of phylogeny, albeit at the expense of personal meaning or
redemption. Anna’s untimely death, the increasing brutality of Prussian militarism, the
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persistence of “medieval” superstition in the academy—all such worrisome developments
could be explained away as so many bumps along the recapitulationary road, ontogenetic
misfortunes absolved by “a gradual advance towards perfection” (Haeckel, 1868/1883,
vol. 2, p. 456). This, in adumbrated form, was the tragic dimension of post-Haeckelian
recapitulationism: Personal tragedy could be safely acknowledged, but only when
subsumed within a macrocosmic process that effaced the person.

In sum, Haeckel’s formulation and applications of the biogenetic law transformed
Darwinian progressivism in one distinct, near-paradoxical way: They relied upon
individual development to demonstrate evolutionary progress, yet were required to treat
as meaningless any appearance of individual decline. The moral contortions required to
maintain this contradiction forced Haeckel to draw some unexpectedly tragic conclusions
about the value of individual life.
The future of phylogeny—especially as witnessed in individual development—
carried the weight of all such beliefs in progress. The stakes thus raised, one can
understand why the specters of degeneration and devolution began to loom. When, in
subsequent iterations, the biogenetic law appeared sans its unidirectional logic,
recapitulationist ideas would prove surprisingly useful in explaining ever more troubling
developments in individual experience and cultural history. No matter how little it
interested Haeckel, his insistence on the obligatory ontogenetic traversal of natural and
cultural antiquity—no matter how compressed or prolonged—also had the effect of
resurrecting the past, making it a permanent presence within all individual development.
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Of course, provided ontogenetic development remained progressive, and phylogeny
couldn’t be reversed, the theory, too, could maintain its progressivism.
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CHAPTER 3

RECAPITULATIONARY DIFFUSION AND DEVELOPMENTAL
ANXIETIES OF ATAVISM:
THE CURIOUS CATHEXIS OF AN INHERITED IDEA
“[T]he typically rotund baby, whose elephantine limbs are exhibited by the proud mother
to all her friends and relatives, is about as melancholy a monument of human misery as it
is possible to imagine!” (Robinson, 1894, p. 471)
At the conclusion of a 1920 primer promoting the previous century’s evolutionary
progressivism, one of Haeckel’s English translators reminded his readers that, besides
being factually correct, the “story of evolution is a great aid to correct thinking.” No
matter the theory’s complexity, promised the ex-priest Joseph McCabe (1920),
evolutionary thinking “gives you a solid ground for hope and trust in man. No
evolutionist can be a pessimist” (p. 124). Notwithstanding the optimism of his loyal
surrogate, by the time of Haeckel’s death in 1919 few evolutionists would have shared
such confidence in the unbroken progress of human history. For many, the assumption of
individual, ontogenetic tragedy that Haeckel considered so much collateral damage along
the march of phylogenetic progress came to represent a more dominant trend within
evolution as a whole. At the height of its influence in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the biogenetic law seemed to evince progress, only to imply decline.
Within this teleologically conflicted territory, a biogenetic approach to child and
developmental psychology began to parallel a trans-disciplinary concern with social and
biological degeneration. (Then far more than now, the boundaries between clinical,
developmental, and social psychology were consistently porous, and the overlap of these

50

fields of study does run the risk of confusing what were sometimes distinct approaches to
the issues involved.) As I show in this chapter, it is no accident that the leading lights of
both the American child study movement and early psychoanalysis couched their
ambivalently

progressivist

theories

of

human

development

in

consistently

recapitulationary terms. After all, to study the child was to study both the pre-history and
the prospects of (future) human evolution, and not merely to establish a normative model
of development. Just as the embryo was presumed to document natural antiquity, for
psychological recapitulationists childhood provided a window into the “childhood of the
race,” into civilization in its imagined infancy (Noon, 2005; Morss, 1990; see also
Brickman, 2003; Gould, 1977, pp. 135-143). Even as the authority of the biogenetic law
waned among biologists and embryologists, those searching for the history and future of
human phylogeny shifted their attention from the embryo to the child, who, alongside the
“primitive,” assumed the peculiar status of both living fossil and prophet. “Youth, when
properly understood,” as G. Stanley Hall (1904/1931) declared in his Adolescence, “will
seem to be not only the revealer of the past but of the future, for it is dimly prophetic of
that best part of history which is not yet written because it has not yet transpired” (vol. 2,
p. 448).
To contemporary observers, this shift (one is tempted to say transference) from
embryonic ontogeny to child development was a natural one, no more than a logical
extension of the era’s transdisciplinary geneticism. As the British psychologist James
Sully (1896) explained in his Studies of Childhood, “Our modern science is before all
things historical and genetic, going back to beginnings to understand the later and more
complex phases of things as the outcome of these beginnings” (p. 4). Within a scientific
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culture suffused with recapitulationary thinking, such “beginnings” need not be
chronologically ancient. In many cases, scientists selected as examples of ontogenesis
material that was far from exotic—and sometimes disarmingly personal. Indeed, ever
since the publication of Berthold Sigismund’s (1856) wildly popular Kind und Welt,
evolutionists from Darwin to the Anglo-German William Preyer (1841-1897; 1882/1890)
had been spinning scientific studies out of their own children’s development.26
By the century’s end, as Sully (1896) observed, child development was fast
becoming a far richer area of evolutionary study, threatening to surpass even the fossil
record in its body of phylogenetic secrets: “The same kind of curiosity that prompts the
geologist to get back to the first stages in the building up of the planet, or the biologist to
search out the pristine forms of life, is beginning to urge the student of man to discover
by a careful study of infancy the way in which human life begins to take its characteristic
forms” (Sully, 1896, p. 4).27 None other than Darwin’s longtime research assistant,
George Romanes (1848-1894), underscored the psychological implications of this shift
from embryo to child, insisting that
in the growing intelligence of a child we have thus as complete a history of
‘ontogeny,’ in its relation to ‘phylogeny,’ as that upon which the embryologist is
accustomed to rely when he reads the morphological history of a species in the
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Gould (1977, pp. 135-139) traces the growth of this genre to Preyer’s
(1882/1890a) Die Seele des Kindes, whose title was apparently stripped of its Teutonic
metaphysics in the widely printed English translation, The Mind of the Child (Preyer,
1882/1890b). However, Darwin’s (1877) “Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” as well as
Sigismund’s (1856) Kind und Welt, both antedate Preyer’s work by more than a few
years (cf. Lorch & Hellal, 2010; Sully, 1896, pp. 4-5). Hall (1891) apparently regretted
that his own infancy had not been the subject of such a work, but nonetheless saw fit to
publish a diary study of two of his children (pp. 127-138; see also Hall, 1923, pp. 376377.
27
See also the vast compendium of such studies summarized by Hall’s colleague
at Clark University, Alexander Francis Chamberlain (1900/1907, pp. 213-355).
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epitome which is furnished by the development of the individual. (Romanes,
1888, p. 432)
And yet for many an evolutionist, as Sully (1896) noted, the child’s ontogenesis was of
more than historical interest:
While a monument to his race, and in a manner a key to its history, the child is
also its product. In spite of the fashionable Weismannism of the hour, there are
evolutionists who hold that in the early manifested tendencies of the child we can
discern signs of a hereditary transmission of the effects of ancestral experiences
and activities. (Sully, 1896, p. 9)28
At once the result of and an active agent in a natural-historical drama, the child provided
many a fin de siècle recapitulationist with an image of evolution in action.

Whether progressivist or pessimistic, the immense breadth of the biogenetic
principle’s diffusion beyond the previous century’s evolutionary biology requires, for
clarity’s sake, a focus that carries two risks: First, my attention to recapitulationary
psychologies in this chapter self-consciously ignores the broad reach of “Haeckel’s Law”
by the turn of the century. As has been documented thoroughly and variously, biogenetic
parallelism shaped discursive arenas as distinct as criminology, science fiction, and
colonial ethnocentrism; late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developmental
psychology and psychoanalysis were but two of the many “genetic” sciences once cast in
the Haeckelian mold. Second, despite the multi-disciplinary proliferation of
recapitulationist theories, it should be remembered that, even at the height of its influence
28

Sully’s (1896, p. 9) apparently unfavorable reference to the German biologist
August Weismann (1834-1914) was meant to endorse a Lamarckian understanding of
recapitulation, in which the modern child reenacts her ancestors’ historical acquisition of
certain characters. It is worth noting that Weismann was, in fact, a lifelong friend of
Haeckel’s, despite being an early and outspoken critic of Lamarckian inheritance. For his
relationship with Haeckel and critique of Lamarckism, see Richards (2008, pp. 162-163,
277n).
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among biologists, the authority of the biogenetic law was never quite uncontested (cf.
Chamberlain, 1981, pp. 697-702; Gould, 1977, pp. 115-155).29
This being the case, I begin with a brief account of the waning influence of
recapitulationism for those studying embryology and evolutionary biology. As tangential
as it may seem, such an explanation is necessary if one is to understand the deeper roots
of recapitulationism’s persistent psychological appeal. For to a much greater degree than
evolutionary biology, the nascent field of developmental psychology proved uniquely
amenable to the expression of anxieties surrounding the directions of human evolution. In
the analysis of the thought of G. Stanley Hall, James Mark Baldwin, and others that
follows, certain vectors of developmental decline—trends once presumed merely
anomalous, particularly by Darwin and Haeckel—came to seem definitive, the rule rather
than its exceptions. As a general trend observable in the phasic development of any one
psyche, it seemed ever more plausible to be both an evolutionist and a pessimist.

The Biogenetic Palimpsest, from Embryology to Psychology
Among biologists as elsewhere, the biogenetic law was never without its
problems. By treating as corroboration the natural world’s endless supply of exceptions
to Haeckel’s principles of condensation and terminal addition, the idea’s reach was such
that it was bound to attract endless critiques. Until the “rediscovery” of Mendelian
heredity, most of these objections came from the increasingly fashionable field of
experimental embryology, where methodological commitments required an almost
instinctual disdain for recapitulationist “idealism.” To many in the latter camp, Haeckel’s
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On pre-Haeckelian critiques of biogenetic parallelism, see Coleman (1973).
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could seem like “a theory,” as Romanes (1908) complained to Darwin in an 1880 letter,
that often appeared “little better than a restatement of the mystery of heredity in terms of
the highest abstraction” (p. 98).30 Producing diminishing returns as a framework for
research, recapitulationism would eventually prove sandier soil for biological theorizing
as well, a fate that was finally sealed with the acceptance of molecular genetics (Hall,
2007; see also Gould, 1977, pp. 202-214).
By the late nineteen-twenties, embryonic ontogeny looked less like a
comprehensive record of phylogeny than, as one observer suggested, “an ancient
palimpsest that has been erased and written over again and again. Traces of the old record
are still there; some are obscure, some are almost entirely obliterated” (Conklin, 1928, p.
75). Strict Haeckelian recapitulationism held that such “traces” were essentially
“imperishable” (unvergänglich, as Freud [1915/1971, p. 301] would later brand them),
but the changing science of heredity allowed for their effective disappearance, if not
wholesale erasure: An instance of atavism, for instance, was an unremarkable
chromosomal fluke, rather than a sign of ontogenetic arrest or phylogenetic regression.
Ultimately, the biogenetic principle became a less reliable (and conceptually more
problematic) instrument for revealing the record of natural history. No longer was
evolutionary biology as well a philosophy of history, at least not to the degree that it was
before (Gould, 1977, pp. 186-206; Laubichler & Maienschein, 2007).
Yet for those scrutinizing human postnatal development, the explanatory power of
the biogenetic law was hard to resist. Phylogeny may have started to seem like an
unreliable palimpsest (or mystic writing pad), but human ontogeny could be counted on
30

On the clash between recapitulationary and experimental embryologists, see
Gould (1977, pp. 186-202).
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to fill the gaps in the fantasied fossil record. One need only carefully observe her own
child’s development, as the American psychologist Milicent Shinn (1900) reasoned in her
Biography of a Baby, to see that “from the ontogenic record no chapter can be torn out: a
fresh copy of the whole history, from alpha to omega, is written out every time an infant
is conceived, and born, and grows to manhood” (p. 8).31
Such confidence could be partly explained by a tendency among non-biologists to
play rather fast and loose with the technical details of the recapitulation theory. To critics,
this was the whole problem with biogenetic theorizing outside biology proper. “A
principle of limited application within the field of its origin,” Haeckel’s law, as the
American developmental psychologist Percy Davidson (1914) complained, “was elevated
to a position of wide generality, and so gave rise to a conception in the main misleading”
(p. 99). By overextending the biogenetic law—and overreaching their disciplinary
expertise—psychological recapitulationists were responsible for the “misleading
influence” that proliferated. According to this verdict, recapitulationism was a case (as
Frank Sulloway [1991] would later say of Freud’s) in which “bad biology ultimately
spawned bad psychology” (p. 245; see also Holmes, 1944).
As much as I distrust this sort of facile, presentist attempt to explain-away
enthusiasm for psychological recapitulationism as so much “bad science” (whatever that
is), Davidson’s (1914) critique of the period’s epistemic heterodoxy is worth considering.
In his well-intentioned attempt to correct a pervasive “misunderstanding,” he established
the key difference between biological and psychological invocations of the biogenetic
law—a difference that is essential to understanding recapitulationism’s persistent appeal
31

Notwithstanding the above, Shinn’s (1900) biogenetically driven biography
began with the newborn, rather than its conception, about which she said nothing.
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beyond biology: “whereas biological recapitulation assumes that the individual passes
through and leaves behind … its recapitulationary stages in the progression towards the
specific adult form,” psychological applications of the theory spoke to “psycho-physical
features, which remain functional for life” (Davidson, 1914, pp. 78-79). Where biological
recapitulation meant abandoning one, presumably more phylogenetically ancient stage
and rising to another—think of a tadpole becoming a frog, or a caterpillar a butterfly—
psychological recapitulation meant meeting inherited, psycho-developmental milestones.
The difference here should be clear: A tadpole might shed its tail when it becomes
a frog, but no such sloughing-off occurs in psychic ontogenesis. (As we all know,
learning how to talk does not mean forgetting how to cry.) Thus, when applied to the
developing human mind, the biogenetic law meant permanence rather than ephemerality,
establishment rather than traversal. To a psychologist like Davidson, better versed than
most in the biology of his day, this was where psychological recapitulationism ran off the
rails:
From these more or less direct applications of the biological theory [in embryonic
ontogeny] there is noticeable a grading off to a less and less chronological notion
of it, as there is in embryology, until recapitulation is supposed to be illustrated in
any juvenile retention of ancestral adult characteristics, or indeed any ancestral
traits whatever, juvenile or adult. (Davidson, 1914, p. 79)
Yet to those studying human psychology, whether or not biogenetic recapitulation really
followed Haeckel’s progressive sequence was irrelevant. The real point of contention—
the one that documented the changing meaning of recapitulation—was the retention of
ancestral features in the contemporary individual’s development. Of course,
recapitulation had always implied the preservation of the ancient progenitor within the
contemporary individual; this was, after all, how the biogenetic law functioned as a
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hereditary mechanism, transmitting the past by compressing it and pushing it back into
earlier and earlier stages of development. As Davidson (1914) noted, what distinguished
early twentieth-century psychological iterations of Haeckel’s law was an emphasis on the
co-existence, or chronological simultaneity, of primitive and modern features.
That this violates a foundational assumption of Haeckelian recapitulationism
should be obvious. Ideally, the phylogenetic past is simply passed through, no more an
active influence in the individual’s existence than a coccyx is a tail. But to psychological
recapitulationists like G. Stanley Hall and Arthur Alliń (1897), given to “conjecture and
wonder,” the fact that a coccyx develops from an ancestral tail seemed to invite endless
psychological speculation (p. 16). At the risk of exhausting the vestigial analogy,
consider their remarks on children’s affinity with animals:
Nothing would be more rash than to assert that the fact that both the bones and
several pairs of muscles that are represented in the human coccyx has anything to
do with children’s amusement with pinning on tails. Nothing, however, is better
established than that there is a closer rapport between animals … and children
than is the case with adults. (Hall & Alliń, 1897, p. 16; see also Guillet, 1900)
Without requiring a causal biological explanation, Hall and Alliń (1897) were content to
observe that what might look like an innocent game of pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey was in
fact a form of catharsis, whereby still-animalistic children “discharge instinctive
tendencies to crime,” among other inherited vices (p. 18). In their phylogenetically
prescribed rapport with animals, children were really “recapitulating with immense
rapidity a very long stage in the evolution of the human out of the animal psyche” (Hall
& Alliń, 1897, p. 18). And in a theme that would shape nearly all psychological
applications of the biogenetic principle, there always remained a degree of uncertainty
surrounding the full disappearance of psychic stages once recapitulated.
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This, then, is what psychological versions of recapitulationism looked like at the
turn of the century. Far from simply misunderstanding the biogenetic law (as Davidson
and others believed), psychological recapitulationists seized upon it for its more
metaphorical, explanatory power, and insisted that past phylogenetic stages necessarily
persisted well after their traversal within ontogeny. As James Mark Baldwin (1897)
explained, analogies were more than sufficient for psychological speculation, “since we
find more and more developed stages of conscious function in a series corresponding in
the main with the stages of nervous growth in the animals; and then we find this growth
paralleled in its great features in the mental development of the infant” (p. 15). For in the
mind unlike the body, as Freud (1915c/1957) would later say, “succession also involves
co-existence” (p. 285).
But what, then, explains such a flagrant violation of Haeckel’s law among these
self-professed men of science? In a word, degeneration. The evolutionary progressivism
once synonymous with the biogenetic principle could hardly be maintained after this
retooling of its most basic directional mechanism. Transferred from the embryo to the
psyche, Haeckel’s (1874/1900a) “brief, compressed reproduction” functioned as a
lifelong presence, looming in the recesses of the mind like some latent atavism, and
threatening to pull the contemporary individual backwards along a reversed
recapitulationary sequence (vol. 1, p. 7).32
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The influence of degenerationist theories within evolutionary biology was more
varied and less lasting than within psychology. On debates surrounding the former from
the eighteen-seventies to the nineteen-twenties, see Bowler (1989).
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Child Development and the Anxieties of Degeneration
Apparently familiar with the various challenges to evolutionary progressivism
that began to emerge in the final decade of the nineteenth century, in 1891 H. G. Wells
weighed in on the implications of one theory in particular. Recent biogenetic studies of
sea squirts, or ascidians, had revealed them to be degenerate vertebrates. As Wells
(1891/1975) noted in his popular essay, “Zoological Retrogression,” the height of this
species’ evolutionary “advancement” seemed to appear in its larval state, after which it
“turns back from the upward path and becomes at last a merely vegetative excrescence on
a rock” (p. 162). From this glaring exception to the laws of evolutionary progress, one
could infer that the future of human development was far from certain. There was, in fact,
“no guarantee in scientific knowledge of man’s permanence or permanent ascendency”
(Wells, 1891/1975, p. 168).33
Since it was clear that an apparently advanced species could devolve via
“degradation,” it seemed possible that man, too, might meet a fate similar to the sea
squirt’s (if he hadn’t already, as Wells [1891/1975] seemed to believe was the case).
Millennia of advancement would be reduced to recapitulationary remnants, abruptly
disappearing in the earliest stages of ontogenesis. For evolutionary biologists, Wells
(1891/1975) explained to his presumed audience of non-specialists, the “presumption is
that before [humanity] lies a long future of profound modification, but whether that will
be, according to present ideals, upward or downward, no one can forecast” (p. 168).
Still, so far as any scientist can tell us, it may be that … Nature is, in unsuspected
obscurity, equipping some now humble creature with wider possibilities of
33

Wells (1891/1975) does not name his source, but his discussion of ascidian
phylogeny in this article appears to be drawn directly from Lankester’s (1880)
Degeneration. See Bowler (1989, pp. 336-337).
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appetite, endurance, or destruction, to rise in the fullness of time and sweep homo
away into the darkness from which his universe arose. The Coming Beast must
certainly be reckoned in any anticipatory calculations regarding the Coming Man.
(Wells, 1891/1975, p. 168).
To paraphrase a much later text (Phillips, 1998), for Wells’ (1891/1975) more
biogenetically inclined contemporary psychologists, the beast was already in the nursery.
A record of homo’s progressive advancement, the infant also carried the seeds of his
decline. Thus, for those applying the biogenetic law to the study of childhood, the
potential for evolutionary degeneration amounted to a social-scientific call to arms: Not
only to ensure progress, but also to prevent heritable retrogressions, child and adolescent
development would be tended to as an uncommonly delicate process.
Tensions in the once-certain advancement of human phylogeny tended to be most
apparent when recapitulationary attention shifted more strongly to ontogeny—
particularly when assuming the form of normative treatments of developmental
psychology. As one contemporary noted rather optimistically, “in the study of children
we may be always sure that a normal child has in him the promise of a normal man”
(Baldwin, 1897, p. 6). Though not immediately apparent, James Mark Baldwin’s (18611934) belatedly influential theory of “organic selection” made such a shift all the more
tenable, allowing as it did for ontogenetic adaptations to be transmitted socially, rather
than materially.
Baldwin termed this process “social heredity.” Without explicitly claiming to do
so, his 1896 “New Factor in Evolution” reversed the classic Haeckelian hierarchy, in
which ontogeny was through and through a function of phylogeny. As Baldwin (1896b)
saw things, the reverse had to be true: Social heredity “tends to set the direction of
phylogenetic progress” (p. 537). Through the mechanisms of adaptive consciousness and
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inherited intelligence, individual experience and behavior determined what traits would
be transmitted to the next generation—and therefore what phylogenetic stages were
recapitulated ontogenetically (Hogenson, 2001; Richards, 1987, pp. 451-503).
While the intricacies of Baldwin’s (1896a, 1896b) reasoning here are beyond the
scope of this chapter, his argument is worth considering for its impact on G. Stanley
Hall’s later reformulation of psychological recapitulationism. Rather than having the
development of the individual’s mind pre-determined by phylogeny (as would a strict
Haeckelian), Baldwin (1896b) proposed instead
a phylogeny of mind which proceeds in the direction set by the ontogeny of mind
…. And since it is the one principle of Organic Selection working by the same
functions to set the direction of both phylogenies, the physical and the mental, the
two developments are not two, but one. Evolution is, therefore, not more
biological than psychological. (p. 547; see also Baldwin, 1896a)
By making individual behavior a necessary factor in psychic evolution, without quite
intending to do so Baldwin’s thought effectively opened the door for degenerative
tendencies to manifest within the social. Put otherwise, Baldwin’s “organic selection”
implied, secondarily, an anxiety regarding the effect of ever-more-plastic human behavior
upon the directions of evolution. For the psychologist if not the embryologist, the
ontogeny of this or that mind functioned to determine the phylogeny of “mind” as a
whole. While continuing to endorse the biogenetic law, the “Baldwin Effect,” as it would
later be called, essentially inverted the Haeckelian power differential (cf. Hogenson,
2001). Now, Baldwin’s subtle inversion of Haeckel’s law meant that the mental
development of the individual child determined the future directions of human evolution.
The consequences of Baldwin’s (1896a, 1896b, 1897) reformulation of the
biogenetic law—not least a more secure basis for anxieties of advance and regress—are
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particularly evident in the manifestly progressivist work of G. Stanley Hall. Indeed,
Hall’s (1904/1931) two-volume study of Adolescence was replete with recommendations
for ensuring the smooth developmental recapitulation of human phylogeny. Yet the text
also contained more than a few cautionary tales about the deleterious effects of
developmental arrest and reversed recapitulation.
I should be clear here that I am proposing a rather different interpretation of the
thought of Hall and associated psychological recapitulationists than is standard. The latter
has tended to take at face-value the many affirmations of evolutionary progress that one
finds in such pages. Certainly, this is an understandable reading, one that is more than
born out by even the most cursory examination of Hall’s substantial oeuvre (cf.
Anandalakshmy & Grinder, 1970, pp. 1114-1118; Arnett, 2006, pp. 190-192; Gould,
1977, pp. 135-155; Noon, 2005, pp. 373-378; Pruette, 1927, pp. 556-558). But by reading
Hall’s evolutionary progressivism—his insistence that “Nothing so reinforces optimism
as evolution”—somewhat against the grain, one may locate the anxiety of degeneration
that propelled so many recapitulationary treatments of childhood, and which allowed for
the swift acceptance of Freudian theory on American psychological soil (Hall,
1904/1931, vol. 2, p. 546). As Wells (1891/1975) noted, “there is almost always
associated with the suggestion of advance in biological phenomena an opposite idea,
which is its essential complement” (p. 158). The same “discord,” or “evolutionary
antithesis” that Wells saw in biological degeneration, I argue, may be found lurking in
the shadows of Hall’s biogenetic psychology of childhood.
Though all but suppressed for much of the twentieth century, the centrality of
recapitulationism in Hall’s thought would be hard to miss. Indeed, his first exposure to
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the biogenetic law was in its natural habitat, during his postdoctoral studies in Berlin and
Leipzig (Ross, 1972). Surprisingly typical of attempts to downplay the recapitulationism
of the previous generation’s psychologists is the kind of revisionist hand-waving of
Hall’s former student, Lorine Pruette (1927). Hall’s “recapitulationary theory,” she
argued at a time when the prestige of the biogenetic law was very much on the decline,
“was for him largely a figure of speech, thrown off for the sake of its illuminating
analogy, and it was treated with as misguided, literal seriousness as was Spencer’s
analogy of society as an organism” (Pruette, 1927, p. 557).34 In truth, however, Hall
treated the biogenetic law as a kind of first principle. In fact, rather than modify or test
the theory experimentally, he spent the early years of his career attempting to translate
recapitulationism into a program of educational reform.
As the famous Child Study Movement took shape in the early eighteen-eighties,
by 1894 the biogenetic law allowed Hall to foresee “not only an educational renaissance,
but a scientific reconstruction that aims at the top and is the salvation and ultimate
development and end and aim of creation and of history” (as cited in Ross, 1972, pp. 260261; emphasis mine). This prophecy, with its liberal use of polysyndeton, may read like
the manic run-on of a madman, but Hall was hardly overstating his convictions: By
allowing the scientist to reconstruct the evolutionary history of the species, the study of
child development would reveal the grand telos of human advancement—and in the
process, demonstrate the educational practices needed to guarantee its fulfillment.
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Gould (1977) was of the mind that Hall’s Adolescence “is still widely read and
studied, but few modern scholars appreciated the central role of recapitulation in defining
both title and subject” (p. 143). On Hall’s encounter with Haeckel’s thought in Germany,
see Ross (1972, pp. 89-94).
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And yet there was another side to Hall’s confidence in child study and its
potential to effect this transformation. Biogenetically based educational reform was not
simply a way to ensure the perfection of the species; it was “one of the most effective
bulwarks against a slow relapse to barbarism” (Hall, 1885, p. 151). On the “right
development” of the child’s mind, he argued in a popular essay, “depends the entire
future of civilization two or three decades hence” (Hall, 1885, pp. 145-146). Influenced
by the many diary studies then appearing across the pond (Hall, 1885, p. 149)—and with
the potential for phylogenetic degeneration never far from his mind—for a time Hall
seriously considered spearheading a research program that would specify the
biogenetically determined, ideal conditions for child development and education (Ross,
1972, pp. 89-94).
The child of thoroughgoing Calvinists, Hall’s initial use of the biogenetic law was
largely confined to religious speculation regarding the developing Protestant child’s
ontogenetic recapitulation of the “evolution” of true religion. Yet in much the same
manner as the theory’s namesake (and Freud thirty years later), Hall’s full conversion to
Haeckel’s Law would appear to have taken place amidst a state of protracted mourning.
In May of 1890, while recovering from a case of diphtheria in the countryside,
Hall’s wife and daughter died from accidental asphyxiation at the family home in
Worcester. Despite taking refuge in a kind of psychologized Protestantism, in the five
bereaved years that followed this tragedy Hall’s scholarly output in psychology ground to
a near halt.35 He did write, however, in 1894 of a “Great Fatigue” that might occasionally
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For Hall’s early religious recapitulationism, see Hall (1883). The gas leak
episode and its apparent effect upon Hall are discussed in Pruette (1926/1970, pp. 95-98)
and Ross (1972, pp. 207-209).
65

develop following the abrupt transition from “the freshness and spontaneity of youth into
the premature ripeness of age” (Hall, 1894b, pp. 451-452), and around the same time first
announced the beginnings of what would become his best-known work, Adolescence
(Hall, 1894a, p. 301).
Facing middle age amidst a mourning become melancholy, Hall began his
recapitulationist study of youth with a paradoxical preoccupation with its ontogenetic
antithesis, senescence. For there was, he confessed in the mid-eighteen-nineties,
a strange rapport between stages of evolution and those of devolution. The foetus
has features and suggestions of old age; and, in learning to speak and move,
children show many if not most symptoms of aphasia and motor disorder. This
correspondence is particularly close between the two climacteric periods of
adolescence and senescence. (Hall, 1894b, p. 450; emphasis mine)
Ontogenetically inscribed, the twinship of progress and decline, of growth and decay,
drove Hall’s recapitulationary theory of human development and phylogenetic progress
from the beginning.
Fancying himself “the Darwin of the mind,” and having taken up a number of
texts advancing similar ideas (among them Baldwin’s [1895/1968] Mental Development
in the Child and the Race, as well as the work of Romanes [1888]), Hall’s new genetic
developmental psychology attempted to divine the history and directions of progress
from the contemporary child’s ontogeny (Hall, 1923, p. 360; see also Fisher, 1925, pp.
49-50). Over the ten years it took Hall (1904/1931) to complete the two-volume
Adolescence, he gradually shifted his venue of research from the laboratory to the natural
world and its history. In so doing, he located his own anxieties over death and
degeneration within the teleological parallelism of the biogenetic law. And so, it is to
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this, his most influential text and the most thoroughgoing (pre-psychoanalytic) biogenetic
study of human development, that my focus now turns.
Like many a turn-of-the-century psychologist, Hall saw evolution taking place all
around him. True, the pace of physical changes might be so glacial as to be imperceptible
(just as Darwin [1859/1977] had lamented in the Origin). That the human psyche was “in
a transition stage,” however, was everywhere apparent. Psychologically if not
anatomically, the Clark University professor was confident that “man is not a permanent
type but an organism in a very active stage of evolution toward a more permanent form”
(Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. vii). What that new form might be, Hall (1904/1931) couldn’t
quite say, but he was hopeful that by directing the psychological ontogeny particular to
children and adolescents according to emerging phylogenetic wisdom, the psychorecapitulationist might not only ensure, but also hasten the species’ transformation into
“the superanthropoid that man is to become” (vol. 2, p. 94).
Hall was not exactly unique in his tendency to advance a “species” of
evolutionary messianism; nor was he was the first to suggest that primary and secondary
educational curricula be tailored to match the phylogenetic stages which they supposedly
recapitulate. Rather, his emphasis on the centrality of the biogenetic law in this process
was unusual insofar as it made the adolescent the arbiter of phylogenetic progress or
regress. He was, moreover, a great deal more forthcoming than others in his fears that
insufficiently recapitulationist child-rearing practices threatened not only to forestall, but
potentially to reverse all that hard-earned evolutionary advancement. As he later
suggested in a more speculative essay, “evolution is only the best case of devolution,”

67

and the adolescent’s chaotic reenactment of an ancient period of Sturm und Drang made
especially clear that phylogenetic progress was far from given (Hall, 1908, p. 180).36
Indeed, as far as subsequent iterations of psychological recapitulationism are
concerned, two core assumptions—each of which I will discuss in some detail below—
color the thousand-plus pages of Adolescence, and distinguish it from prior applications
of the biogenetic law. First, Hall (1904/1931) insists that adolescence is biogenetically
noteworthy insofar as it is “neo-atavistic”—that is, deriving from more phylogenetically
recent evolutionary changes and acquisitions. Childhood, in contrast (according to the
standard recapitulationist logic), is “paleo-atavistic,” and exhibits traits of more primitive
and evolutionarily ancient species. To cite two typical examples, children’s affinity for
water is held to reflect human descent from some piscine progenitor, just as newborns’
strength as swimmers briefly reproduces the adulthood of a pelagic ancestor (Hall,
1904/1931, vol. 2, pp. 192-196; Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, pp. xiii-xiv).37 Middle childhood
or the latency period (as it would later be called), in fact documented “the age of maturity
in some remote, perhaps pigmoid, stage of human evolution.” For this reason, Hall
argued, “the boy is father of the man in a new sense in that his qualities are indefinitely
older and existed well compacted untold ages before the more distinctly human attributes
were developed.” Whereas the “child comes from and harkens back to a remoter past,” in
the neo-atavistic adolescent
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On the “culture epoch theory” and other attempts to structure primary
educational curricula according to the phylogenetic sequence, see Gould (1977, pp. 148155) and Morss (1990).
37
Hall (1904/1931) seemed to believe that the greatest danger to female
development along these lines was “the persistent ignoring by feminists of the prime
importance of establishing normal periodicity in girls” (vol. 1, p. xiv).
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the later acquisitions of the race slowly become prepotent. Development is less
gradual and more saltatory, suggestive of some ancient period of storm and stress
when old moorings were broken and a higher level attained …. [I]f there is arrest
at any stage or in any part before the higher unity is achieved there is almost sure
to be degeneration and reunion on a lower level than before. (Hall, 1904/1931,
vol. 1, pp. ix-x)
And so, an outline of the phylogenetic telos of humanity—our gradual progress toward
that “superanthropoid” man—may be located in the latest, most phylogenetically recent
stages of adolescent development. (Hall, for what it is worth, seems to have relegated
post-adolescent adulthood to a kind of evolutionary status quo, carrying on more or less
statically until the onset of senescence more predictably reversed the adolescent
developmental sequence.)
Second, for Hall, the neo-atavistic character of adolescence presented a
contemporary moral problem in terms of its apparent “plasticity”—a word, as we will
see, that carried no small amount of anxiety for Hall the evolutionary progressivist (at
least when compared to Baldwin), and which often emerged in the context of cautionary
tales regarding the dangers of developmental “precocity.” According to Hall (1904/1931),
in her ontogenesis the pubescent youth recapitulates a more recent and decidedly more
labile period of phylogeny, one in which the trappings of civilization were insecurely
acquired through an ancient epoch of Sturm und Drang. Ultimately, the “new birth” that
he saw taking place in adolescent development was one that recapitulated an inheritance
that remained far from settled (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. xiii). The progress of the
human species therefore hinged upon the proper supervision of its adolescents.
The wide dissemination of any scientific theory tends to produce a heterodox
climate of opinion and application, and Hall’s use of the biogenetic principle was no
exception. Though dismissed by later historians of science with a presentist bent as a
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misinformed popularizer, Hall was keenly aware that his idiosyncratic applications of
biological recapitulationism were not exactly the height of scientific precision. Indeed, in
a rhetorical gesture not unlike Freud’s famous remark to Ernest Jones (“so much the
worse for the biologists”), Hall proposed that on matters of recapitulationism the same
inconsistencies that made for bad biology amounted to theoretical necessity in
psychology. “Realizing the limitations and qualifications of the recapitulation theory in
the biologic field,” he argued in the preface to Adolescence, “I am now convinced that its
psychogenetic applications have a method of their own” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. viii).
Clearly, evolution as it was recognizably taking place in contemporary society
was more psychological than physical, just as Baldwin had implied. (Indeed, Hall
[1904/1931] believed it had been so ever since some not-so-distant time when “the
evolutionary struggle began to be predominantly psychic instead of physical” [vol. 1, p.
49].) And so just as Haeckel (1874/1900) had prophesied in his Anthropogenie, in the
first decade of the new century Hall (1904/1931) insisted that it was “in the psychic yet
more than the physical rudiments that we must seek the key to unlock the enchanting but
baffling mysteries of man’s past” (vol. 1., p. 49). Just as it was becoming worse biology,
recapitulationism was somehow making for better and more compelling psychology.
Ten years in the making, the product of Hall’s emergence from a prolonged state
of bereavement (his “Great Fatigue”) was also a methodological statement, showing how
the biogenetic law could be brought to bear upon what he considered the most pressing
problems facing civilization. While accepting critiques like Davidson’s (1914) (and those
of other more biologically orthodox scientists), Hall insisted that recapitulationism
belonged in psychology as in no other field of study. Indeed, though rarely observed, the
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real methodological innovation in Adolescence was to invoke “phyletic explanations” on
developmental questions involving a high degree of moral ambiguity (Hall, 1904/1931,
vol. 1, p. viii). Because, as Hall maintains, the most recent additions to human phylogeny
are comparatively fragile, parents, teachers, and psychologists must reason biogenetically
to determine the proper care of the child and adolescent. This was neither a systematic
case for, nor a simple application of, recapitulationism as a philosophical proposition or
scientific theory; it was, rather, an attempt to morally cathect an inherited idea.
In Hall’s eyes, all impediments to psycho-phylogenetic progress boiled down to
the dangers of “precocity,” to the too-early emergence of certain ontogenetically
prescribed traits and behaviors. In contrast to his more biologically inclined
contemporaries, for Hall no less than Haeckel the evolution of the psyche admitted only
addition, and never retrograde revision. His hypothetical units of mental heredity, which
he termed “psychophores,” naturally contained multitudes, and were “wax to receive and
marble to retain” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 2, p. 65). Yet the psychic palimpsest worked in
one direction only: It could be written over, but never erased. Whether amended or
reversed, all accumulated traces were carved in stone.
And so, for the developmental psychologist, timing was everything. Indeed, the
logic of recapitulationism itself seemed to imply as much, for, given “the immense
importance of further coordinating childhood and youth with the development of the
race,” Hall (1904/1931) insisted that
only here can we hope to find true norms against the tendencies to precocity in
home, school, church, and civilization generally, and also to establish criteria by
which to diagnose and measure arrest and retardation in the individual and the
race. While individuals differ widely in not only the age but the sequence of the
stages of repetition of racial history, a knowledge of nascent stages and the
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aggregate interests of different ages of life is the best safeguard against very many
of the prevalent errors of education and of life. (vol. 1, p. viii)
The child and adolescent might not recapitulate human phylogeny in a uniform order, but
the biogenetic law still provided the moral yardstick for determining what sorts of
precocity should be considered dangerous to civilization.
The child, Hall (1904/1931) suggested in a Rousseauian mode, “revels in
savagery” (vol. 1, p. x). Yet if so fortunate as to enjoy a pastoral upbringing like the
author’s, her baser instincts “could conceivably be so organized and directed as to be far
more truly humanistic and liberal than all that the best modern school can provided”
(Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. x). This would be the natural result of childhood’s faithful
ontogenetic recapitulation of human phylogeny: The savage past would simply play itself
out, and upon its phasic completion remain as a relic in the recesses of the psyche.
Successfully traversed through developmental catharsis, phylogenetic memory would be
adaptively sublimated, functioning for the adult as “the only muse that can save us from
the omnipresent dangers of precocity” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. xi).38
The same, however, could not be said of the adolescent, whose rates of
psychological as well as physical growth Hall believed far more variable, and hence more
directionally labile. For the awkward age was really the recapitulation of an ancient
period of unspeakable barbarity, in which mature civilization just barely emerged from a
savage infancy. Much therefore depended upon how adolescents were raised, educated,
and disciplined—particularly given that most of them now came of age in urban,
industrial settings that Hall believed less conducive to enlightened ontogenesis. Insisting
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On Hall’s nostalgia for his pastoral boyhood, see his “Notes on Early
Memories” in Hall (1920, pp. 297-336).
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that the “whole future of life depends on how the new powers now given suddenly and in
profusion [to the adolescent] are husbanded and directed,” Hall’s ten years of labor were
meant to provide a guide to such care and influence: To “help the young exploit aright all
the possibilities of the years from fourteen to twenty-four and to safeguard them against
… insidious dangers,” he modestly proposed, “is the writer’s chief desire” (Hall,
1904/1931, vol. 1, pp. xv, xix).
Being neo-atavistic, the plasticity of the adolescent’s development—in which
orderly progress seemed to be but one mood swing away from becoming irreversible
regress—reflected a certain porosity in the border separating the savage from the
civilized. While recapitulationists had been projecting Victorian notions of primitivity
onto child development for some time, Hall’s anxieties about the directional lability of
adolescent development reflected a deeper uncertainty regarding the inevitability of
human progress. Adolescence was a kind of naturally selected point of crisis, one that
reified psychologically the social upheaval of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. However, what should be emphasized in this vein is not the importance of
historicizing recapitulationist ideas (which, as discussed above, seems more than
satisfactorily accomplished already), but the function of the biogenetic law to the
psychological theorists that most stridently advanced it. With his vision of adolescence as
a teleologically bi-directional developmental sequence, Hall anxiously re-cathected
recapitulationism to a degree that Haeckel only hinted at.
Which is not to say that the theory itself emerged unchanged. Hall’s use of the
biogenetic law in Adolescence was nothing if not uneven and idiosyncratic. Rather than
an orderly recapitulationary sequence, as Hall (1904/1931) saw it the biogenetic plasticity
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of adolescence brought forth a host of unresolved phylogenetic conflicts, “as if ids or
determinants essentially contrary were struggling for survival in the same individual”
(vol. 1, p. 46). Further, the historical recentness of the phylogeny that adolescent
ontogeny recapitulated meant that heredity played a smaller role than environmental
influences in determining the directions of recapitulation. For the adolescent’s mental
development, the hereditary “germplasm” provided no psychic Bauplan to function as a
safeguard against regression and degeneration. Environmental forces being more subject
to change, Hall (1904/1931) argued that adolescent ontogeny evinced “far greater liability
to reversion”—and, for that matter, more potential to transmit undesirable, newly
acquired traits (vol. 1, p. 47; see also Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, pp. 49-50).
Again, Hall’s anxieties on this count derived from a subtle reformulation of the
biogenetic law. Citing the theory of “retrogressive evolution” first introduced by the
paleontologist Edward Drinker Cope (1840-1897), he could not help but admit that
“ontogeny often reverses the order of phylogeny” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 1, p. 241;
emphasis mine). (This, indeed, was the sort of theoretical innovation to which Percy
Davidson [1914] so objected: Applied psychologically, recapitulation meant merely the
retention of ancestral qualities on the one hand, and a tendency for them to be expressed
in a nonspecific sequence on the other.) Since in Hall’s (1904/1931) hands the direction
of ontogenetic recapitulation was subject to reversal—and since new traits acquired at
this more phylogenetically recent stage would more easily be transmitted to subsequent
generations—the “city of ‘Man-soul’” could easily degenerate into “a wild mob of
lawless passion, desires, or blinder impulses and impressions” (vol. 1, p. 324). From
there, the collective human psyche would devolve into “a chance personality very

74

different from any earlier stage of development,” one perhaps far more monstrous than
those of its primitive progenitors. If, Hall (1904/1931) cautioned, the human “race is to
degenerate,” “it will be by the progressive failure of youth to develop normally and to
maximal maturity and sanity …. If regeneration is ever to lift us to a higher plane, the
adolescent nisus will be its mainspring” (vol. 1, p. 324).
This would seem a heavy burden for the pubescent youth to bear. Subject to
contradictory impulses and newly sensitive to ever-changing environmental influences,
Hall’s manifestly paternal anxiety was latently social. At bottom, his text was a guide to
“bringing a race to ever more complete maturity” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 2, p. 56); a study
of adolescent ontogeny was as well a warning about the directions of human phylogeny.
Neither a manual for the educator nor a guide for the parent, Adolescence was a psychorecapitulationist’s vision of what psychological maturity meant for culture—and where it
might be located and actively contested within the life of the individual. A “parallel
embryology of the psyche” was required, then, an “archeology of mind” that would make
natural history the “strongest safeguard” against psychic degeneration (Hall, 1904/1931,
pp. 57, 61).
In all of Hall’s work that followed, the biogenetic principle continued to loom like
a procession of phyletic ghosts, any one of them threatening to atavistically reappear in
human development’s more “climacteric periods.” For in both adolescence and
senescence, “past and future contend with each other” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 2, p. 94).
Rather than simply demonstrating the ontogenetic traversal of comparatively recent
phylogeny, adolescent development made clear that individual development did not so
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much resolve as reenact the unseen conflicts of natural antiquity. In the mind no less than
the brain, Hall (1904/1931) saw the phyletic legacy as being
built layer upon layer of partly isolated yet strangely interacting strata. Very
ancient hereditary tendencies often push up perhaps even into consciousness, or
affect conduct as if striving to be relived and competing for the focus of attention
or perhaps leading a submerged life in nearly faded automatisms. Layers are often
reversed. (vol. 2, p. 68)
In a sense, the adolescent was only the epitome of a more general psychological reality:
Evolution took place in the individual, but its phasic sequence was governed by caprice.
The potential for phasic reversal was constant. More than any other stage of life, “the
youth in his upward stage of progress” showed humanity’s potential to “backslide.” It
was therefore “the most critical” as well as the most representative “stage of life, because
failure to mount [developmental stages] almost always means retrogression, degeneracy,
or fall” (Hall, 1904/1931, vol. 2, p. 72).
As should be clear by this point, Hall’s style was not exactly a model of economy.
Yet this last word—fall—hints at his curiously recapitulationist anxiety. All his doctrines
of progress and demonstrations of evolutionary advancement betrayed a kind of lapsarian
angst, in which the human adolescent’s “new birth” could just as easily result in a
“second fall.” For all his assurances regarding the certain advancement of civilization,
Hall’s reformulation of the biogenetic law meant that tragedy and regress were never far
from his mind. Given the plasticity of human ontogeny, evolution seemed more and more
synonymous with devolution.
Four years after the publication of Adolescence, a rhetorical question testified to
Hall’s (1908) biogenetic disorientation: “Which way really lies up or down, progress or
retrogression in the vast continuum we call the universe, but which may have no
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boundaries or breaks in either time or space?” (p. 181). Even as he posed this
unanswerable

question,

Hall’s

doubts

were

drawing

the

American

psycho-

recapitulationist to an increasingly persuasive alternative: Freudian metapsychology.
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CHAPTER 4

FREUD’S REVERSAL OF THE BIOGENETIC LAW
“[T]his basic force of Freud’s attaches itself to a variety of objects and gives rise to very
mixed personalities, which permit themselves to be conceived (at least by literary people)
as demons inhabiting the psyche; some of them atavistic, and continuing the existence of
a previous incarnation, and some of them dating back merely into infant or early adult
life” (Ransom, 1924, p. 161)
Ever since his postdoctoral years in Berlin and Leipzig, Hall had been keenly
aware of certain intellectual and clinical developments across the pond. While he appears
not yet to have read The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1999) at the time that
Adolescence was published, he nonetheless had been promoting Freud and Josef Breuer’s
work on hysteria since at least the eighteen-nineties. Yet what inspired Hall to invite
Freud, Jung, and Sándor Ferenczi to Clark University in 1909 was neither the new
theory’s clinical implications nor its novel treatment of sexuality. Rather, most
compelling to Hall (1909) was the overarching, evolutionary geneticism of
psychoanalysis, according to which (as he mused a few months before the arrival of his
old world guests), otherwise inexplicable, individual behaviors “irresistibly suggest past
evolutionary stages of mentation” (p. 259).39
Often heralded as the moment that “the plague” of psychoanalysis reached
American soil, the 1909 visit of Freud, Jung, and Ferenczi to Clark University also
39

On Hall’s reading of Freud and arrangement of the latter’s visit to North
America, see Ross (1972, pp. 379-394), Rosenzweig (1992), Skues (2012), Makari (2009,
pp. 234-235), and Greenberg (2010, pp. 27-28). While this chapter focuses more or less
exclusively on Freud’s reverse recapitulationism, it should be noted that phylogenetic
theorizing played an important role in Jung’s repudiation of his mentor’s biogenetic
metapsychology. On this see Dufresne (2017, pp. 229-236) and Gould (1977, pp. 161163).
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marked the meeting of two distinct threads of psychological recapitulationism.40 To
varying degrees, all three guests’ formulations of the biogenetic law at the time closely
paralleled Hall’s use of the theory, a likeness not lost on their American host. Yet while
Hall would continue to advocate for psychoanalytic theory in one form or another for the
rest of his career, his recapitulationism remained relatively static, serving as a kind of
fixed principle in a career that took a number of different directions in its remaining
years. (Indeed, in the years following the Clark visit, Hall continued to voice support for
Freud’s elaborations of the biogenetic principle [e.g., as cited in Rosenzweig, 1992, pp.
373-377].) The same cannot be said of Freud and his followers, in whose hands the
directional reversal of Haeckel’s Law came not only to complement, but in fact to
amplify and systematize the moral anxiety lurking in the shadows of Hall’s
developmental psychology.
In order to explain the transformation of late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury recapitulationism in Freudian hands, in this chapter I move from my against-thegrain reading of fin de siècle American developmental psychology to what is,
academically speaking, undeniably well-trod territory. Here, my case for a new
interpretation of the place of the biogenetic law within early psychoanalytic theory—not
so abrupt a change of sub-disciplinary venue as it might seem—also requires a shift in
method, from the intellectual-historical to the historiographical and hermeneutic. For
while Freud’s commitment to the biogenetic law has been better documented than that of
any figure discussed thus far in this study (save Haeckel, of course), these readings have
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undergone precious little modification—the environment’s selective pressures, if you
will, apparently being minimal—since the appearance of Frank Sulloway’s (1979)
magisterial study, Freud, Biologist of the Mind.
For better or for worse, he who would deign to write about the biogenetic within
the psychoanalytic is obliged to do so in the shadow of Sulloway (1979; cf. Crews, 1997,
p. vii). For this reason, my analysis of Freud’s recapitulationism begins with a reappraisal
of its best-known postwar interpretation, Sulloway’s Freud. Because Freud’s
(1920/1961a) introduction of the death drive amounted to the fulfillment of prior, more
tentative reversals of the biogenetic law (e.g., Hall’s developmental psychology, and
August Dohrn’s evolutionary biology), I focus particularly on Sulloway’s (1979) reading
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.41 I argue further that, methodologically speaking,
Sulloway’s species of historiographical “geneticism” is responsible for his failure to
account for the manner by which an increasingly outmoded theory had been ever more
anxiously cathected in Freud’s biologistic metapsychology. Rather than an opportunity to
explain-away an idea by reducing it to its historical constituents, the psychoanalytic
reversal of recapitulationism provides a prime example of the importance of attending to
the moral functions that a scientific theory serves for its proponents.
Every bit the epitome of postwar assumptions regarding prewar psychoanalytic
recapitulationism, Sulloway’s (1979) reading is typical of those that understand scientific
theories strictly in terms of their veracity or truth-value, rather than their status as
historically situated cultural objects, variously cathected. Yet rather than challenge
41

In order to avoid confusion with Sulloway’s (1979) readings of Freud
(1920/1961a), which refer to Strachey’s translations, I am using the Standard Edition’s
version of Beyond the Pleasure Principle over the arguably superior translation provided
by Gregory Richter in Freud (1920/2011).
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Sulloway’s scholarship, which continues to seem as close to unassailable as one can get
in such matters, I show that his interpretations or conclusions regarding Freud’s
commitment to the biogenetic law hardly followed from the material he so ably
presented. I argue further that these very deficiencies in interpretation invite a reappraisal
of psychoanalytic recapitulationism along the lines advanced in the previous two
chapters—namely, that the theory functioned to express a tragic sense of the relationship
between ontogeny and phylogeny, personal and cultural history, and individual and
society. I then turn to an analysis of the place and function of the biogenetic law across
the development of Freudian metapsychology.
No less than Darwin or Haeckel, Baldwin or Hall, Freud’s use of the biogenetic
principle can only be understood through the tragic, moral anxiety that the onceprogressive theory was made to bear. In Freud’s hands, the full ambivalence of Haeckel’s
law shifted to the surface. (Indeed, as we will see in chapter four, this assumption of
directional lability would accompany numerous post-Freudian iterations of psychological
recapitulationism, albeit less explicitly so.) While still a sign of phylogenetic progress
and a normative framework for ontogenetic development, the biogenetic principle
unambiguously expressed all those anxieties of psychological degeneration and regress
that lurked in the shadows of its previous incarnations.

A Case Study in Recapitulationist Historiography: Sulloway
Twelve years after the publication of his watershed study of the Freudian legacy,
Frank Sulloway’s evaluation of the history of psychoanalysis appeared little changed.
Most if not all “of Freud’s most essential psychoanalytic concepts,” Sulloway (1991)
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maintained in a brief reassessment of Freud’s case histories, “were based upon erroneous
and now outmoded assumptions from nineteenth-century biology” (p. 245). Chief among
these assumptions was Freud’s commitment to the biogenetic law, which, by the time of
Sulloway’s writing, had been largely abandoned by biologists on the one hand (Gould’s
[1977] study notwithstanding), and effectively disregarded by psychoanalytic theorists on
the other. As in his Freud, Biologist of the Mind, Sulloway (1991) again narrated the
history of the analytic movement as that of “a complex psychobiology in which the
biological aspects became increasingly cryptic” (p. 245). No less false for their successful
concealment, these biological miscalculations constitute the fragile base (or “intellectual
quicksand,” as Sulloway [1991] had it [p. 246]) to which an apparently formidable
theoretical superstructure must be reduced and dismissed.
Exhaustive in its research and strident in its conclusions, Sulloway’s (1979)
analysis remains as compelling as it was controversial. Indeed, his demonstration of the
Lamarckian and Haeckelian roots of Freud’s metapsychology undergirds much of what I
will argue in this chapter. Yet Sulloway’s ultimately negative appraisal of psychoanalytic
theory—and the necessity of the different reading that I am proposing—may, I think, best
be reckoned with by dividing his argument into its constituent steps; these are, in brief:
historical narrative, genetic interpretation, and naively deductive conclusion.
Taking a cue from Sulloway’s (1991) addendum to his own work over a decade
later, I begin my discussion of recapitulationism in psychoanalytic metapsychology with
a revisionist reading of Sulloway’s (1979) own. Because the once-progressivist
biogenetic law saw its most enduring reversal in the form of Freud’s death drive, I
approach Sulloway’s treatment of this theory in Freud, Biologist of the Mind as a
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practical “case history” built upon its own kind of “intellectual quicksand” (Sulloway,
1991, p. 246). In brief, I maintain that Sulloway’s challenge to the historical amnesia
regarding the biologism of the death drive—and by extension, all recapitulationist
metapsychology—is no less persuasive now than it was in 1979. Equally unchanged,
however, is the flimsiness of Sulloway’s presumed exposé of the Freudian legacy on such
narrowly genetic grounds. As I demonstrate, Sulloway’s genetically fallacious dismissal
of psychoanalysis tout court left him oblivious to the moral function that the
recapitulation theory served for Freud and his followers—and which (as we will see in
chapter 4) it has continued to serve well after its demise within biology proper. Because
the soundness of Sulloway’s scholarship is less in question than the conclusions drawn
therefrom, my analysis along these lines is itself divided into two sections (which
together happen to mirror Sulloway’s [1979] own reasoning): the first affirmative and
exegetical, the second critical and interpretive.
As for Sulloway’s (1979) achievement: Probably the least noticed and most
radical conclusion in Freud, Biologist of the Mind was the idea that the death drive makes
sense. Beyond the Pleasure Principle’s speculative rhetoric notwithstanding, Sulloway
succeeded in showing that the development of Thanatos followed logically and
necessarily from Freud’s prior scientific work. Indeed, for Sulloway (1979) a halfcentury of assumptions to the contrary only bolstered his reading of Freud as “cryptobiologist”; the death instinct’s “consistently misunderstood status,” he argued,
“exemplifies just how fully [Freud’s] intellectual union of psychology with biology has
gone unappreciated in psychoanalysis” (p. 395). Far from being the speculative flight of
fancy (or, to Freud’s faithful contemporaries, embarrassing digression) that was to inspire
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so much post-Freudian theoretical innovation, Sulloway’s revised account of Beyond
rendered it of a piece with the posthumously published and misunderstood Project for a
Scientific Psychology (1895).42 In reconsidering the intellectual and social history of
metapsychology from these once-apocryphal origins, Freud, Biologist of the Mind was
itself a species of secret history—which is by no means to say weak history. Indeed, in
Sulloway’s capable and mostly cautious hands, even the byzantine, arcane mechanics of
the Project assumed a kind of coherence.
Something of an ancillary achievement, this narrative coherence was put in the
service of Sulloway’s chief interpretive claim: namely, the existence of an unbroken
continuity between Freud’s early neurological aspirations and his later metapsychology.
Such apparently divergent threads as Freud’s debt to Fechnerian psychophysics, his
invocation of Haeckel’s biogenetic principle, and his commitment to Lamarckian
inheritance—the three cornerstones of the argument in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—
are thus united. Each of them, Sulloway (1979) maintained, was enlisted to solve
theoretical enigmas first identified in the 1895 Project, and none did so more effectively
than the ultimately problematic science of phylogeny:
In short, phylogeny was Freud’s final answer to many of the difficulties that
threatened to undermine his most basic psychoanalytic claims. From the problem
of attributing neurosis to phantasies instead of to real events, to the issue of just
how universal were the psychosexual stages and neurotic complexes that Freud
espoused, phylogenetic assumptions played a paramount role in legitimating his
science of mind. (Sulloway, 1979, p. 388)
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On ideologically motivated mischaracterizations of Beyond by Freud’s
epigones, see Sulloway (1979, pp. 393-395) and Dufresne (2000, pp. 23-26). For a
reading of the Project that agrees with Sulloway’s but draws less reductive conclusions,
see Lothane (1998).
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With the phylogenetic component of the biogenetic principle as his Rosetta stone,
Sulloway thus refuted the conventional separation between Freud’s social (or
metapsychological) and clinical (or psychological) works. While the principle of
biogenetic recapitulation may have been problematic for Sulloway’s contemporaries, it
was clearly not so for Freud and other unreconstructed psycho-recapitulationists,
allowing them as it did to actually solve problems that might otherwise undermine the
development of a unified psychobiological theory.
I will return to the presentism behind Sulloway’s conclusions on this point below.
First, however, it is important to underscore his historical verdict on Freud’s consistent
and increasingly cryptic biologism. As it happens, Sulloway (1979) was most succinct on
this argument shortly before turning to the case of the death drive: “In sum,” he
concluded, “Freud’s psychoanalytic theories became more biological, not less so, after
the crucial years of discovery (1895-1900), just as they became increasingly sophisticated
in their psychological content” (p. 391). The ontogeny of psychoanalytic theory thus
came to mirror the evolutionism on which it was originally based: Like the “primitive
stages” of human phylogeny that Freud (1915/1971) considered more “imperishable”
than later adaptive advances (p. 301), his psychology neither succeeded in nor intended to
abandon its biological foundations:
The Freud who wrote Totem and Taboo (1912-13) and other cultural-historical
works was much the same Freud, conceptually speaking, who, between 1895 and
1900, erected his basic psychobiological theory of mind. In particular, the same
biogenetic-Lamarckian paradigm of human development inspired both the early
and the later achievements, providing the underlying model of human
psychosexual evolution for Freud’s interpretation of human behavior. (Sulloway,
1979, p. 393)
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Allowing him to solve the theoretical problems originally outlined in the explicitly
biological Project for a Scientific Psychology, Sulloway’s Freud emerged as a
surprisingly consistent character.
The same evolutionary schema that allowed Freud to resolve such problems also
required him to develop the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Yet if
Sulloway (1979) was aware that previous versions of the biogenetic law had hinted at
some version of the death drive, he didn’t say so. Instead he was content to argue that
Freud’s commitment to his theory of neurosis—itself of rather diverse parentage,
including the biogenetic law, Fechnerian psychophysics, and Lamarckian inheritance,
among other theories—logically demanded that he develop a parallel and contradictory
drive in human nature.
Recall again that classical Haeckelian recapitulationism was ostensibly a
unidirectional and progressive force. Phylogenetically inherited stages, once traversed
over the course of ontogenesis, are abandoned in the movement towards chronologically
later evolutionary acquisitions—hence the manifestly progressivist character of most
nineteenth-century applications of the biogenetic principle when applied to nonbiological (i.e., social) phylogenetic phenomena. This latter feature, however, was
apparently of little importance to Sulloway. Instead, he observed that somewhere
between 1910 and 1920 Freud realized that the biogenetic law was
in direct conflict with his alternative “frustration-regression” model …. In short,
by 1920 Freud desperately needed to inject a formal, regressive force into
psychoanalytic theory unless he wished his biogenetic machine to undermine his
whole evolution/involution paradigm of neurosis. (Sulloway, 1979, p. 399)
To paraphrase, Freud (1920/1961a) devised the death drive in order to preserve first his
theory of neurosis, and second the biogenetic principle on which it was based. While it
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might be tempting to accuse Sulloway of exaggerating Freud’s commitment to
recapitulationism, even the briefest sample of his metapsychological reasoning (which I
will present below) will testify to the idea’s centrality in his theory.
As Sulloway (1979) carefully explained, Freud modified the biogenetic law by
introducing into it two oft-misunderstood features of Fechnerian psychophysics. On the
one hand there was Fechner’s principle of “approximate stability,” which for Freud’s
purposes explained the organism’s apparent pattern of embryonic recapitulations. Such
repetitions of prior evolutionary stages account for the repetition compulsion at the level
of ontogenesis, as they allow for “parts of the whole to return to roughly the same
position at rhythmical intervals” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 405). These repetitions do not,
however, account for the phenomenon of involution in historical or phylogenetic terms.
Thus, to complete the death drive and give it a phylogenetic component, Freud united
Fechner’s principles of “absolute” and “approximate” stability: The latter explained
repetitions and regressions in embryonic development, but the former accounted for what
Freud (1920/1961a) branded “the first” (and therefore primary and indissoluble) instinct:
“the instinct to return to the inanimate state” (p. 46)—or in Fechnerian terms, a state of
absolute stability (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 404-408).
As Sulloway seems to have been aware, with the death drive Freud (1920/1961a)
actually reversed the direction of biogenetic recapitulation. His “regressive force” meant
that the ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogeny really operated in reverse. Lower stages
are passed through not in order to reach higher ones, but only in order to return to a stage
prior to all stages, that of the inorganic. Recast though the death drive, recapitulation thus
became a process of briefly delaying the tragic telos of phylogeny. This “second force in
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organic life,” Sulloway (1979) noted, had the effect of “reversing such biogenetic
achievements through regressions to previously abandoned stages,” and all of this in the
name of a nostalgic involution. In the end, Freud’s commitment to the biogenetic
principle “required” that he invert it (Sulloway, 1979, p. 413). And so, in Sulloway’s
(1979) still-canonical reading, two mutually compatible Freuds emerged: one a
committed man of nineteenth-century science, the other an innovator more than willing to
borrow, bend, and shape conventional scientific wisdom to preserve his “biogenetic
machine.”
Why did Freud engage in this dizzying display of conceptual gymnastics? Again,
Sulloway’s (1979) answer was that the demands of logical consistency required that he
do so, “for biology clearly constitutes the very heart of his misunderstood logic” (p. 414).
In Beyond and thereafter, this logic culminated in “the ultimate expression of [Freud’s]
life-long adherence to various biogenetic and psycho-Lamarckian assumptions that, like
the death instinct itself, have found little subsequent favor with Freud’s psychoanalytic
followers” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 414). To hazard a paraphrase, Beyond revealed that, in
contrast to almost all of his followers, Freud’s (1920/1961a) deepest loyalty was to
nineteenth-century evolutionary theory, and his many cultural-critical applications of
such doctrines were but the outgrowth of this intellectual fealty.
Surely it is possible to accept the basis of this argument and still question its
conclusions. Put otherwise, an historical account, once accepted, does not thereby cease
to admit multiple interpretations. For instance, Sulloway (1979) had it that Beyond was
“the culmination of Freud’s remarkable biogenetic romance” (p. 415), but one could
more persuasively argue that the text’s genre is closer to biogenetic jeremiad, giving
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voice and theoretical foundation to Freud’s growing and “wholly non-scientific belief”
(as he himself branded it in 1927) “that mankind on the average are a wretched lot” (as
cited in Yerushalmi, 1991, p. 15). After all, the “crypto-biological” reading that Sulloway
(1979) endorsed and the “subjective,” borderline hagiographic reading he rightly
denounced both still failed to account for the social upheaval amidst which Freud wrote
Beyond—to say nothing of the moral anxiety that the theory had carried since its original
formulation by Haeckel. As Sulloway (1979) himself suggested, the most “remarkable”
feature of Freud’s “biogenetic romance” was the manner by which its traditional telos
was inverted: In Freud’s hands, recapitulationism was finally transformed into a
regressive rather than progressive process. Thus reconfigured, the biogenetic principle
gave scientific support for Freud’s growing awareness of all the empty promises of
social-evolutionary progressivism and Enlightenment optimism (cf. Fromm, 1970).
Such at least is the reading I am proposing in this chapter, which differs from that
of Sulloway (1979) largely on this question of origins—or rather, on how much meaning
historicism permits us to make of origins. As it happens, what Sulloway said about the
development of Freud’s evolutionary thinking applies just as well to his own: His final
conclusions were “ultimate-causal” rather than “proximate-causal”—were genetic rather
than hermeneutic, explanatory instead of descriptive, and above all else, ineluctably
reductive (Sulloway, 1979, p. 356).43
Of course, none of this would be problematic were it not the case that Sulloway
(1979) saw fit to reason from this self-consciously reductive method to a negative
appraisal of psychoanalytic thinking and practice as a whole:
43

Sulloway (1979) draws this distinction from Ernst Mayr’s (1961) “Cause and
Effect in Biology.”
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Acceptance of Freud’s historical debt to biology requires a rather uncongenial
conclusion for most psychoanalytic practitioners, namely, that Freud’s theories
reflect the faulty logic of outmoded nineteenth-century biological assumptions,
particularly those of a psychophysicalist, Lamarckian, and biogenetic [i.e.,
recapitulationist] nature …. Plausible enough as they may have seemed to Freud,
such assumptions were nevertheless wrong; and much that is wrong with
orthodox psychoanalysis may be traced directly back to them. (pp. 497-498)
If one were searching for an example of the genetic fallacy, she could do worse than to
select the above passage. What Sulloway concluded about the inspirations for and
preoccupations of Freud’s metapsychology is one thing; what he concluded about
“orthodox” psychoanalysis and its attendant (though apparently unspecified) problems is
quite another. This seems a fatal overestimation of the interpretive potential of “tracing” a
contemporary phenomenon to its historical origins—and one whose error points toward
an alternative method of reckoning with the surprisingly consistent function of the
biogenetic principle within psychology.
Returning to the case of the death drive, Sulloway’s (1979) deductive conclusion
about psychoanalysis as a whole may be summarized as follows. First, Freud needed the
death drive because of his commitment to “various biogenetic and psycho-Lamarckian
assumptions” (p. 414). Second, these assumptions were forgotten or denied by Freud’s
followers because they (i.e., the assumptions) were rejected by postwar biological
science. And finally, Freud’s followers in turn suppressed his biologism because (again
paraphrasing Sulloway [1979]) were they to acknowledge it, unassailable proof would
exist that psychoanalysis was built on “intellectual quicksand” (Sulloway, 1991, p. 246).
But how important was, say, belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics to
past (let alone subsequent) psychoanalytic practice? We may no longer find it useful to
believe that the latency period recapitulates the Ice Age (more on this below), and we
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may know that Mendelian genetics generally trumps Lamarckian inheritance, but does
the refutation of these ideas—ideas that so undeniably inspired Freud—mean a refutation
of ideas he himself inspired? 44 Does it really get us any closer to understanding why so
many a man of science continued to invoke an ever-more-untenable theory?
Sulloway (1979) couldn’t quite say that it did, and perhaps for this reason he
retreated, leaving it to a few choice critics to prophesy the collapse of psychoanalysis
under the weight of its own disavowed pseudo-scientific origins. Departing from the
status of psychoanalytic practice and returning to Freud-the-crypto-biologist, he
concluded that Freud had to be understood as a man of his time, and invoked Thomas
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) Structure of Scientific Revolutions for support: “history is inevitably
harsh in its assessment of those individuals who have sought to transform
‘preparadigmatic into ‘paradigmatic’ sciences” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 499). In the end,
Freud’s “synthetic approach and his theoretical daring were highly appropriate to the
particular historical context in which he expressed them” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 500)—and
by implication, less than highly appropriate to the historical context that followed.
Another passage from Kuhn’s (1962/1996) famous treatise on the history and
philosophy of science (one not quoted by Sulloway [1979]) may provide an escape from
this quaint historicism, as well as the outlines of an alternative means of reckoning with
the biogenetic within the psychoanalytic:
Can we not account for both science’s existence and its success in terms of
evolution from the community’s state of knowledge at any given time? Does it
really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature
and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it
44

For an excellent sample of post-Freudian psychoanalytic uses of the
metapsychology first outlined in Beyond, see the selections excerpted in the appendices
to Dufresne’s edition of Freud (1920/2011, pp. 155-376).
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brings us closer to that ultimate goal? If we can learn to substitute evolutionfrom-what-we-do-know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know, a number
of vexing problems may vanish in the process. (Kuhn, 1962/1996, p. 171)
Among those vexing problems will be Sulloway’s (1979, 1991) genetic conclusions
about Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Kuhn (1962/1996), perhaps anticipating Latour
(1987), was not only proposing a substitute philosophy of science, but also calling
attention to the way that scientific theories are actually developed and used by their
proponents. In other words, there seems no reason to reduce the whole of psychoanalysis
to the foundations on which it was first developed, however weak those foundations
ultimately proved. Moreover, doing so tells us precious little about the moral function of
the ideas themselves—their moral function, that is to say, in current contexts no less than
the original ones.
Freud was as much a theoretical innovator as he was a life-long disciple of fin de
siècle evolutionism. His fealty to the latter had its limits, but the inversion of the
biogenetic principle first advanced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle derived explicitly
from the tragic dimensions of previous iterations of Haeckel’s Law. Despite his lipservice to Kuhn’s (1962/1996) insights, Sulloway (1979) seems to have declined to
embrace a more responsible historicism—one that sees knowledge as an historical
process whose contents are inseparable from their emotional valences, and not as
revealed truth uncontaminated by its human origins.

Psychoanalytic Recapitulationism: An Anti-Genetic Analysis
With Sulloway’s (1979) still-canonical interpretation as a point of departure, in
the remainder of this chapter I provide an analysis of Freudian metapsychology that

92

reveals the moral function played by early psychoanalytic reversals of the biogenetic law.
Importantly, this reading is conducted without the presentist preoccupation with the
scientific truth-value of Haeckel’s law that has hampered other attempts to locate
psychoanalytic metapsychology within the history and philosophy of science. In brief, I
show that sometime during the First World War, Freud’s reformulation of Haeckel’s law
rendered definitive the very tragic dimensions that Haeckel, Hall, and previous
recapitulationists had considered merely peripheral (even if uncertainly so). In a trend
that would continue well after Freud’s biologism had been forgotten and suppressed, the
once-progressivist theory became a psychologically inscribed vehicle for the expression
of anxieties surrounding the directions of civilization.
As early as his nineteenth year, Freud (1875/1990) could be found making casual
reference to Haeckel as one of “our most modern saints” (p. 96). Though he rarely
mentioned the theory’s eponym by name, the mounting centrality of Haeckel’s law
within his work developed in tandem with an engagement with degenerationist theories
of individual and social development. While the theoretical ontogeny is complex, Freud’s
earliest appropriations of recapitulationist ideas appear to have emerged amidst his
attempts to rework medical theories of “nervous dissolution” within a biogenetic
framework.45
Like many a nineteenth-century student of neurology, Freud’s exposure to the
theories of English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) played an important
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Ellenberger (1970) notes that it “was mostly under the cloak of Haeckel that
young men of Freud’s generation first became acquainted with Darwinism, and his
prestige remained so high that, when young [Hermann] Rorschach hesitated in 1904
between vocations of art of natural science, it was a logical step for him to write to
Haeckel and as his counsel” (p. 234; see also Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 290-291).
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role in his substitution of biogenetic explanations for medico-materialist ones (e.g.,
localization-based explanations for aphasia [Freud, 1891/1953a]). The same was true for
many of the developmental psychologists that Freud (1899/1999) would cite favorably in
The Interpretation of Dreams, who approached both neurocognitive diseases and
abnormal child development as isolated instances of reversed biogenetic recapitulation.
Among such like-minded predecessors was James Sully (1881/1891), who reasoned in
his Illusions that
If the nervous system has been slowly built up, during the course of human
history, into its present complex form, it follows that those nervous structures and
connections which have to do with the higher intellectual processes … have been
most recently evolved. Consequently, they would be the least deeply organized,
and so the least stable; that is to say, the most liable to be thrown hors de combat.
This is what happens temporarily in the case of the sane, when the mind is held
fast by an illusion. And, in states of insanity, we see the process of nervous
dissolution beginning with these same nervous structures, and so taking the
reverse order of the process of evolution. (pp. 122-123)46
For the same reasons that Hall (1904/1931) thought the phylogenetically “recent” period
of adolescence to be the most directionally labile stage of psychological ontogenesis,
Sully (and others influenced by Hughlings Jackson’s neurological theories) believed that
the “highest” stages of psychic development carried the greatest risk of recapitulationary
reversal.
In one of his many creative appropriations of medical and natural-scientific
terminology, Freud tended to refer to this kind of retrograde development as “involution.”
Whereas in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and his early case histories Freud
(e.g., 1905/1962, p. 43n) used this term in its then-conventional guise (i.e., referring
variously to neurological decline and anatomical manifestations of the latency period), by
46

Sully (1881/1891) cites Hughlings Jackson’s work at the end of this paragraph.
On such connections see Sulloway (1979, pp. 271-273, 250-251).
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1915 the term Strachey translates (and which Freud sometimes used, in English) as
“involution” had begun to carry a more metapsychological meaning (Freud, 1915/1957c,
p. 286).47
Six months after the outbreak of the Great War, Freud (1915/1957c) found
occasion to observe that “a certain extraordinary plasticity of mental developments is not
unrestricted as regards direction” (p. 286). In the mind unlike the body, environmental
pressures could just as easily guide development toward ostensibly abandoned stages as
they could lead to “higher” achievements. This, Freud (1915/1957c) offered, “may be
described as a special capacity for involution [Rückbildung]—for regression—since it
may well happen that a later and higher stage of development, once abandoned, cannot be
reached again. But the primitive stages can always be re-established; the primitive mind
is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable” (p. 286).
Just as Percy Davidson (1914) had complained a year before, proliferating
psychological bastardizations of the biogenetic law meant that psychic recapitulation
could proceed along either progressive or degenerative lines. Though not directly leveled
at Freud, the gist of his critique—namely, that for psycho-recapitulationists
“recapitulation is supposed to be illustrated in any juvenile retention of ancestral adult
characteristics, or indeed any ancestral traits whatever” (Davidson, 1914, p. 79)—was an
accurate characterization of the use Freud was then making of the biogenetic law. Since
phylogenetically inherited primitive stages persisted well after their ontogenetic traversal,
the reanimation of atavistic traits or periods could occur at any point in the life span. In
47

For instance, Freud uses the terms “evolution and involution” in English in a
1907 letter to Karl Abraham (as cited in Falzeder, 2001, p. 5). On nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century medical sources for Freud’s early theories of degeneration see
Sulloway (1979, pp. 269-273).
95

the case of the mind, Freud (1915/1957c) argued, “every earlier stage of development
persists alongside the later stage which has arisen from it; here succession also involves
co-existence” (p. 286). He would continue to emphasize this point for the duration of his
career, arguing, for example, in Civilization and Its Discontents that “only in the mind is
such a preservation of all the earlier stages alongside the final form possible …. [I]t is
rather the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life” (Freud,
1930/1961b, p. 20; see also Gould, 1977, pp. 155-161).
Yet at some point in the second decade of the new century, Freud concluded that
the biogenetic law was not so directionally labile as other psycho-recapitulationists had
assumed. Prior stages did not simply persist alongside their psychic progeny; they pulled
the higher down toward the lower, the individual Ich back to the ancestral Es. As the
Great War drew to a close and his metapsychology evolved, Freud would accord ever
more prominence to the involutionary potential of the human species; similarly, he came
to consider the prospects of future progressive developments increasingly dim. Recall
here that Sulloway (1979) explained Freud’s tendency on this count as one among several
strategic maneuvers in his effort to make psychoanalysis a respectable, unified natural
and social science. (More conventionally, social historians have understood the
development of the death drive as occasioned by its political and biographical, rather than
scientific context [cf. Dufresne, 2000; Makari, 2009, pp. 316-319, 446; Sulloway, 1991].)
And yet for Freud, Thanatos finally gave voice to the shadow of the evolutionary telos,
finding its most enduring expression in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. From there it
would remain an essential, organizing assumption within psychoanalytic metapsychology
until the death of its creator.
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Freud, of course, was neither alone nor altogether original in his growing anxiety
about the retrograde capacities of the descent of man. His biogenetically based skepticism
toward the promises of civilization grew out of a sustained engagement with the kind of
evolutionary thinking initiated (at least in the German-speaking world) by Haeckel
(1909), who like Darwin (and Freud) maintained that the “higher moral qualities of
civilized man have been derived from the lower mental functions of the uncultivated
barbarians and savages, and these in turn from the social instincts of animals” (p. 150).
Yet what ultimately distinguished the direction of Freud’s thinking on these matters from
that of his nineteenth-century evolutionary and neurological sources was his eventual
insistence that the evolution-involution dialectic was, by virtue of its chronological
priority, always biased toward the latter direction—that, as he would conclude in Beyond,
“the pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death instincts” (Freud, 1920/1961, p.
77). As Henri Ellenberger (1970) noted in his Discovery of the Unconscious, Freud’s
theory of the instincts effectively reversed the direction of Darwinian phylogeny, an
inversion evident in the very ontogenesis of Freud’s metapsychology:
Freud’s theory of the instincts is obviously derived from Darwin. It is worthy of
note that Freud started with the exclusive consideration of libido and later came to
the assumption of a separate aggressive and destructive instinct, whereas Darwin
had followed the opposite path. (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 236)
Involution was the rule, and this held true for social no less than biological development.
Equally influential in Freud’s metapsychological reversal of the biogenetic law
were certain continental-philosophical currents prominent in the previous century,
particularly the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Friedrich Nietzsche (18441900), and a rather more obscure writer named Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) (cf.
Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 512-518). Of course, from the “long eighteenth century” to the late
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Victorian period, philosophy and biology were not quite the conceptually and
institutionally distinct domains that they have since become. (One is reminded that
Goethe in his time was famed as a naturalist as much as a writer.) As discussed in
Chapter 1, the first significant iterations of what would later be established as Haeckel’s
biogenetic law emerged from early nineteenth-century Naturphilosphie and Romantic
medicine, both of which, as the German medical historian Walter Pagel (1945) noted,
approached “disease as a reversion to the most primitive stages of life” (p. 36; see also
Galdston, 1989).48
And so, at the level of composition, Freud’s recapitulationary reversal was
assembled from the scientific and philosophical detritus of the previous two centuries.
Were it not the case that his biologism gradually disappeared from the psychoanalytic
movement after his death—and that he had a habit of obscuring his philosophical debts
for most of his professional life—this could probably go without saying; certainly it has
been said by many since, and said well (cf. Rieff, 1979, pp. 188-219).49
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The undeniably presentist (if occasionally useful) practice of distinguishing
between Freud’s philosophical and scientific influences is a frequent trope among postFreud War historians that attempt to recover a kind of crypto-positivistic truth value from
psychoanalytic metapsychology. Again, Todd Dufresne’s recent work suggests a deessentialized way around this pointless stumbling block. For instance, in Dufresne
(2017), he concludes that what “is most true of psychoanalysis lies … with Freud’s
phylogenetic fantasies, with the metapsychology, and with the late Romantics, and not
with empiricism, positivism, science, realism, objectivity, and falsifiability” (p. 258).
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Thanks to each of these trends—Freud’s tendency to deny his philosophical
influences and his institutional descendants’ disinterest in his “outmoded” biologism—an
impressive historiography has developed around the task of illuminating the nineteenthcentury sources of and inspirations for psychoanalysis. As I refer to these studies
throughout this dissertation, I have chosen not to include a comprehensive survey of the
area’s historiography. That said, it does seem the case that the comparatively late arrival
of these non-internalist cultural and intellectual histories of psychoanalysis testifies to
Freud’s success in both presenting the movement as a sui generis contribution to the
natural and social sciences, and in styling himself as something of a messianic figure.
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As it addresses the pre-history of primitivity, or the sources of involution, my
analysis of Freud’s work is necessarily biased toward the biological dimensions of his
post-1915 thought. True, this emphasis does run the risk of reinforcing Freud’s own
denial of his philosophical debts, but my sense is that his biologism remains the more
poorly understood dimension of his social and political thought (Sulloway’s [1979] work
notwithstanding). For despite the groundbreaking work of, say, Edwin Wallace (1983)
Lucille Ritvo (1990), and Patricia Kitcher (1992), the scholarship surrounding Freudian
metapsychology continues to reflect a preference for philosophical interpretations and a
disinterest in Freud’s biologism or social-scientism.50 This seems equally the case for
critical and apologetic readings of psychoanalytic theory.
Appearing to one degree or another throughout his work, tracing the development
of Freud’s involutionary recapitulationism is a less than systematic task. Nonetheless,
before his metapsychological pessimism was leveled at political and religious
institutions—as it was in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921/1959),
Civilization and its Discontents (1930/1961b), and Moses and Monotheism (1937),
among other places—Freud had delineated the process by which the telos of evolution is
redirected toward the past.51
In the earlier stages of his mature theory, Freud’s use of recapitulationism
functioned more to place psychoanalysis within a biogenetic framework than to modify
Haeckel’s law. In a later edition of the Interpretation of Dreams (1919/1953b), for
50

For more recent examples of studies that insist on reading Freud’s
metapsychology in exclusively philosophical terms, see Boothby (2001) and Dufresne
(2000).
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It seems criminal not to mention the parallel narrative of Freud’s (often
implicit) engagement with Judaism in this period. Three excellent treatments of this issue
are Yerushalmi (1993), Gilman (1993), and Salberg (2007).
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instance, he added a phylogenetic inference to the notion that dreams involve a regression
to (the dreamer’s) childhood: “Behind this childhood of the individual”—behind the
ontogenetic component of the dream—“we are promised a picture of a phylogenetic
childhood” (p. 548). This “picture of the development of the human race,” Freud
(1919/1953b) speculated, was “in fact an abbreviated recapitulation influenced by the
chance circumstances of life” (p. 548). In the dream like the embryo, the buried vestiges
of psychic antiquity were preserved as in amber. Dream-work and psychoanalysis could
therefore claim pride of place among the sciences, particularly those “which are
concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the
beginnings of the human race” (Freud, 1919/1953b, p. 549).
It is worth noting that Freud added this phylogenetic component to his theory of
regressive dreaming at a time when the recapitulation theory was itself falling out of
favor among biologists. Given that the second edition of the Interpretation appeared ten
years after the first (in 1909), he apparently did so at the same time that his reversal of the
biogenetic law was in the works. (The above remark, it should be noted, does not appear
in Joyce Crick’s more recent translation of the original text; see Freud [1900/1999, pp.
358-259].) One can surmise that in the eighteen-nineties Freud’s “biogenetic machine”
was in its earliest stages, and that his embrace of Haeckel’s law didn’t go far beyond a
perfunctory nod to then-conventional wisdom.
Nonetheless, the outlines of Freud’s (1900/1999) incipient recapitulationism do
appear in a lengthy footnote buried in the middle of the book’s first edition (one that he
saw fit to move to the main text from 1915 onward). Having just introduced the Oedipus
complex, Freud attempts to account for its divergent appearances in Oedipus Rex and
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Hamlet. While each drama addresses an identical theme, Freud (1900/1999) argues that
their differences in treatment owe to “the advance of repression over the centuries in
mankind’s emotional life” (p. 204n). Oedipus, of course, unwittingly succeeded in an
action on which Hamlet could only consciously, obsessively ruminate: murdering the
father and marrying the mother. Antedating Hamlet by two millennia, Oedipus Rex
functions as a fossil specimen. The Oedipus complex, then, becomes a kind of living
fossil, repressed over two-odd millennia into the unconscious to the point that conscious
catharsis (via action) has become difficult, if not impossible. Though he says nothing of
recapitulation, its mechanism is clearly present: What was in Oedipus an adult trait “out
in the open and realized” has been compressed into the unconscious, exhibited only in
early psychosexual development and reappearing in adult dreams (Freud, 1900/1999, p.
204n).
At this stage in his work, Freud’s recapitulationism was not so thoroughly
apparent as in the essays that would soon follow. Rather than finding the content of the
unconscious in human prehistory, in the Interpretation Freud (1900/1999) traced the
dream to diurnal wishes from childhood (i.e., “the wish represented in the dream has to
be an infantile one” [p. 363]). Here, psychic development would appear strictly
individual, for in dreaming the adult psyche recapitulates merely its own ontogenesis.
As it happens, scarcely a year before the book’s publication Freud found the
paucity of phylogenetic material to be one of the Interpretation’s flaws, complaining to
Wilhelm Fliess that “the theory of wish fulfillment has brought only the psychological
solution and not the biological—or, rather, the metapsychical—one. (I am going to ask
you seriously, by the way, whether I may use the term metapsychology for my
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psychology that leads behind consciousness)” (as cited in Masson, 1985, pp. 301-302).
Clearly, Freud was entertaining the systematization of a kind of biogenetic
metapsychology—this letter contains the first appearance of the term in his
correspondence—one that sought to establish parallels between contemporary individual
experience and archaic history. In a sense, Freud’s conclusion in the Interpretation
anticipated the biogenetic metapsychology to come. Addressing popular belief in the
dream’s divining powers, Freud (1900/1999) asks, “And what of the value of dreams for
our knowledge of the future? …. [O]ne should rather ask: for our knowledge of the past.
For in every sense, dreams come from the past” (p. 412). To just which “past” Freud
refers will soon undergo a bit of clarification.
Even here, however, Freud’s recapitulationism was essentially backward-gazing.
Rather than illuminating a history of evolutionary advancement or anticipating
improvements soon to come, his biogenetic speculations functioned rhetorically to
identify everyday processes of involutionary regression. Just as Sully (1881/1891) had
argued, dreams and psychopathology amounted to developmental backsliding,
momentarily guiding the individual along a reversed recapitulationary sequence.
Consistent with early twenty-first-century anthropological thinking on such matters,
Freud’s phylogenetic Patient Zero was primitive man, observable in the present through
the habits of contemporary children, neurotics, and “savages.” Parallels in the
development of these three groups—and the implied proximity of savagery to
modernity—would come in the form of Totem and Taboo (1913/1950), but Freud had
been gradually formulating his biogenetic psychology well before he began to apply it to
“primitive” cultures.
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As his metapsychology materialized in the early nineteen-teens, Freud began to
see the ontogenetic-phylogenetic parallelism of Haeckel’s law as the missing link within
his theoretical system. In his 1911 postscript to the Schreber case, for instance, he
prophesied that “the time will soon be ripe … to complete what has hitherto had only an
individual and ontogenetic application by the addition of its anthropological counterpart,
which is to be conceived phylogenetically” (Freud, 1911/1958, p. 82). To be clear,
anthropology at this time was a resolutely historical (to say nothing of racist) science; to a
recapitulationist, the term itself was synonymous with human phylogeny—with the “prehistory of the race” that Freud believed to beckon from the unconscious and reveal itself
in dreams and neuroses (Brickman, 2002, 2003; see also Wallace, 1983).
Thus, in “dreams and in neuroses,” Freud (1911/1958) concluded in an imagined
dialogue with his like-minded brethren,
‘we come once more upon the child and the peculiarities which characterize his
modes of thought and his emotional life.’ ‘And we come upon the savage too,’ we
may now add, ‘upon the primitive man, as he stands revealed to us in the light of
the researches of archaeology and of ethnology. (Freud, 1911/1958, p. 82)
In Totem and Taboo (1913/1950) the adult neurotic completed Freud’s threefold
parallelism along just these lines. To borrow Celia Brickman’s (2003) algebraic
rendering, his biogenetic anthropology meant that “neurotics = children = primitives” (p.
67. To be fair, however, the equation wasn’t quite so straightforward, and admitted one
key distinction: In the final paragraph of Totem and Taboo, Freud (1913/1950) concluded
that in children and neurotics “the thought is a complete substitute to the deed. Primitive
men, on the other hand, are uninhibited: thought passes directly into action” (p. 200).
Modern children and adult neurotics, that is to say, are the Hamlet to the primitive’s
Oedipus. Only the outward response and inward register of desire (and not its contents)
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have changed. Neurotic or not, in the contemporary individual the Haeckelian mechanism
of condensation had compressed ancient enactments of libidinal impulses into the
unconscious. There, they persisted as archaic vestigia, transmitting phylogenetic memory
via psychic ontogeny (albeit in the disguised form of dreams and neurotic symptoms).
At times, Freud’s nascent metapsychological preoccupation with phylogenetic
parallels prompted him to reframe earlier works along recapitulationist lines. In his 1914
preface to the third edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, he all but
apologized for the absence of biogenetic interpretations. Such was the nature of
psychoanalytic observation, he admitted, that “disposition is left in the background, and
more weight is attached to ontogenesis than to phylogenesis” (Freud, 1905/1962, p. xv).
And by “disposition” Freud (1905/1962) meant phylogeny, “the precipitate of earlier
experience of the species to which the more recent experience of the individual, as the
sum of the accidental [or ontogenetic] factors, is super-added” (p. xv).
In addition to documenting the increasing prominence of recapitulationism within
his thought, Freud’s pattern of revisions also reflects the degree to which many of his
better-known theories emerged from applications of the biogenetic law. Though rarely
noted, the introduction of the psychosexual stages in the Three Essays was an especially
Haeckelian maneuver. Such was the insight of Ferenczi’s student Michael Balint (18961970), who noted that “the three phases of the psychosexual development of man
discovered by Freud correspond to a similar triple gradation in phylogenetic sexual
evolution” (Balint, 1930/1965, p. 5). The phase of “oral incorporation,” Balint
(1930/1965) argued, recapitulated the development of a single-celled ancestor, with the
periods of “anal evacuation” and “genital mating” each reflecting a more
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phylogenetically recent provenance (p. 15). Child sexuality as whole was “the remnant of
a long-vanished epoch; having lost its biological purpose, it is rather like an old paid-off
mercenary who willingly offers his services to any bidder” (Balint, 1930/1965, p. 15).
Curiously, in the first, 1905 edition of the Three Essays Freud self-consciously
placed individual development (or ontogeny) on equal footing with “heredity,” or
phylogeny. Sexologists’ and developmental psychologists’ habit of doing the opposite—
of giving explanatory priority to hereditary, often degenerationist interpretations—were
the targets of much of Freud’s critique:
It is noticeable that writers who concern themselves with explaining the
characteristics and reactions of the adult have devoted much more attention to the
primeval period which is comprised in the life of the individual’s ancestors—
have, that is, ascribed much more influence to heredity—than to the other
primeval period, which falls within the lifetime of the individual himself—that is,
to childhood. (Freud, 1905/1962, p. 39)52
Freud’s reasoning here was more Haeckelian than it might at first appear. His objection
to existing treatments of adult sexuality was at bottom both conservative and biogenetic:
One couldn’t just leap into hereditary speculations and phylogenetic conclusions on the
basis of adult sexuality alone; such would invent a phylogeny oblivious to its clear (if
troubling) documentation within ontogeny.
Whatever their true reasons (naturally, Freud saw some Victorian prudishness at
work), this was what had allowed previous psychologists to dismiss the phenomena of
child sexuality tout court, as they reasoned directly from the contemporary adult to the
primitive progenitor (himself also an adult, in keeping with the Haeckelian schema). As
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Freud (1905/1962) softened his criticism in a 1910 footnote, admitting that his
“judgment upon the literature of infantile sexuality need no longer be maintained since
the appearance of [G.] Stanley Hall’s exhaustive work (1904)”—namely, Adolescence (p.
40n).
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he clarified in a 1915 footnote added to the third edition of the Three Essays, it was
simply not “possible to estimate correctly the part played by heredity until the part played
by childhood has been assessed” (Freud, 1905/1962, p. 39n).53 For the psychoanalyst, one
could only get to phylogeny by way of ontogeny.
And Freud certainly got there. In the same year that he published his
“involutionary” lamentation, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (Freud,
1915/1957c), he sent Sándor Ferenczi a draft of his twelfth metapsychological essay,
“Overview of the Transference Neuroses.” Retitled A Phylogenetic Fantasy after its
rediscovery in 1983, the brief essay illuminates the development of Freud’s (1915/1987)
increasingly novel use of the biogenetic law.54 Of a piece with Totem and Taboo
(1913/1950), in this draft Freud was both more explicit and more speculative about the
causal role that phylogeny played within human ontogeny.
While this fragment of an ultimately jettisoned project has been read a number of
ways, most scholars have ignored the degree to which the text provides a window into
Freud’s real-time reformulation of psychological recapitulationism (cf. Dufresne, 2017,
pp. 6-8; Gould, 1987; Grubrich-Simits, 1987; Ritvo, 1990, pp. 90-98). In fact, the text
shows Freud (1915/1987) reconciling his belief in the individual’s capacity to acquire
heritable traits (i.e., his Lamarckism) with the possibility that in individual neurosis,
ontogeny may recapitulate phylogeny in reverse. When development is neurotically
fixated or arrested, he argues, this or that neurotic’s ontogenetically acquired trait is “not
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Note that this is not the same as saying that ontogeny has a causal influence on
phylogeny (as Baldwin [1895/1968] had concluded). On Freud’s shift from
environmentalist to hereditarian explanations of childhood sexuality, see Burston (1994).
54
In the interest of smoother reading, in my quotations from this text I have
removed the translators’ and editor’s scrupulously added punctuation.
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eliminated thereby; it only moves into still earlier prehistory, because one can justifiably
claim that the inherited dispositions are residues of the acquisition of our ancestors”
(Freud, 1915/1987, p. 10).
In its involutionary function, neurosis pulls the subject back to that state in which
now-dispositional, phylogenetic traits were first acquired. Like the facial expressions
whose origins Darwin had traced in The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872/1965), the neurotic’s symptoms “returned” him to the environmental contexts in
which they were originally acquired. Briefly stated, the ontogeny of his primitive
progenitors replaces his own. From this regressed state, Freud (1915/1987) reasoned, the
regressed neurotic may nonetheless acquire new traits to be mapped upon the atavistic
ones; we
should find no contradiction if the individual adds new dispositions from his own
experience to his inherited disposition acquired on the basis of earlier experience.
Why should the process that creates disposition on the basis of experience cease
precisely at the individual whose neurosis one is investigating? …. Seems rather
to be [a] necessary complement. (Freud, 1915/1987, p. 10)
With his typical rhetorical modesty, Freud (1915/1987) admits that how “much the
phylogenetic disposition can contribute to the understanding of the neuroses cannot yet
be estimated” (p. 10). Readers familiar with Freud, however, expect a sweeping thesis to
follow this cautious understatement, as it most certainly does. As in Totem and Taboo
and Moses and Monotheism, Freud (1915/1987) politely asks his reader (here, Ferenczi)
to briefly suspend his disbelief as he introduces a bit “of fantasy and unconfirmed things”
(p. 11).
However much Mendelian biologists might object, for Freud (1915/1987) at this
point it “is still legitimate to assume that the neuroses must also bear witness to the
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history of the mental development of mankind” (p. 11). Noting that neurotic symptoms
seem to antedate the development of the ego—harkening back, as they do, to a past better
represented by the active, libidinal Oedipus than the ruminative, inhibited Hamlet—he
argues that “the former [i.e., the libido] recapitulates conditions of the phylum of
vertebrates, whereas the latter is dependent on the history of the human race” (p. 12).
Different neuroses appear at different ages in human ontogeny, with the “transference
neuroses” (e.g., anxiety hysteria and obsessional neurosis) appearing far earlier in
individual development than the “narcissistic neuroses” or psychoses (say, dementia
praecox and paranoia). The neurotic’s reverse recapitulation of phylogeny is therefore
itself inverted: “the later the neurosis appears [within ontogeny], the earlier
[phylogenetic] phase of the libido to which it must regress” (Freud, 1915/1987, p. 12).
Yet for his “biogenetic machine” to run smoothly, Freud needed the ontogenetic
regression to run parallel to (and not invert) the phylogenetic sequence that it
recapitulated in reverse. “Only in doing so, one must go far afield and allow some
hypothetical intermediate link.” This would be “the exigencies of the Ice Age,” which
gave the primal human “the stimulus for the development of civilization” (Freud,
1915/1987, p. 13). The transference neuroses (“anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and
obsessional neurosis”) were really Ice-Age acquisitions recapitulated in contemporary
Europe. Anxiety in particular first emerged in the trying circumstances of the planet’s
glacial interlude. In such times, Freud reasoned, environmental pressures required a
repression of the libido on the one hand, and the concurrent development of the rational,
censoring ego on the other; with this latter development arose everything from
intelligence to language. The legacy within contemporary ontogeny of this “adaptation to
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exigency” may be found in the adult neurotic, who recapitulates both the anxiety and the
obsessional rigidity demanded by a biogenetically transmitted history (Freud, 1915/1987,
p. 16).
In the case of both the hapless neurotic and the Ice Age survivalist, no instinct
suffers as much in this series of adaptive compromises as the individual’s sexuality.
Repressed by necessity in the Ice Age, in the neurotic’s contemporary ontogeny “this
human type, so valuable for the development of civilization, perishes in its return [from
the Ice Age] from the demands of love life” (Freud, 1915/1987, p. 16). His mind enlarged
and his libido bridled, the neurotic’s pattern of ontogenetic, reverse recapitulation of IceAge phylogeny corrected Faust’s mistranslation of the Gospel of John, with which Freud
had concluded Totem and Taboo: In the beginning was the deed, sure, but in the second
beginning, the one initiated in the Ice Age and recapitulated ontogenetically in the latency
period, came the word (cf. Freud, 1913/1950, p. 200).55
Having done his best to illuminate a potential phylogenetic explanation for the
most common neuroses, Freud concluded with some observations that reflected his
ongoing Lamarckian commitments—and which suggested in turn the moral lability of
biogenetic recapitulation within the mind. I will spare the reader another retelling of the
myth of the primal horde (which Freud recounted variously in this text, Totem and
Taboo, and Moses and Monotheism), and note only that from its presentation in A
Phylogenetic Fantasy he concluded that the myth proved that “neurosis is therefore a

55

Ferenczi, with whom Freud was closely collaborating during the writing of
what would become A Phylogenetic Fantasy, was even more explicit on the
recapitulation of the Ice Age within contemporary ontogeny (e.g., Ferenczi, 1913/1952,
p. 237; 1936, p. 257; 1924/1989, pp. 68-72).
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cultural acquisition”—is, in other words, super-added to the phylogenetic legacy by
social experiences such as the Ice Age (Freud, 1915/1987, p. 19).
If his reading of James Mark Baldwin had prompted this reversal of the
Haeckelian dialectic (in which, one recalls, ontogeny was entirely a function of
phylogeny, and never the reverse), Freud didn’t say so. He did, however, justify his
appeal to Ice Age “scientific fantasies” as being a “salutary rude awakening if we were
perhaps on the way to placing the phylogenetic disposition above everything else”
(Freud, 1915/1987, p. 20). In light of his conclusion that the neuroses of modernity
recapitulate a past more recent than previously thought, he speculated that there “remains
room for new acquisition and for influences with which we are not acquainted. In sum,
we are not at the end, but rather at the beginning, of an understanding of this phylogenetic
factor” (Freud, 1915/1987, p. 20). For now, it seemed safe to assume that history could
radically retool what had been phylogenetically inherited.
Hungry, clinically underemployed, and desperate for “the end of the world
drama,” one can understand why Freud and Ferenczi’s thoughts turned to “the exigencies
of the Ice Age” as they waited out the Great War (as cited in Grubrich-Simitis, 1987, p.
95). A time of unprecedented violence, social upheaval, and material deprivation, the Ice
Age that Freud (1915/1987) imagined in his Phylogenetic Fantasy and Ferenczi
(1924/1989) in his Thalassa (where it counted as a “Catastrophe” on par with the origin
of organic life) bore an eerie resemblance to the scenes of their writing. Freud’s
engrossment in the international catastrophe and a prolonged depression both had a hand
in his definitive statement regarding that still-inchoate “phylogenetic factor” in human
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psychology.56 This would be, of course, the involutionary recapitulationism of Beyond
the Pleasure Principle.
Freud, like Haeckel, often found occasion to quote from Faust in his work, albeit
to somewhat different ends (e.g. Freud, 1913/1950, p. 200; 1920/1961a, p. 51). Though
he never suffered the death of a spouse, the culmination of his reversal of the biogenetic
law took place amidst a state of grief comparable to Haeckel’s. In addition to lamenting
the general desolation that followed the First World War, in 1920—the year in which he
first introduced the death drive—Freud mourned the death of his beloved daughter,
Sophie. I emphasize this context of loss not to explain biographically Freud’s inversion of
a theory long associated with evolutionary progressivism so much as to highlight how
differently he responded to the death of a loved one. Whereas Haeckel placed his bets on
the generally progressive arc of phylogeny (and so renounced the promises of ontogeny
[Richards, 2008]), amidst his own mourning and melancholy Freud began to envision the
unraveling of civilization according to an irrepressible drive.
By the time he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud seems to have become
convinced that no amount of Lamarckian acquisition could do away with the
involutionary tendencies of the human species. No new Ice Age would reallocate the
contemporary species’ share of its phylogenetic inheritance. The combined effect of his
study of the war neuroses, the loss of his daughter, and the general desolation that colored
interwar Vienna brought him back to the Fechnerian psychophysics that had so
preoccupied him in the days of his collaboration with Fliess. Moving from a discussion of
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Grubrich-Simits (1987) observes that in this period Freud was in “a gloomy
mood—sometimes [he wrote Ferenczi,] ‘I have to struggle for a long time until I regain
my mental equilibrium’—and filled with thoughts of death” (p. 82).
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trauma and an elucidation of the repetition compulsion, Freud (1920/1961a) “speculated”
about the descent of consciousness.
Importantly, these speculations begin with (and are based on) “embryology, in its
capacity as a recapitulation of developmental history” (Freud, 1920/1961a, p. 29). The
seat of consciousness, Freud (1920/1961a) observes, is located in the cerebral cortex,
itself a “baked through,” hardened “shield” that mediates external stimulation in much
the same manner as an ancestral single cell’s “ectoderm” or membrane (p. 27). In the
course of human evolution, that cell membrane would have evolved to effectively protect
against excessive stimuli from the external world, but not from the internal repository of
phylogenetic inheritance. Nonetheless, when the shield of consciousness—itself the result
of the recapitulated evolution of the ectoderm—is breached by a trauma, the compulsion
emerges to repeat the trauma in dreams so that it might be mastered and “undone.” Thus,
Freud (1920/1961a) concludes, “there was also a time before the purpose of dreams was
the fulfillment of wishes” (p. 38).
Followed to its logical conclusion (or point of origin, if you prefer), this “time
before” was the state of the inorganic, the preexistence of life in which naught there was
but inanimate matter. Freud (1920/1961a) knew that this “urge inherent in organic life to
restore an earlier state of things” seemed an odd suggestion from a student of evolution
like himself (p. 43). “This view of the instincts,” he admits, “strikes us as strange because
we have become used to see in them a factor impelling towards change and development,
whereas we are now asked to recognize in them the precise contrary” (p. 43). But he is
quickly spared the task of explaining this about-face by none other than the biogenetic
law:
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we are quickly relieved of the necessity for seeking for further examples by the
reflection that the most impressive proofs of there being an organic compulsion to
repeat lie in the phenomena of heredity and the facts of embryology. We see how
the germ of a living animal is obliged in the course of its development to
recapitulate (even if only in a transient and abbreviated fashion) the structures of
all the forms from which it is sprung, instead of proceeding quickly by the
shortest path to its final shape. (Freud, 1920/1961a, p. 44)
Put otherwise, the posttraumatic repetition compulsion was, in fact, a derivative form of
biogenetic recapitulation. New acquisitions and influences might be added to the old, but
development was nonetheless obliged to recapitulate all of phylogeny. Even so, the real,
most phylogenetically ancient drive behind the recapitulationary sequence was inherently
negative. Here, then, was the biomechanical determinism in Freud’s tragically recast
recapitulationism: Recapitulation was but a series of detours, manifestly progressive but
ultimately involutionary and self-destructive.
Instead of seeing development as potentially regressive or involutionary, Freud’s
(1920/1961a) biogenetic reasoning in Beyond maintains that it has always been so.
Acquired amidst all the Sturm und Drang of human phylogeny, “all the organic
instincts”—manifest in the recapitulationary repetition of past stages—“tend toward the
restoration of an earlier state of things” (p. 45). Ontogeny, far from being a record of
evolutionary advancement, is the result of outside interference, of traumas like the Ice
Age that forced the organism to terminally add new traits on top of phylogenetically
inherited ones. In truth, Freud (1920/1961a) reasoned, drives to repeat and develop
upward give the “deceptive appearance of being forces tending towards change and
progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old
and new” (p. 45). Whatever novelty or creativity as might emerge in ontogeny was at
bottom evidence of the fact that “the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion” (p.
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47); even the sexual instincts, to which “alone we can attribute an internal impulse
towards ‘progress’ and towards higher development,” serve to prolong life only that it
may be undone in a manner agreeable to the individual (p. 48n).
Recapitulationary development, Freud argued, ultimately operated in reverse.
“There is unquestionably no universal instinct towards higher development observable in
the animal or plant world,” and what might seem to be higher development in one place
is on closer inspection always “balanced or outweighed by involution in another” (Freud,
1920/1961a pp. 49, 50). And lest he appear to been speaking only of over-stimulated
ectoderms, Freud made clear that his law of reverse-recapitulationary involution made all
of human civilization the result of so many, externally imposed detours from
degeneration: “What appears in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulsion
toward further perfection can easily be understood as a result of the instinctual repression
upon which is based all that is most precious in human civilization” (Freud, 1920/1961a,
p. 50). Such repression might forestall the unraveling of “all that is most precious” in the
social, but only temporarily. It would appear that the more Freud sought to explain
civilization in biogenetic terms, the more he distrusted the direction of its development.
As in Totem and Taboo, Freud (1920/1961a) ended Beyond with a surprise
quotation—an aphoristic afterthought of an epigraph, if you will: “What we cannot reach
flying we must reach limping …. The Book tells us it is no sin to limp” (p.78). Taken
from the nineteenth-century German orientalist Friedrich Rückert’s translation of a
volume of eleventh-century Arabic prose, the appearance of the passage seems intended
to provide an apologetic coda for Freud’s (1920/1961a) repeated disavowals of his
conclusions and “speculations” in Beyond. No doubt this purpose was well served. As
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Alan Bass noted in his translation of Derrida’s (1980/1987) reading of Beyond, in it one
observes “Freud’s repeated gesture of taking another step forward that goes nowhere,”
undermining both his legacy and whatever speculation he attempted to advance in the
text (as cited in Derrida, 1980/1987, p. 292n). In a sense, his rhetoric to this end quite
appropriately paralleled his argument.
Rhetorical or not, with his cryptic postscript Freud seems to have been aware that
by basing his argument in Beyond on a reversal of the biogenetic law, he was shedding
whatever vestiges of a previous progressivist evolutionism remained. Indeed, it would be
difficult to exaggerate the degree to which Freud (1920/1961a) reversed Haeckelian
recapitulationism with the argument that drove Beyond—not because he misrepresented
the biogenetic principle, but by virtue of the fact that he appealed to it in order to
demonstrate the involutionary or devolutionary bias of both ontogeny and phylogeny.
Recall again that the previous century’s recapitulationism was a necessary
mechanism of heredity and progress. Newer traits could be added onto more ancient and
ontogenetically earlier ones. Haeckel’s principles of condensation and terminal addition
governed such developments, and generally drove them toward advancement and away
from degeneration. Freud’s use of the concept throughout his career—most especially in
Beyond—ultimately functioned to direct the species away from progress and back toward
its own non-existence. From this point forward in his work, his metapsychology would
exhibit a decidedly tragic character, suffused as it is with the assumption that phylogeny
is an essentially autocidal process.
In his capacities as philosophical-scientific hermeneut and bricoleur, Freud’s
tragic reversal of the biogenetic law through the death instinct can be counted among the

115

more unusual performances of appropriation. The metapsychology established in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle and subsequent works was at once an application and an inversion
of the late nineteenth-century evolutionary progressivism embodied by everyone from
Haeckel to Hall; it was as well a scientific apology for a strand of post-Idealist
philosophical pessimism in the style of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But above all else
Freud’s (1920/1961a) dizzying synthesis was a philosophy of ambivalent history, an
illumination of the deepening shadows that accompany the process of progress. Far from
the “counter-political triumph” that Carl Schorske once judged it, the doctrine of
involution was newly cathected to address a Europe at a crossroads (as cited in Spurling,
1989, p. 115). Caught between a half-century of post-Enlightenment evolutionist
optimism and the birth pangs of fascism, Freud’s inversion of an outmoded
recapitulationist biology and appropriation of a bygone philosophy proved surprisingly
well suited to his time.
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CHAPTER 5

THE ATAVISTIC AFTERLIFE OF THE BIOGENETIC LAW
“The ministers of knowledge have always assumed that the whole universe was
threatened by the very changes that affected their ideologies and their positions. They
transmute the misfortune of their theories into theories of misfortune. When they
transform their bewilderment into ‘catastrophes,’ when they seek to enclose the people in
the ‘panic’ of their discourses, are they once more necessarily right?” (de Certeau,
1980/1984, p. 96)
As Sulloway (1979) was so quick to show, in the years following Freud’s death
the Haeckelian foundations of psychoanalytic metapsychology did not fare so well as the
theory’s more palatable ingredients. Thanks to the demise of the biogenetic law within
biology proper, psychic versions of recapitulationism soon gave off more than a whiff of
anachronism. Alongside Lamarckian inheritance, Freud’s recapitulationism found itself
subject to an uncommon degree of dismissal and suppression by postwar psychoanalytic
apologists. Much of this historical revision owed to the emergence of several loosely
connected scientific and intellectual developments in the postwar years, each of which
had a hand in banishing the biogenetic law from the ranks of respectable psychology.
Among other trends, these included the anti-teleological, neo-Darwinian synthesis within
evolutionary biology; a growing institutionalism and insularity within psychoanalytic
practice and theory; and within Anglo-American academic psychology, first the
ascendance of behaviorism and next the cognitive revolution that supplanted it (cf. Arlow
& Brenner, 1964, pp. 70-71; Makari, 2008, pp. 467-485; Ruse, 1993).
Somewhat tellingly, postwar biologists’ rebukes of Haeckelian holdouts were
often couched in the rhetoric of the emerging cognitive sciences. By 1959 Ernst Mayr, for
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instance, could write off the “deplorably great number of biologists left who to this very
day believe that there must be a close correlation between ontogeny and phylogeny” with
a simple appeal to the “terms of the information theory: ontogeny is the decoding of
coded information, phylogeny is the creating of ever new codes of information and the
survival of the most successful ones” (p. 181). As the ever more fashionable
computational model of mind made clear, recapitulationary parallels were merely
incidental or epiphenomenal—quite the opposite of the “deeply internal and causal”
relationship that Haeckel (1874/1900, vol. 1, p. 6) had embraced. Apart from the
occasional half-hearted conjecture, psychology and biology had entered a decidedly postrecapitulationist age.
“Post-,” James Clifford (1994) once noted, “is always shadowed by neo-“ (p.
328). And so it was with the biogenetic principle, whose afterlife in evolutionary
psychology and cognitive neuroscience might as well have been announced in its
biological obituary. With the “triune brain” theory introduced in the nineteen-sixties by
the neuroscientist Paul MacLean (1913-2007), an idea that had become an embarrassing
anachronism for psychoanalysts quietly began to assume the form of a persistent atavism
within the brain sciences. No less than it was for Freud, the reverse psychorecapitulationism of neuroscientists like MacLean was rooted in an anxiety of social
degeneration
Though the theory appeared in altered form and by other names, for a number of
evolutionary psychologists—particularly those given to approaching brain structure as a
kind of phylogenetic archive—the biogenetic principle continued to function in much the
same manner as it had for every recapitulationist since Haeckel and Hughlings-Jackson:
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Neural (and so psychological) ontogeny progressed or degenerated in a sequence that
mirrored neural phylogeny (cf. Ploog, 2003). Despite its repudiation by evolutionary
biologists, a species of retooled crypto-recapitulationism allowed postwar evolutionists to
“localize” the tragic directions of human history within the bidirectional dynamics of
neuroanatomical development. In effect, the potential for phylogenetic regression or
“involution” was concretized along a neural ontogenetic sequence. Whether described as
death drive or reptilian brain, the persistence of the evolutionary past in everyday neuroontogeny continued to mean that development contained its own phylogenetic antitheses.
In postwar America no less than interwar Vienna, worrisome developments at the
heart of civilization seemed to demand recapitulationary explanations. Like Freud
(1920/1961a), who in Beyond the Pleasure Principle had reasoned biogenetically from a
study of the “war neuroses” to the trans-phylogenetic death drive, in the last quarter of
the twentieth century a number of evolutionary psychologists and cognitive
neuroscientists found themselves offering reverse-recapitulationary explanations for
traumas that seemed to unfold at the height of modernity. Anything from explanations of
the 1999 Columbine shootings to the neural substrates of PTSD seemed to cathect the
bidirectional, ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogeny with a highly moral anxiety (see
Bailey, 2002; Linden, 2008).

Before making a more speculative analysis of such unwitting revivals of the
(reversed) biogenetic law, the more conventional account of the postwar demise of
psychological recapitulationism should at least be acknowledged. I have in mind
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specifically the domestication of the biogenetic law within the “genetic epistemology” of
Jean Piaget (1896-1980).
Under the supervision of his mentor, Pierre Janet (1859-1947), Piaget studied
James Mark Baldwin’s work extensively. Consequently, much of his treatment of the
parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny in psychological development was predicated
upon Baldwin’s inversion of the Haeckelian causal sequence (Cahan, 1984; Richards,
1987, pp. 464-465). (Baldwin, one will recall, had argued that ontogenetic adaptations
within social life determined the shape of psychological phylogeny, and not the other way
around.) Despite making the occasional nod to possible recapitulationary parallels, Piaget
(e.g., 1967/1971, pp. 82-85) generally stayed mum on questions of phylogenetic factors
within the sequential phases of cognitive development (Kitchener, 1985; McKinney,
1998). By giving greater emphasis to the relationship between child development and the
historical socialization of knowledge (or “ethnogenesis”), his use of the recapitulation
theory was such that phylogeny no longer dictated the course of individual growth or
decay (as it had to varying degrees for Haeckel, Hall, and Freud, inter alios). The
outcome of ontogeny was more plastic than tragic, and the educator was thus afforded
considerable power in shaping the moral constitution of future generations.
Gould (1977), it is worth noting, concluded his discussion of psychological
recapitulationism in Ontogeny and Phylogeny with a brief account of Piaget’s thought,
which he took to represent the last gasp of the biogenetic law within the cognitive and
social sciences. True, he argued, it certainly looked as if Piaget was given to drawing
Totem and Taboo-like parallels between child development and “primitive man.” Yet as
much as it seemed that these two “sequences run in parallel,” Gould’s (1979) Piaget
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insisted that “neither causes each other” (p. 147). Rather, cultural history and child
development “both follow similar paths because a common object (the preconscious
mind) is pursuing a common history of development” (Gould, 1977, p. 147).
Depending on the culture, this pursuit might end in childhood, or it might extend
into adulthood. Yet whatever parallels as might emerge merely reflected the existence of
shared environmental constraints. Instead of suggesting recapitulation, the resemblance
of modern ontogeny in its early stages to ancient phases of phylogeny simply pointed to
the relationship between ecology and developmental timing (or heterochrony) in natural
selection. A modern child and a primitive culture, for example, both have to establish the
same principles of conservation, but this is only because they both must navigate a world
that imposes similarly fixed spatial boundaries upon cognition. To inversely paraphrase
Haeckel, resemblances between the two are superficially external and epiphenomenal.
One might reasonably infer from Gould’s (1979) narrative that the loosening of
such associations was but the birth pangs of modern-day cognitive psychology—which,
not so surprisingly, emerged in tandem with the “rediscovery” of Piaget by American
developmentalists (Hsueh, 2009, pp. 356-357). For one could, in a Piagetian mode,
tentatively entertain an outdated biogenetic parallelism, and all the while continue to
deny any causal relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny (or for that matter,
between psychological development and cultural history). In a way, Piaget’s amoral,
vaguely progressivist use of evolutionary theory neatly matched Gould’s (1979)
reappraisal of the biogenetic law in the second half of Ontogeny and Phylogeny: Good
science made note of abstract parallels in different spheres of development and evolution,
but never stooped to the level of cultural criticism or jeremiad (as had the psychoanalytic
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recapitulationists he bemoaned elsewhere in the text). Recast in the twin, apolitical
images of cognitivism and the neo-Darwinian synthesis, biological and psychological
versions of the biogenetic principle survived as little more than a curious analogy (Gould,
1979, pp. 155-164).57
True as far as it goes, I want to suggest that this turn in Gould’s (1979) stillcanonical intellectual history was something of an unintended red herring, one that seems
broadly emblematic of narratives that uncritically celebrate the “cognitive revolution”
from a disciplinary distance. For even as Piaget’s proto-cognitivism was gaining
influence and the last vestiges of recapitulationism were being purged from the academy
and the laboratory, at least one evolutionary neuroscientist was in the process of
“rediscovering” the reversed biogenetic law in neuroanatomical ontogeny. The primary
catalyst for such developments—at least in intellectual-historical terms—was Paul
MacLean’s theory of the “triune brain.”
One

way

or

another,

all

evolutionary-neuroscientific

narratives

of

recapitulationary regression have their origins in MacLean’s tripartite theory of brain
morphology. Thus my discussion in this chapter focuses heavily on a reexamination of
the development of MacLean’s theory. I then shift to an analysis of one of the more
elaborate applications of trinitarian neuroanatomy to crypto-recapitulationist accounts of
psychological development and decline—which, as we will see, have persisted well
beyond their lifespan within biology proper.
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While the chronology is shared, it should be emphasized that the
metapsychological, crypto-recapitulationism under discussion in this chapter is of a
different sort than the “evo-devo” that began to gain favor in the late seventies (see Hall,
1992; Laubichler & Maienschein, 2007).
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As with the previous chapter’s analysis of Freudian recapitulationism, I should be
clear here that I am neither interested in, nor in a position to adjudicate the scientific
merits of MacLean’s theory (which, for what it is worth, were already beginning to seem
rather modest by the time his magnum opus appeared in book form [Deacon, 1990;
Nakano, 1998]). More important for my purposes here is revealing the manner by which
the triune brain theory effectively repeated a previous generation’s reversal of the
biogenetic law, albeit through a process of anatomical or neuroscientific reification. In so
doing, recapitulationism, with its consistent (but usually unstated) devolutionary
implications, came once again to function as an explanation for the persistence of the
“primitive” within psychological modernity. Yet instead of locating the capacity for
recapitulationary degeneration within “racial memory” or psychic structure, MacLean’s
triune brain did what neuroscientific materialism does best: it reified (or “organ-ized,” if
you prefer) all the anxieties of progress and decline within an autonomous anatomical
object.

Crypto-Recapitulationism and the Triune Brain
Born the son of a Presbyterian minister, the father of the triune brain didn’t
exactly enter medicine with an interest in psychopathology. As Paul MacLean (1998)
explained in an autobiographical essay, the exigencies of military service forced it upon
him. Stationed at a psychiatrically understaffed naval hospital in New Zealand during the
Second World War, his assigned ward was filled with the psychological casualties of the
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Guadalcanal campaign; “in addition to having malaria and an enlarged liver,” he recalled
that all of them “suffered from a psychoneurosis” (p. 255).58
MacLean

(1998)

found

the

whole

experience

unsettling—sometimes

understandably (“I was taken by the scruff of the neck, lifted out of bacteriology, and
placed in charge of the psychotic ward”), and sometimes to the point of asphyxiation, as
when a shell-shocked Marine slyly tried to strangle him with his own tie, something that
only began to register once he “felt … my head beginning to burst” (p. 255). (Thankfully
a Navy corpsman was available to rescue him, as conceivably had happened earlier in the
case of his would-be assailant.) All these soldiers hors de combat only seemed to draw
the doctor into battle. Without fail, the mere sound of an airplane overhead would cue “a
whole ward of patients” to “‘hit the deck’ and crawl under the bed” (p. 255). At one
point, MacLean’s (1998) attempt to coax them out of an exaggerated startle response
revealed the unseemlier side of posttraumatic stress. After getting down on his hands and
knees to extinguish a flashback, he “discovered fruit jars containing things such as cut off
ears and gold teeth under the head of almost every bed” (MacLean, 1998, p. 255).
An older student of the war neuroses might have found much to mull over on
MacLean’s ward, but the medical officer apparently wasted little time in formulating a
straightforward explanation for the traumatized soldiers’ compulsion to repeat: Grateful
that his own head didn’t explode, MacLean’s (1998) war-time “experiences with patients
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My account of MacLean’s career draws heavily from his 1998 autobiographical
essay, as well as Lambert (2003).
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suffering from psychiatric illness got me thinking again that the mind must be in the
head, that it was not just an epiphenomenon” (p. 255).59
Frustration with civilian medical practice only reinforced this conviction. Instead
of infectious disease, most of his patients presented with tamer versions of the same
conditions he had encountered among veterans of the Pacific theater. Whatever his
patients’ complaints, too many of his physical examinations and medical histories failed
“to uncover anything except psychological symptoms” (MacLean, 1998, p. 256). It
wasn’t just that he had no way of alleviating these symptoms (psychological cures for
psychological problems seem not to have interested him); simply put, “it was frustrating
not to have any idea where in the brain these symptoms were generated” (MacLean,
1998, p. 256). Without a proper neural map and despite his best clinical efforts, he could
do little to keep the mind out of medicine.
Several professional detours later, MacLean believed he’d located the anatomical
source of his patients’ problems. Although at first he used the term “visceral brain” to
describe the neural locus of psychic distress, a study of Paul Broca’s work led him to
christen the brain’s seat of emotion “the limbic system” (Lambert, 2003, p. 344;
MacLean, 1949, 1952). For Broca, the système limbique referred to the brain structure
forming a boundary or border (i.e., limbus) between the brainstem and the cerebrum.
Reasoning that the former structure was phylogenetically older than the latter and thus
more given to primitive behaviors, MacLean (1949, 1952) added a subtle biogenetic
connotation to the language of the limbic.
59

For example, “Many medical men, who had previously held themselves aloof
from psychoanalysis, have been brought into close touch with its theories through their
service with the army compelling them to deal with the question of the war neuroses”
(Freud, 1921, p. 1).
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Like the psychoneurotic symptoms of old, postwar psychopathological
phenomena owed their appearances to conflicts between the demands of the present and
the vestiges of phylogeny. In MacLean’s thinking, however, reason and consciousness
were processed in the cerebrum (or “neomammalian brain”)—it being of more
phylogenetically recent

provenance

than

the

other

brain

systems—with

the

neurobehavioral relics of primitive phylogeny preserved anatomically in the brainstem.
Mediating between the two, with varying degrees of success, was the limbic complex.
Psychiatric disturbances thus began as anatomical border clashes, incoherent
miscommunications between advanced and atavistic cultures of the brain.
Or at least this was how MacLean (1998) recalled the early formulation of his
theory, which he believed “might account for the seemingly paradoxical overlapping of
affective experience whereby primitive peoples and those with psychoneurotic and socalled psychosomatic conditions appear to experience outside conditions as though they
were happening inside” (p. 259). In the miscommunication between an overcharged
primitive brain structure and contemporary, individual experience, phylogenetically
ancient behaviors emerged atavistically as neurobehavioral symptoms. And yet these,
too, were just so many psychological masquerades, presenting as subjective but
nonetheless etiologically organic. Mediating between the pressures of modern ontogeny
and the vestiges of primitive phylogeny, the limbic system allowed one to both localize
and historicize the multitudes the mind contained.
While these psychopathological phantoms seemed to inhabit the unconscious,
their atavistic quality really owed to the preverbal, phylogenetically primitive provenance
of the limbic system. The “visceral brain,” MacLean explained in 1949 (not yet having
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introduce his limbic terminology), “eludes the grasp of the intellect because its
animalistic and primitive structure makes it impossible to communicate in verbal terms”
(p. 351). Here was an explanation for the strange behavior he encountered during his
military service: Even if it couldn’t be verbalized by the shell-shocked veteran,
psychopathology could at least be localized in the pre-linguistic storms of the limbic
system and the brainstem. This, he argued, explained the phylogenetically regressive
quality of clinically significant emotional disturbances: Since “our affective behavior
continues to be dominated by a relatively crude and primitive system,” language failed to
express, and reason to comprehend, the true contents of the emotional faculties
(MacLean, 1998, p. 259; see also McCarthy, 2017).
Throughout the fifties and sixties, MacLean contrived an array of experimental
environments to study the phylogenetically distinct subsystems of the individual brain.
His selection of research subjects was suitably diverse, including the evolutionarily
representative brains of squirrel monkeys and komodo dragons, as well as humans. Most
of his work was conducted under the aegis of the National Institutes of Health, where he
held increasingly influential positions within ethological and neurobehavioral laboratories
(Lambert, 2003; MacLean, 1998).
After a prodigious output of experimental research, MacLean’s work finally
entered the mainstream with the buzz that followed a series of lectures he gave in 1969 at
Queens University in Kingston, Ontario (MacLean, 1973b). There, his suggestion that
human neuroanatomy reflected the presence of three distinct, quasi-autonomous ancestral
brains garnered a degree of media attention that surprised even him (this being before
neuroscientists cornered the market on feeding sensationalist copy to science journalists).
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While MacLean thought that he had been at least partly misunderstood—he emphasized
the interdependence of the three sub-brains more than his audience of lay-scientists, who
seemed to have appeared overnight—he had unwittingly rediscovered what was, in fact, a
far older idea, one which an ambiguously post-recapitulationist psychology was only too
eager to seize upon and appropriate (Lambert, 2003, p. 34; MacLean, 1973b, p. 5;
MacLean, 1998, p. 265).
Before launching into a discussion of brain anatomy and experimental findings
(e.g., which regions of the squirrel monkey hypothalamus could be electrically stimulated
to produce a penile erection), MacLean (1973b) saw fit to frame his introduction to the
triune brain as a potential means of averting an otherwise inevitable Malthusian
catastrophe. While 1969 was no simple time, he was less concerned with social unrest
than the impending “population explosion,” “an alarming sign that the problems of
modern man are soaring at an unprecedented rate.” If current trends continued, he
warned, “the human population will squeeze itself to death by 2026” (MacLean, 1973b,
p. 6). Rather than agricultural exhaustion, however, in the ballooning postwar population
he saw the onset of increasingly hostile competitions over territory and space.
Lest one think this of little relevance to evolutionary neuroscience, MacLean
(1973b) pointed out that internecine turf battles fell under the jurisdiction of the oldest of
man’s three sub-brains, the ones “I refer to as reptilian, old mammalian, and new
mammalian” (p. 8). “Man’s oldest brain,” he explained, “is basically reptilian.” The basal
ganglia, which he elsewhere would refer to as the “R-complex,” is distinguished from the
neocortex (“neomammalian”) and the limbic system (“paleomammalian”) by virtue of its
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containing “only a rudimentary cortex” (MacLean, 1973b, p. 8).60 Comparative neuroethology and lesion studies showed the reptilian brain to be as primitive as its name
implied, preoccupied, as it was, with maintaining territory, engaging in repetitive
movements, and impassively annihilating any perceived sources of material competition.
At pains to emphasize the three-in-one quality of his neuroanatomical ménage à
trois, MacLean explained the reified relationship between primitive phylogeny and
human neuro-ontogeny with a timely metaphor. “In the popular language of today,” he
suggested,
these three brains might be thought of as biological computers, each with its own
peculiar form of subjectivity and its own intelligence, its own sense of time and
space and its own memory, motor, and other functions. On the basis of behavioral
observations of ethologists, there are indications that the reptilian brain
programmes stereotyped behaviors according to instructions based on ancestral
learning and ancestral memories (MacLean, 1973b, p. 8).61
While one does not normally endow computers (biological or not) with subjectivity,
MacLean’s concern was with emphasizing the apparently independent, but ultimately
interactive and mutually constitutive relationship between the three brains. Each of them
had its place in normal ontogeny; provided they communicated well—this being what he
believed unique about the neural nesting doll model—their interdependent collaboration
would give rise to smoothly functioning, embodied consciousness.
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The R-complex was never meant to refer to a precise brain location, but “a
group of large ganglia including the olfactostriatum, corpus striatum, globus pallidus, and
satellite gray matter” (MacLean, 1983a, p. 13; italics mine). See also MacLean (1982,
pp. 291-315).
61
Always in search of ways to temper the metaphoricity of his theory, MacLean
(1975/1993) elsewhere characterized the interactions of the three sub-brains as a kind of
literary division of labor: “one might imagine that the reptilian brain provides the basic
plots and actions; that the limbic brain influences emotionally the developments of the
plots; while the neomammalian brain has the capacity to expound the plots and emotions
in as many ways as there are authors” (p. 40).
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Of course, disruptions in the limbic (or paleomammalian) system might produce
anything from epilepsy to excessive emotionality. Disorders of the neocortical or
neomammalian brain could affect functions of speech, language, or other higher-order
tasks of reasoning. Yet what really worried MacLean was the possibility of an ascendant
reptile brain. More than the other two parties of the trinity—which were goal-oriented
and responsive to external stimuli—the R-complex was a slave to its compulsion to
repeat the past; “it seems to be hidebound by precedent” (MacLean, 1973b, p. 10). To be
fair, there was a place for such behavior in human development—MacLean (1973b)
suggested “ceremonial rituals, religious convictions, legal actions, and political
persuasions” as examples of socially beneficial reptilian actions (p. 10)—but problems
arose when such repetitive behaviors superseded higher-order functions.
On this point MacLean (1973b) saw fit to invoke an earlier generation’s theory of
repetitive actions. Reptilian “homing” behavior, he argued, was comparable to Freud’s
explanation of “man’s compulsion to repetition [sic]”: “Freud [viz., 1920/1961a] saw a
biological model for this in the ‘circuitous paths’ of recapitulation in ontogenetic
development, and in line with such thinking was led to the conclusion that ‘the goal of all
life is death,’ with the animate returning to the inanimate” (MacLean, 1973b, pp. 10-11).
No longer lurking in the shadows of Fechnerian psychophysics or psychic ontogeny,
Thanatos was now carved into the brainstem. However, MacLean didn’t waste much time
dissecting the death drive—and why would he? All those ontogenetic “circuitous paths”
betrayed no recapitulated autocidal tendencies, but pre-programmed instructions for the
most phylogenetically ancient brain to serve the ancestors for whose benefit it was
naturally selected in the first place. The death instincts really served the reptile brain.
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In case it seems as if I am unduly reading recapitulationism into the triune brain
theory, allow me to clarify: MacLean was far less concerned with drawing phasic
parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny than he was with showing the potential for
distinct phylogenetic acquisitions to take on varying levels of influence and control
within everyday brain function and behavior. Neuroanatomically, phylogeny was not so
much sequentially recapitulated as ever-present. “Nature,” he mused,
despite all her progressiveness, is also a staunch conservative and is more
tenacious than the curator of a museum in holding on to her antiques. The
reptilian and limbic brains have survived millions of years of evolution, and it is
evident that we can expect no overnight permutation that will remove them from
the brain of man. (MacLean, 1973b, p. 20)
Even if this bears little resemblance to Piagetian (let alone embryological, such as they
were) iterations of recapitulationism in the late sixties, it is in line with—and in fact
amplifies—the biogenetic law as Freud (1915/1957c) reformulated it, where in both
ontogenetic development and phylogenetic “advancement,” “succession also involves
coexistence” (p. 286).
Yet instead of Freud’s (1930/1961b, pp. 17-20) vision in Civilization and Its
Discontents of a Rome with its past and present structures equally intact, in the triune
brain MacLean (1973b) could see “a building to which wing and superstructure have
been added” (p. 8). That original structure, the foundation on which all future brains are
built in human ontogeny, made for a rather unbecoming Bauplan. For one, it had a habit
of placing mindless faith in charismatic frauds. One need only observe a wild turkey—a
close neuroanatomical ancestor of the ur-reptile, MacLean (1973b) explained—engaging
in “the copulatory act” after being “triggered by a mere phantom” to see “how often the
caricature of a leader such as a Hitler is sufficient to deceive people into thinking that
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they are following a true leader!” (p. 11). Here was the allure of fascism, biogenetically
reified in the triune brain: For the reptilian Es, the excitement of an atavistic shadow was
sufficient to lure the neomammalian subject into blind, carnal obedience.
What is more, as MacLean (1973b) speculated in a consideration of Konrad
Lornez’s ethological research, the reptile brain played a crucial role in the process of
behavioral “imprinting” within human ontogeny. Though he didn’t mention G. Stanley
Hall, his anxieties on this count centered on the same, preternaturally labile period of
ontogenetic recapitulation—namely, adolescence, with all its unbridled Sturm und
Drang:
I am among those who speculate that in human society the age of adolescence
may be a critical time for imprinting to occur with respect to the same or opposite
sex. At this age boys and girls have many features in common, and there is the
possibility that, in schools of one sex, imprinting at these times may be conducive
to a life of continued homosexuality. (MacLean, 1973b, p. 11).62
Apparently, the potential dominance of reptilian compulsiveness during adolescent
development—which MacLean (1973b) understood as an extension of imprinting
behavior—made the stage particularly susceptible to the interaction of “ancestral
memories” and blind “obeisance to precedent” (pp. 11, 10). As a climacteric period
within human neuro-ontogeny, brain development within adolescence amounted to a
phase of recapitulationary lability—or a “neural ladder, a visionary ladder” as he put it,
“for ascending from the most primitive sexual feeling,” which he associated with the Rcomplex, “to the highest level of altruistic sentiments,” the fruits of neomammalian
reason (MacLean, 1973b, p. 58).
62

MacLean (1973b) was skeptical of any sexual-revolutionary improvements on
this situation, judging it “doubtful … that such reasoning lies behind the co-educational
trend in our country where, in some universities, as you know, boys and girls are now
sharing the same dormitories” (p. 11n).
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In case one might think that the phylogenetically nested brains had no parallels in
sexual ontogeny, MacLean (1973b) again warned of the plasticity of the most
evolutionarily recent developmental stages. “It is possible,” he noted when comparing the
sexual proclivities of the paleomammalian and neomammalian brains, “that these large
evolving territories of the brain are incapable of being brought into full operation until the
hormonal changes of adolescence occur” (p. 58). Until the hormonal activation of more
altruistic sexuality in adolescence, one had only “primitive sexual feeling.” In other
words, the higher, more socially beneficial sexual functions associated with recent
phylogeny could only be activated according to their parallel ontogenetic phases. A child
might be born with the anatomical seeds of all three sub-brains, but the course of
development determined which of them dominated her behavior.
Despite all his research into the neuroanatomical relics of phylogeny, nothing so
worried MacLean as the thought of a resurgent reptile brain. For him, “reptilian
behavior” was always synonymous with “ancestral memories,” with the behavioral
phantoms of ancient phylogeny (MacLean, 1973b, p. 11). While he thought such
phylogenetic vestigia had their merits, applications of his evolutionary neuroanatomy
inevitably located the more unsavory side of human behavior squarely in the reptile brain.
And in this MacLean differed from Freud, whose “archaic inheritance” was supposedly
anchored in primate (and specifically hominid) pre-history.
As much as it contributed to necessary patterns of system regulation and routine,
the structure was simply not trustworthy. The same “proneness to imitation” that allowed
for the veneration of a false prophet like Hitler also explained “mass hysteria, mob
violence, and now, thanks to television, a world-wide adoption of fads and fashions.”
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According to triune Massenpsychologie, “the reptile brain behaves as though it were
neurosis-bound by an ancestral superego, lacking the adequate neural machinery for
learning to cope with new situations” (MacLean, 1973b, p. 12). Instead of learning
socially adaptive, potentially altruistic strategies, the reptilian superego was compelled to
imitate and repeat.
In MacLean’s (1973b) evolutionary neuroanatomy, the limbic system emerged as
an attempt to domesticate such savage automata; it amounted to “nature’s attempt to
provide the reptilian brain with a ‘thinking cap’ and to emancipate it from the ancestral
superego” (p. 12). Still, the fact remained that the reptilian brain was hopelessly prelinguistic (or “prosematic,” in trinitarian parlance), and neomammalian verbal reasoning
could only go so far in its efforts to harness the baser impulses of the R-complex.
This, in effect, made psychoanalysis a fool’s errand. In attempting to give voice to
an unconscious that was both ontogenetically and phylogenetically ancient, the analyst
was contending with “two ever-present animals which are conscious and wide awake, but
hopelessly inarticulate …. [The] neural machinery does not exist for the reptilian and
limbic brains to communicate in verbal terms” (MacLean, 1973b, p. 12). The problem, as
MacLean (1973b) saw it, was not one of individual psychopathology, but of “a
generalized world sickness.” For our ontogeny is at odds with our phylogeny, and “our
neocortex is all out of step with our reptile brains” (p. 18). Faced with a cast of
phylogenetic phantoms as strident as they were silent, MacLean believed that only
evolutionary neuroscience could provide what Hall (1885) had sought in education: “one
of the most effective bulwarks against a slow relapse to barbarism” (p. 151).
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While he usually concluded his neuroanatomical jeremiads on a note of cautious
optimism, the gist of MacLean’s biogenetic anxiety was in one sense little different than
that of John Hughlings Jackson, who first transferred the concept of reverse
recapitulation to neurology. For Hughlings Jackson, as Henri Ellenberger (1970)
summarized, the “more [phylogenetically] recent the centers” of the nervous system, then
“the more vulnerable they are, and when one of them is damaged, the activity of the older
centers increases” (p. 290; see also Harrington, 1991). The neomammalian brain was thus
a kind of perpetual adolescent—indeed, not unlike the adolescent of Hall’s (1904/1931)
best hopes and worst fears: Ontogenetically recapitulating a relatively recent addition to
phylogenesis, an inherent plasticity made the evolutionarily modern all the more
susceptible to atavistic regressions. Sub-brains out of harmony inevitably led to the
dominance of the older, reptilian centers. Yet for MacLean, the operative word here was
boundary (or barrier, liminal, limbic, and so on), always a reference to potential
disturbances in the mediation of ancient and modern evolutionary innovations, which
might be reconfigured at any point. Within the model of the triune brain (to paraphrase
Freud [1904/1965, pp. 354-355]), the boundary between the primitive and the modern is a
fluid one, and we are all a little reptilian.
Ever the neologist, MacLean (e.g., 1970) sometimes referred to his
phylogenetically divided brain morphology as “schizophysiology.” Under normal
conditions, conflicts between the competing demands of the three ontogenetically
manifested tiers of phylogeny were contained within the paleomammalian limbic system.
There, MacLean (1970) imagined the “impulses of the discharging neurons … as
stampeding bulls which do not jump the fence and leave the corral of the limbic system”
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(p. 135). But when the three “cerebrotypes” went out of alignment, the bulls broke
through the gates. One could then expect anything from epilepsy to psychosis, each the
product of an emotionally overwhelmed limbic mediator, unable to distinguish between
external (i.e., present) and internal (or ancient) stimuli.
Though a committed man of science, MacLean’s thought allowed for the
occasional atavistic reappearance of his childhood Presbyterianism. There was the “threein-one,” trinitarian language of the triune brain itself, of course (the obvious religiosity of
which he later claimed to regret), but he also published the occasional essay on religion
and science. The same year that his watershed talk at Queens University appeared in A
Triune Concept of the Brain and Behavior (1973b), he weighed in on the moral
dimensions of the previous decade’s student movements. In the disconnect between his
own generation’s social-scientific progressivism and the ascendant generation’s demand
“for a cultural tune-up,” he proposed “to call attention to another generation gap,” one
that “applies to the human brain” (MacLean, 1973a, p. 113).
This was no light-hearted analogy. MacLean saw the era’s anxieties about social
degeneration as already existing within the imperfect trinity of the phylogenetically
divided brain. Where a psychoanalyst might have rested comfortably on the assumption
that phyletic antiquity was (usually) safely housed within the unconscious, comparative
ethology and the emerging evolutionary neuroscience showed that reptilian vestigia
cannot “be relegated to the unconscious”; “in actuality they may be wide awake”
(MacLean, 1973a, pp. 123-124). Problems of social communication and understanding
were already inscribed in neuroanatomical heredity. Social upheaval was thus localized
within neural disconnects between phylogenetic inheritance and contemporary ontogeny.
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In such trying times, the old could no better understand the young than the neocortex
could give voice to the pre-linguistic R-complex.
Still, evolutionary neuroscience provided some reason for optimism. Comparative
neuro-ethology showed that the arc of phylogeny was bent toward “empathy” and
“altruism.” The fact that these words were of relatively recent coinage reflected the
gentler, more civilized functions of the newest (i.e., neomammalian) brain. Just like
psychopathology and “mob violence,” hope was in the head, and for “those weary
mortals looking for relief from the constant drone of dismal news about the state of the
world,” MacLean (1973a) could comfortably “suggest that they take up cerebral
astronomy and study the three great galaxies of the triune brain” (p. 126).
Ten years after his essay on the brain’s generation gap, MacLean’s faith in the
authority of the neomammalian brain was beginning to wane. While no triune apostate, a
study of the “Brain Roots of the Will-to-Power” found him admitting that “we, as
animals, seem to lack the safeguards, particularly in large groups, against a primitive
regression to the irrational and violent use of power” (MacLean, 1983b, p. 360). Despite
the capacity for empathy provided by the neocortex, recent experimental research showed
that “the R-complex may have a mind of its own” (p. 363).
While he still stopped short of endowing it with autonomous sentience, the
structure seemed to drive human behavior far more than MacLean had previously
believed. Indeed, his recent ethological research showed it capable of communicating,
albeit non-verbally: the “challenge display” of various lizards he saw reflected in “the
goose step of a military parade,” to cite one of several examples (MacLean, 1983b, p.
365).
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What is more, the neomammalian brain no longer seemed like the reliable
guarantor of rational behavior and social harmony that it had previously appeared to be.
Notwithstanding its capacity for language and reason, the “invention of the cortex made it
possible to accomplish what is often a prerequisite, namely, the ability to unlearn what
the species has learned to do over millions of years” (MacLean, 1983b, p. 369). This
censorship-through-forgetting, however, had its limits. Evolutionary neuroscience and
social engineering might bring society back in line with the generally progressive
phylogenetic trend (i.e., toward more empathy and altruism), but, as seen in the use of
“the Olympic Games [as] a leverage for terrorists,” the plasticity of the limbic and
neocortical brains was as well their vulnerability. The latter structures seemed to know
too little, to have too “few wired-in programs and none in particular for dealing with
large numbers of individuals” (MacLean, 1983b, pp. 369-370; see also Rosengart, 2016,
pp. 261-284). The reptilian brain, however, was imperishable.

Phylogenetic Regression and the Triune Brain: A Case Study
MacLean never quite gave up on his belief in the harmony of triune
neuroanatomical phylogeny and social progress. Not unlike Haeckel and Hall, his
evolutionary-psychological interpretations tended to emphasize recapitulationary
capacities for devolutionary regression, only to abruptly conclude with a reaffirmation of
faith in evolutionary progress. Nonetheless, the triune brain concept effectively shifted
the anxiety of bidirectional recapitulationism from psychic ontogenesis to a brain state in
ongoing evolution. Indeed, for those that detected the workings of the biogenetic law
within MacLean’s evolutionary brain morphology, the potential for reverse psychological
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recapitulation was plain to see. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter I provide a case
study of one of MacLean’s more outspoken enthusiasts. Representative of a more general
trend within evolutionary psychology and psychiatry, what follows amounts to a kind of
abridged reception history of the crypto-recapitulationist triune brain within psychiatry
and evolutionary psychology.
No sooner had Gould (1977) published his historical obituary of the biogenetic
law as previously conceived, than MacLean’s (e.g., 1973) crypto-recapitulationist theory
began to attract the attention of a new generation of evolutionary psychologists. Among
them was the psychoanalytically minded “paleopsychologist” Kent Bailey, who was
among the first to observe the specter of reverse recapitulationism lurking in the triune
brain. By Bailey’s (2017) account, his preliminary insights were validated by the source
himself: At a 1983 conference held in his honor, MacLean “averred that it made perfect
sense” “to speak of ‘regressing down the triune brain’ or ‘progressing up the triune
brain,’” particularly when it came to discussing matters of social unrest and
psychopathology (see also Bailey, 1987, p. xiv).
Bailey’s work, to which I devote the remainder of this chapter, amounts to one of
the more transparent—and the more tragic—applications of MacLean’s cryptorecapitulationist brain morphology. As this brief sample of late twentieth-century
invocations of the triune brain theory should make clear, the concept of recapitulationary
regressions within modern ontogeny continued to carry the same tragic anxiety that it had
for every recapitulationist since Haeckel.
Published a year before Sulloway’s (1979) Freud, Biologist of the Mind, Bailey’s
first foray into triune psychology appeared in his 1978 article, “The Concept of
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Phylogenetic Regression.” Tellingly, the essay opened with an epigraph from that fin de
siècle monument to devolution, H.G. Wells’s (1896) The Island of Dr. Moreau. But
Bailey’s (1978) concern was less with calling attention to biological degeneration than
with critiquing a certain disciplinary amnesia. Much like Sulloway (1979) (but to a rather
different end), Bailey (1978) chastised contemporary psychoanalysts for uncritically
“forgetting” their profession’s metapsychological and evolutionary origins. Against those
postwar analysts that wrote off instances of reverse biogenetic recapitulation as so many
“suggestive analogies,” Bailey (1978) endeavored to demonstrate that “all regression
probably involves a phylogenetic component, and, in certain cases, this component may
provide the overriding motive force in behavior” (p. 7).
Bailey’s (1978) piece, however, was no historical exposé. What Sulloway (1979)
had regarded as suppressed or forgotten recapitulationary dimensions of psychoanalytic
thought, Bailey saw as being in need of explicit revival. If anything, his extensive
summary of diffuse, then-contemporary nods to recapitulationary devolution was meant
to endorse what he argued was a viable, indeed necessary theory. While in this article his
use of MacLean’s theory was derived from secondary distillations, he nonetheless saw it
as a crucial corrective to insufficient social-psychological explanations of “man’s
inhumanity to man” (Bailey, 1978, p. 29).
Previous treatments of regressive behavior, he argued, had too narrowly focused
on ontogenetic material. Thus, a psychoanalyst might account for otherwise inexplicable
appearances of “primitive” behavior as regressions to an individual’s childhood conflicts.
Such explanations, however, could only get one so far. “What I suggest,” Bailey (1978)
offered, “is that regression is indeed developmental, but it reflects the interlocking of
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both phylogenetic and ontogenetic factors in the maturation of the individual” (p. 21).
There was something too impersonal, too archaic about the kinds of behaviors that Bailey
had in mind. “Simply speaking,” he explained, “some degree of phylogenetic regression
is involved in those instances where the more advanced, self-conscious, civilized,
neocortically-mediated motives and behavior yield to the archaic vestiges of millions of
years of evolution” (Bailey, 1978, p. 11; emphasis mine). Note, here, the language of the
cortical:

Personhood

and

its

unfolding

within

ontogeny

(“maturation”)

are

“schizophysiologically” oblivious to the true telos of regression. Both neuroanatomically
and experientially, regression recapitulated phylogeny in reverse. As the subject moved
down the neural ladder (or regressed down the triune brain), the content of the psyche
became less ontogenetic and more phylogenetic.
Not surprisingly, these regressions had all the hallmarks of MacLean’s Rcomplex. They variously involved “reduced inhibition,” “increased aggressiveness,”
“increased pleasure seeking,” “increased nonverbal communication” (recall the
“prosematic” quality of the reptile brain), “increased acceptance of authority,” and the
“elicitation of ‘fixed’ action patterns of behavior” (Bailey, 1978, pp. 12-17). What is
more, locating such behavioral trends in brain morphology meant that the past was
always available for atavistic activation. With phylogeny spatially and temporally
flattened within the brain, Haeckel’s “orderly repetition” now seemed like an
unpredictable admixture of the personal and the primitive. While not consciously
accessible, the vestiges of phylogeny were (as MacLean had earlier insisted) “wide
awake,” “and primitive emotional systems stand ready to gain precedence at a moment’s
notice” (Bailey, 1978, p. 20).
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Again, for Bailey no less than Freud, phylogenetic antiquity ultimately meant
dominance and authority. That the brain preserved phylogeny anatomically meant that “in
a matter of seconds, a culturally refined, cortically controlled individual can regress to the
emotionality characteristic of his evolutionary forebears, and at that moment he is little
different from them” (Bailey, 1978, p. 22). It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree
to which this reasoning made explicit what MacLean and previous cryptorecapitulationists had merely implied. Indeed, Bailey seems to have followed the
unwitting, neural reification of recapitulationism to its logical conclusion—namely, that
the ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogenetic progress was always subject to reversal.
“When regression occurs,” he explained, “the genetic process is reversed and the
individual returns to earlier, more primitive stages of the developmental sequence,
producing greater instinctive dominance as it goes” (Bailey, 1978, p. 22).
In addition to endowing the ontogenetically manifested phylogenetic past with a
kind of alien agency, one other feature of Bailey’s concept of phylogenetic regression
resembled that of previous generations. While MacLean had generally placed the
evolutionarily distinct sub-brains on equal footing, influence-wise, Bailey insisted that
the deck was stacked in favor of phylogenetic antiquity:
Not only does one regress to lower phylogenetic levels as well as progress to
higher ones, but descent, disintegration, dedifferentiation, decentralization, and so
forth, are more quickly and easily accomplished than ascent to the higher levels
which require oft-resisted excesses in the form of enculturalization, education,
and cortical programming. (Bailey, 1978, p. 24)
It wasn’t just that reaching and maintaining the “higher levels” was more labor-intensive
than descending to the lower ones. The latter were in fact stronger and more durable than
the former. With their inherent lability, evolutionary-psychological advancements always
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cast a tragic shadow. In this familiar light, the human individual “is neither devil nor
angel in any stable sense—it all depends on the neural dynamics operating at a given
moment” (Bailey, 1978, p. 30).
In his original essay Bailey (1978) had appealed to the triune brain to lend his
phylogenetic-regressive speculations a modicum of neuroscientific support. By the time
he published a book-length account of his theory, however, he had apparently given up
on making any secret of his indebtedness. Indeed, despite having had at a best a minimal
acquaintance with the man, he dedicated the more than five hundred pages of his Human
Paleopsychology (1987) to MacLean, whose theory he described as providing “the
conceptual basis of the ideas developed in this book” (p. 59).
Redirecting his remarks from psychoanalytic theory to evolutionary neuroscience
and psychology, Bailey (1987) supplemented his homage to MacLean with a nod to an
earlier theorist. The fact that the biogenetic law failed to bear out biologically, he
suggested,
is not to say that Haeckel’s theory is wrong in all respects. If recapitulation theory
has any explanatory power at all, it is likely to be in the realm of mind and not
morphology; whereas Haeckel’s zoology was fraught with complications and
exceptions, his psychology may rest on firmer conceptual ground. (Bailey, 1987,
p. 26)
So why, in light of all its multi-disciplinary refutations, would one go about reviving the
biogenetic law in this form? For the brain-enamored evolutionist, too much of human
behavior could not be explained in any other way. Indeed, the book’s subtitle—
Applications to Aggression and Pathological Processes—went some length to explaining
the appeal of the idea. His “phylogenetic regression-progression model,” as Bailey (1987)
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explained, “was specifically designed to address the causes of violence, psychopathology,
and the more general problem of human evil” (p. 29).
Here again, accounts of the tragic dimensions of human behavior and cultural
history seemed to demand reverse-recapitulationary explanations. Reified in the triune
brain, regression meant a change in the ratio of influence shared by contemporary and
phylogenetically primitive neural systems. No sooner does an imbalance between the
demands of the present and the compulsions of the past develop than “the imprisoned
beast breaks forth in dyscontrolled and uncivilized forms of behavior” (Bailey, 1987, p.
95). This would go some length, Bailey (1987) suggested, toward explaining the behavior
of America’s better known serial killers and mass shooters. In the case of Ted Bundy, for
instance, the “higher levels may be held guilty only in the negative sense; they did not
cause Bundy to kill, but failed to keep him from killing” (p. 346; see also Bailey, 1995;
Bailey, 2002, pp. 336-33). Ever available within the triune brain, phylogenetic regression
offered a suitably recapitulationary explanation for the atavistic reappearance of the
primitive within the modern.

In a sense, MacLean’s theory of the triune brain both repeated and amplified the
full ambivalence of all previous versions of psychological recapitulationism. Phylogeny,
while not recapitulated in ontogenetic phases, was spatially and hierarchically nested in
the brain. The individual’s experience might reflect phylogeny’s progressive
development (say, in the strengthening of family bonds or the advancement of socially
beneficial scientific research), or it might just as easily climb down the neural
evolutionary ladder, and pre-verbally reenact primitive, imitative behaviors en masse.
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And

yet

what

distinguished

this

neuroscientific

iteration

of

bidirectional

recapitulationism was not its pattern of anatomical reification—neurologists had been
putting the mind in the brain since at least the days of Gall and Spurzheim, after all—but
the manner by which it flattened or leveled all of phylogeny within any given ontogenetic
moment (cf. Harrington, 1987, 1991; see also Cooter, 1984).63 Instead of an
ontogenetically manifested Haeckelian Stammbaum, one had an organ with its own
phylogenetic, “neural ladder.” Here, the evolutionary past was not something one
overcame in the course of development, or which reared its head in moments of psychic
distress. It was anatomically omnipresent, with regression no more than a matter of
environmental activation.

63

One MacLean apologist, Steven Peterson (2002), carried neuroscientific
reification to an almost mystical level, proposing that the process of reification was itself
a brain state.
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CONCLUSION

Around the time that MacLean’s neuroscientific recapitulationism was at the
height of its popularity, the Renaissance historian William Bouwsma (1984, 1988)
suggested a reappraisal of an apparently unrelated strand of intellectual history. To the
consternation of theologians as well as historians, in his psychobiographical take on
Reformed thought Bouwsma (1984) used the affective registers of Calvinism as a kind of
Ariadne’s thread, one that ultimately led to “an interpretation of Calvin as an anxious
human being” (p. 256). While, as Bouwsma observed, Calvin’s thought seemed meant to
serve a singular and consistent function—“to dissolve rather than to express anxiety”—it
was only partially successful. In the end, he argued, “Calvinism succeeded
simultaneously in dissolving, expressing, and intensifying anxiety” (Bouwsma, 1984, p.
256; see also Essary, 2017). Even aside from questions of soteriology, Calvin’s thought
seemed to offer assurance, only to elaborate anxiety. In all of its forms, the entire
theological system seemed cathected, as it were, with a kind of lapsarian angst.
However unrelated its scientific claims, from the late nineteenth century to the
present psychological recapitulationism has served a function similar to the one
Bouwsma observed in sixteenth-century Calvinism. Prior to its reformulation by Haeckel,
various forms of biogenetic parallelism (not least Darwin’s) were treated as signs and
assurances of evolutionary progress. As seen most clearly in the embryo, natural history
progressed by adding newly selected traits on top of old ones. In the recapitulation of its
phylogeny, human development demonstrated a progressive ascent, one in which both
civil society and civilized psychology emerged as improvements upon a more animalistic
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past. Initially, Haeckel’s promotion of Darwinism in Germany echoed this approach to
human evolution and psychology. Yet by the time he introduced his newly systematized
recapitulationism in the form of the biogenetic law, personal tragedy had already begun
to undermine the progressivism that prior evolutionary theories had presupposed. In
Haeckel’s system, individual experience was ineluctably tragic; its only value consisted
in its demonstration of phylogenetic progress as a whole.
Early psychological applications of “Haeckel’s law” evinced a similar
ambivalence. While manifestly a sign of social progress, recapitulation in both Hall and
Baldwin’s developmental theory ultimately called attention to the precariousness of
sanity. Thus, Haeckel’s “brief and speedy recapitulation of phylogeny” was as well a
demonstration of humanity’s unwavering potential to mount “a slow relapse to
barbarism” (Hall, 1885, p. 151). In the hands of Hall and other fin de siècle
recapitulationists, both the child and the adolescent came to function as bellwethers for
broader anxieties of devolution and decline.
While in many ways a progress-minded child of the Enlightenment, Freud’s
(1920/1961a) introduction of the death drive ultimately gave center stage to these very
anxieties. No longer was devolution merely the implicit shadow of evolution. Rather, as
he argued in Beyond, recapitulation showed that “the aim of all life is death” (Freud,
1920/1961a, p. 46). Phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically, progress was only a
series of detours, distracting the species as well as the specimen from the inexorable
march toward its own undoing. In this light, Freud’s unwavering commitment to
psychological recapitulationism seems less outmoded than it appeared to his postwar
epigones.
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While the biogenetic law had begun to fall out of favor among biologists well
before Freud reversed it, the idea maintained a consistent appeal among those attempting
to reconcile modern psychology with natural history. This continuity was most apparent
(and has been least understood) among neuroscientists and evolutionary psychologists
inspired by MacLean’s triune brain theory. By “localizing” the devolutionary tendency of
ontogeny’s recapitulation of phylogeny in the brain, neuroscience-minded evolutionists
effectively flattened the directionality of previous versions of recapitulationism. Much as
Freud had feared, in the “reptile brain” the unseemly legacy of primitivity remained as
“imperishable” as ever.
In offering a new interpretation of the history of psychological recapitulationism,
I suspect, to revise Gould’s (1977) introduction in Ontogeny and Phylogeny, that I treat a
subject currently popular (p. 1). Thanks to the accumulation of insights from evolutionary
developmental biology (or evo-devo) that began in the early nineteen-eighties, a species
of biogenetic parallelism has regained a modicum of respectability among twenty-firstcentury evolutionists (Wray, 2009; see also Hall, 1992; Laubichler & Maienschein,
2007). Yet as should by now be clear, this study has generally refrained from weighing in
on the value of recapitulationism as an explanatory model within contemporary social
and evolutionary psychology. I have neither provided nor recommended an update to this
mostly dead idea. No doubt this is among the chief limitations of the narrative undertaken
here—that it stops short of connecting past iterations of recapitulationism with their more
viable living descendants among psychobiological theory.64
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In addition to the previously discussed arguments of Sulloway (1979) and
Gould (1977), an alternative interpretation of the legacy or “afterlife” of
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Of course, for the recapitulationists discussed in this dissertation, “viability” was
always a matter of ambivalence, of the inherently ambiguous nature of development and
progress. In a sense, the principle of biogenetic recapitulation has itself become a
recurring atavism. Many times written off as an intellectual fossil, a relic unfit to survive
scientific selection, it has reemerged just when its irrelevance has been most vigorously
asserted. Against all biological evidence, psycho-recapitulationists seem to cling to the
idea with an anxiety unmatched in other fields.
And so rather than show that there is, after all, some truth to the biogenetic law—
that there is some sense in which recapitulation is psychologically real—we should ask:
what does it mean when a theory based on the veneration of the fossil becomes one?
Fossils, which have a way of outliving their paleontologists, often prove more durable
than that which they record, and the fact of their existence exceeds the content of their
testimony. At the last say, we may have to be content to acknowledge the dominance of
the affective and aesthetic valences of our theories. For at least within psychology, our
notions of progress and development are as well warnings of devolution and regress—
and that no less than our minds, our theories contain multitudes, all of them equally
imperishable.

recapitulationism within developmental psychology may be found in Morss (1990, pp.
227-234).
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